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Pay and Grade Differentials at the World Bank

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At the World Bank, only about half of salary and grade differentials between men and women and between staff from high- and low-income countries are attributable to differences in worker characteristics. Neither omitted-variable bias nor quotas imposed to ensure diversity are compelling explanations for remaining differentials in salary and grade. Discrimination is likely to explain some of the remainder.



Summary findings

Large international organizations such as the World Bank pursue many objectives in hiring policies, including reduced costs, cultural diversity, and the avoidance of discrimination.

There can be sharp tradeoffs between these objectives. Diversity is enhanced by recruiting from an international labor market, for example, but international organizations face unusually large differences in reservation wages for staff capable of doing the same work.

One way to reduce costs would be to pay employees their reservation wages, which implies unequal pay for equal work, or discrimination.

Filmer, Grosh, King, and van de Walle show how these tradeoffs are resolved in the World Bank's hiring processes. They estimate disparities in salary and grades between men and women and by country of origin that cannot be attributed to differences in the productive characteristics of workers.

The results indicate that about half the salary and grade differentials between men and women and staff

from high- and low-income countries are attributable to differences in worker characteristics.

They explore a number of alternative explanations for the rest of the salary and grade differentials, including omitted-variable bias, quotas imposed to ensure diversity, and discrimination in hiring and promoting.

They argue that neither omitted-variable bias nor quotas are compelling explanations for disparities and that discrimination probably exists, although certainly less than would be implied by a cost-minimizing hiring policy.

A shift seems to be occurring in the hiring process at the Bank, possibly because (1) the application pool, including women and Part II nationals (from developing countries) has significantly improved in quality, (2) information gathering during hiring has intensified, decreasing guesswork, (3) there is more incentive to staff from minority groups, and (4) the Bank's increasing diversity in terms of gender and nationality groups is more conducive to high performance by the people against whom there may previously have been bias.

This paper — a product of the Development Research Group — is part of a larger effort in the group to apply economic analysis to policy issues. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Cynthia Bernardo, room MC2-501, telephone 202-473-1148, fax 202-522-1154, Internet address cbernardo@worldbank.org. April 1998. (72 pages)

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Pay and Grade Differentials at the World Bank

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****** The authors, listed in alphabetical order, are all of the World Bank's Development Research Group in Development Economics. The paper originated as a request to the Development Research Group to examine the patterns of pay and grade of staff at the Bank, focusing on differences between men and women, and to assess the presence of any gender bias. For their help, the authors thank Berk Ozler, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Dan Levy, Thomas Hastings, Selina Khan, Susheela Jonnakuty and Rajeev Jain (HRSIS) who kindly assisted in preparing the database. They also thank colleagues and seminar participants for excellent comments on earlier versions.

A. Introduction

The World Bank has multiple objectives in its hiring policies. On the one hand (like other companies and organizations), it wants to cut costs where possible. But it also pursues a number of other, potentially conflicting, objectives as an employer:

1. A preference for cultural diversity. The World Bank's charter has long championed a composition of employees that broadly reflects the composition of country membership.¹ In more recent times, this preference has expanded to include sensitivity to the gender balance across nationalities. The flip side of cultural diversity goals is the likelihood of systematic differences in the characteristics of workers which may, in turn, explain salary and grade differences. There are far fewer PhDs from developing countries. It is harder to hire women from countries which have not traditionally encouraged women to work outside the home, or to induce them to move to Washington. Language and communication skills vary across individuals for whom English is not the primary language.

2. An international labor market. Most firms hire locally or, at best, nationally. Due in part to its aim for diversity, the Bank faces a much larger labor market in which supply prices vary enormously. The labor pool it confronts is one aggregated across diverse and only weakly integrated national labor markets across the world. Wages for the same labor differ among these national labor markets. So the Bank faces unusually large differences in reservation wages for

¹ Assuming diversity can be measured through the mix of nationalities, the Bank has done well. As of May 1997, 129 nationalities were represented at levels 18 and higher (para-professional and professional grades), and 177, over all staff. However, the passport one holds does not necessarily reflect one's experience.

staff capable of performing the same duties.² Yet the Bank, like other employers, seeks to reduce its labor costs. In principle, one way to do this would be to pay potential employees their reservation wage. This could well result in substantial discrimination, defined as different wages for workers with the same productivity.

3. A desire to avoid discrimination. The World Bank, in common with many employers, wants to avoid discrimination or, at any rate, the appearance of discrimination. This works to relieve the worst effects of facing world labor markets with skewed wage distributions for similar workers. It would not be politically feasible to minimize costs. This problem is common to many local firms not least because of the ramifications of not complying with the law. But in the particular case of the World Bank, this further entails an implicit desire not to simply mirror the (large) differences in wages for the same labor in the world at large. The Bank's personnel department takes an active role—and one that has become more aggressive in recent years—in trying to ensure that the Bank meet its mandate of achieving staff diversity, while also treating hires equitably. A conscious effort has been made through, for example, greater centralization of recruitment decisions and close monitoring to reduce horizontal inequity.

4. A dual recruitment structure. There are two main ways in which staff are recruited to the World Bank. Around 20 percent of current staff started out as Young Professionals (YP). The program, which sets an age limit and starts all recruits at the same initial level, is designed to

² There are other reasons besides labor market segmentation associated with restricted labor mobility internationally. Some potential hires are educated elites who are quite desperate to flee bad economic or political situations at home, or simply to improve their work environments and bring up their children with more opportunities, and so are willing, in order to ensure employment, to accept lower pay than counterparts who are already settled in the U.S. Others may have much reduced bargaining power because of the necessity of having visas renewed in order to stay in the U.S. As is often noted, married women's bargaining power is also reduced as they frequently face lower mobility and choose work conditional on a husband's work location (for example, see Hersch and Viscusi 1996). U.S. men (say) who face none of these constraints are likely to have much higher bargaining power.

recruit a young cadre of professionals who have a little work experience and recent academic qualifications. In general, YP recruits undergo a more uniform and rigorous interview and selection process than other recruits. The applicant pool is also far larger relative to the number of positions being filled than for other job openings. For this reason, YPs can be expected to be a relatively homogeneous group in terms of characteristics such as technical ability and communications skills. Non-YP recruitments follow a number of less formal routes, which tend also to be less controlled by Personnel or by concerns of the greater good of the institution at large. Some come in through open recruitment, while others are directly identified and hired by managers. The difference between the YP recruitment process and the less regulated process for the rest of the staff hired provides an interesting comparison for tests of discrimination.

Without the third feature, and possibly the fourth, it would not be surprising to find large disparities in salaries between men and women, and by country of origin, at the World Bank—disparities which cannot be attributed to differences in the characteristics of workers. The interesting question here is how far the third and fourth features of World Bank hiring processes are able to reduce such disparities. That is the main question addressed by this paper.

We classify staff by gender and by whether they come from a Part I or Part II member country of the Bank.³ The data cover *all* regular and fixed-term staff in the professional (non-support) grades who were on active duty as of May 23, 1997.⁴ The data do not include full pay

³ Data on staff members' pay, grade, and characteristics were prepared by Human Resource Services Department (Personnel) from its staff files. Part I member countries are considered "developed" and are no longer entitled to borrow from the Bank. In general, Part I countries consists of OECD countries. Part II member countries are considered "developing" and are therefore entitled to borrow.

⁴ Staff in grades 22 to 30 are included. Note that some staff in these grades entered at lower grades. In particular, those who entered the World Bank through the Young Professionals Program enter at grade 21. In addition, some entered at non-professional levels. The total number of regular staff in grades 22-30 was 3,003 as of the date the data were extracted from the records.

and promotion histories, but do include both entry and current levels, so that average annual growth in salaries and grades over time can be measured.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for salaries, indexed to be 100 for Part I men. All underlying salaries are net of taxes and expressed in 1990 US dollars.⁵ The ranking from highest average salary to lowest is Part I men, Part II men, Part I women, then Part II women. Current average salary for Part II men is 95 percent of that for Part I men; for Part I women, it is 87 percent; and for Part II women, 82 percent. The same rankings are revealed for pay at entry, but with even larger quantitative differences. Some catch-up in relative terms is thus indicated. This especially favors Part II men relative to Part I men. Annual salary growth rates are on average a little higher for women (3.8 percent versus 3.2 and 3.3 percent for Part I and Part II men, respectively). Table 1 also shows mean tenure for the four staff groups. The slightly lower mean years of employment duration of women (10.7 for Part I and 11.2 for Part II women against 11.9 and 12.5 for Part I and II men respectively) probably reflects the Bank's active efforts at female recruitment in recent years. In May 1997, Part I men accounted for 45 percent of all staff in levels 22-30; Part II men, for 29 percent, Part I women, 18 percent, and Part II women, 8 percent.

A pattern similar to that for salaries is found for the distribution of staff groups across grades. Table 2 shows the summary statistics, while Figure 1 graphs the distribution of each staff group. Women are in general recruited at lower grades than men, and Part II staff at lower grades than Part I staff. Figure 1 shows clearly that the grade distribution of men is skewed

⁵ According to the international tax treaties that pertain to World Bank employment, non-U.S. citizens are exempt from U.S. income taxes, but U.S. citizens are not. To maintain comparability among employee groups, all regular staff are paid salaries net of taxes, with U.S. citizens being given a separate tax allowance.

towards the higher grades relative to the grade distribution of women, even though the average duration of employment tends to be similar across groups.

What accounts for these disparities? Should they be a source of concern? The disparities in pay and grade documented above are unadjusted for differences in observed individual characteristics, such as length of Bank employment, highest education degree, and area of specialization. Clearly, differing values of such characteristics will be rewarded differently. If individual characteristics that matter to productivity systematically differ across groups, then that could explain the differences in salary and grade. But, perhaps they don't. We may in fact be seeing the effect of underlying differences in the returns to the characteristics of the four groups. The analysis that follows examines the sources of these disparities.

These issues are clearly of concern to the World Bank. But the Bank's experience is of wider interest from a number of points of view. It is of general interest to see how the evolving objectives of this large international organization facing a global labor market influence the way in which its internal labor market functions; armed with data covering a long enough period, we are able to throw light on the effects on wage differentials of the Bank's changes in hiring policies, with potential implications for other large organizations. Another aspect of the Bank's experience which is of wider interest is the institution's unusual dual entry system, with differing possibilities for discrimination between the two streams of recruits. The structure of the internal hiring process at the Bank allows us to implement a novel test for omitted variable bias—a common problem in past empirical research on wage differentials.⁶

⁶ Recent discussions in the literature include Jones and Makepeace (1996) and Berger (1995).

Below we first discuss our empirical models. We then present our findings on the decomposition of salary and grade differentials—including at entry, current and in growth over time—across staff groups. A number of alternative assumptions and samples are tested in order to gauge robustness of the results, as well as to better understand them. A final section interprets the results and discusses their implications for Bank policy and practice on hiring and promotion.

B. Models and Decompositions

We use an approach standard in the literature on labor economics.⁷

Models

The reduced-form model for the log of current salary (W_{ij}) for the i^{th} staff member in the j^{th} group can be written as:

$$(1) \quad \ln W_{ij} = X_{ij}\alpha_j + e_{ij},$$

where X_{ij} is a vector of individual characteristics—including age, nationality, education, area of specialization, work experience prior to Bank employment and duration of employment in the Bank. The corresponding parameters are α_j , while e_{ij} is a zero mean error term uncorrelated with X_{ij} . The estimated coefficients are used to calculate predicted salaries for the four groups as well as predicted salaries based on the measured characteristics of one group and the parameters of another and vice versa. These predicted values are next used to decompose the differentials in

⁷ The approach is originally due to Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). A previous study of the World Bank by Oaxaca and Ransom (1993) uses the methodology to explore current salary differentials and promotion rates for staff on board in 1988 and 1992. The present study expands the analysis to examine entry level salaries, growth in pay, current and entry grade and the rate of promotions. It has access to somewhat richer data and the more recent data also allows an exploration of the effects of recent hiring policies on gender and nationality differentials.

mean salaries across groups into three component parts. For example, the salary differential between Part I men (subscripted by m1) and women (f1) is expressed as:

$$(2) \quad \ln W^*_{m1} - \ln W^*_{f1} = \underbrace{\hat{\alpha}_{m1}(X^*_{m1} - X^*_{f1})}_{\text{[Characteristics]}} + \underbrace{X^*_{f1}(\hat{\alpha}_{m1} - \hat{\alpha}_{f1})}_{\text{[Structure]}}$$

[Total difference]

where the $\ln W^*$ s and X^* s represent the predicted mean (log) current salaries and the mean characteristics of the respective groups.⁸ This is simply an identity derived from the original regression model. The first component is the salary differential attributable to differences in the observed characteristics of the groups. The second is that attributable to between-group differences in the returns to given individual characteristics; it is in effect, the extra income Part I women would expect to get if Part I men's parameters were used to value Part I women's characteristics. The latter is usually referred to as the difference due to "structure".

If the underlying model is correctly specified, then structure is interpretable as discrimination relative to what Part I men are currently paid. If the model is incorrectly specified—for example if there are omitted variables correlated with gender—then the structure component could also pick up the effects of misspecification. To the extent that there are important omitted variables, the coefficient estimates will be biased. If the biases are small or about equal between staff groups, this would not be problematic as they would cancel out. In general, as will be evident below, our models predict current salaries and growth in pay quite well, though biases in the underlying parameter estimates of the decompositions due to omitted variables or endogeneity can never be ruled out conclusively.

⁸ This is often referred to as the Oaxaca decomposition. Blinder (1973) proposed essentially the same technique simultaneously to Oaxaca (1973).

In the example above, we used Part I men as the reference wage structure against which discrimination is measured. Why Part I men? As has been pointed out by Neumark (1988), the appropriate reference should depend on the underlying nature of discrimination. This is not known or discernible from the data. One argument for choosing Part I men is that, in the absence of discrimination, the Part I male wage structure would prevail. We do not, of course, know what the wage structure would be like in a different, no-discrimination, situation. However, given that Part I men have historically dominated the World Bank staff and that they remain the largest staff group (accounting for 45 percent), it might be argued that this reference is the most defensible. It is the main reference group we will use throughout the analysis. We test the sensitivity of the decomposition results to this assumption by also using the coefficients from a pooled regression model as the reference wage structure, as suggested by Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).⁹ The decomposition given in equation (2) then takes the form:

$$(3) \quad \ln W^*_{ml} - \ln W^*_{fl} = \underbrace{\hat{\alpha}(X^*_{ml} - X^*_{fl})}_{[\text{Total difference}]} + \underbrace{[X^*_{ml}(\hat{\alpha}_{ml} - \hat{\alpha}) - X^*_{fl}(\hat{\alpha}_{fl} - \hat{\alpha})]}_{[\text{Structure}]},$$

[Characteristics]
[Structure]

where the $\hat{\alpha}$'s are the coefficients obtained from the pooled regression and represent the non-discriminatory wage structure.

We also examine the differences in initial salary and differences in growth in pay since entry. The equation for annual salary growth is:

⁹ Alternatively we could use a population weighted combination of the parameters for each sub-group as the reference as in Cotton (1988). As Oaxaca and Ransom (1988) discuss, the pooled model doesn't constrain the wage structure parameters to lie within the range of the existing structures as does the Cotton method. Oaxaca and Ransom see this as an advantage of the pooled model. The pooled model will also give lower standard errors for the weighted coefficients. Finally, a problem arises in implementing the Cotton method when there are non-overlapping characteristics across groups. For example, in the present case we include certain important nationalities—such as US—as controls in

$$(4) \quad r_{ij} = X_{ij}\gamma_j + v_{ij}$$

where r_{ij} is the average annual rate of growth of salary for individual i in group j (given by $(W/W_0)^{1/t} - 1$, where t is tenure, W is current salary and W_0 is the initial salary, and all are indexed to the individual and group). As before, X is a vector of characteristics that are thought to affect salary at the time of entry and over time, and v is a zero mean innovation error. Similarly to equation (2) above, we then decompose the differences in average salary growth for pairs of groups. For example, for the decomposition between Part I men and Part I women, we calculate:

$$(5) \quad \underset{\text{[Total difference]}}{r^*_{m1} - r^*_{f1}} = \underset{\text{[Characteristics]}}{\widehat{\gamma}_{m1}(X^*_{m1} - X^*_{f1})} + \underset{\text{[Structure]}}{X^*_{f1}(\widehat{\gamma}_{m1} - \widehat{\gamma}_{f1})},$$

where the $\widehat{\gamma}$'s are the coefficients from the estimated equations; and (as before) the “*”s denote mean values.

The identity giving the growth rate as a function of current wage, entry wage and tenure allows us to back out entry salary predictions and their decompositions.¹⁰ For example, the predicted log of entry salary for a given group (such as Part II women if they had the parameters of Part I men) is given by the mean (log) current salary of that group minus the mean for that group of $t \ln(1 + r^e)$ where t is tenure and r^e is the predicted growth rate of each individual in that group. Once the predicted log entry salary has been calculated for all groups (including for all combinations of characteristics and parameters), then the decompositions can be derived as before.

the regressions. But, clearly, there are no US nationals in the Part II groups. In principle this means that there are unobserved coefficients and it is unclear what to do in taking weighted averages.

¹⁰ Alternatively, we could run an initial salary regression. However, as we explain shortly, pre-entry and at time of entry information is sparse.

We repeat the above analysis for current grade, grade at entry, and rate of promotion.

Except for the dependent variable, the model specifications and decompositions are the same and so need not be repeated.

An issue we are unable to deal with because of lack of data is sample selection bias.¹¹

This bias could potentially come from two sources. The universe of staff who are currently active is the result of hiring choices and staff attrition. To assess the existence and extent of bias in pay and grade levels and promotion, it would be necessary to examine time series data. Full histories for the staff who are currently employed at the Bank are not sufficient, because they leave out others who have already left the Bank. Although potentially a problem, we think that it is not a major one: attrition tends to be low. For example, excluding the last three years, attrition at the Bank has been around 3 percent per year.

Variables

This section summarizes the variables used in the analysis and described more fully in Appendix Table 1. The variables comprising X are dummy variables for the year of entry to Bank employment (this captures tenure as well as any circumstances specific to the year of appointment), age at entry (entered in linear and squared forms), dummies for maximum completed level of education (doctorate, masters and bachelors degrees), dummies that interact the education degree with its country of location and discipline, dummies for the university where economics PhDs were obtained, number of years of work experience prior to joining the World Bank, current marital status, dummy variables for current nationality, and current

¹¹ This bias might affect both the salary and grade analysis.

affiliation within the Bank (operations; central vice-presidential units related to research, knowledge management and dissemination; or others, primarily support units such as accounting, personnel, and finance).¹²

Several additional factors that are thought to influence salary and promotion are not available to us. For example, while data on pay, grade, and departmental affiliation are routinely updated in computerized files, updated information on education completed, in-Bank and other training, language skills and so on, are self-reported and so contain gaps and are difficult to verify. Further, qualitative information about performance and annual performance merit ratings are strictly confidential and not available to us.

Omitted variables also include pre-entry or time-of-entry information. For example, we are not able to control for nationality and marital status at entry or for the first hiring unit within the Bank. For some individuals these attributes will have remained fixed, for others they will have changed. The data on pre-Bank work experience are also limited. The length and nature of one's previous work experience as well as previous salary are probably good indicators of one's alternative labor market. Although, as mentioned, we include years of previous work experience in our regressions, we do not have data on salary or location for the previous work. Oaxaca and Ransom (1993), who had data on the location of previous work experience, found only a marginally significant salary effect of experience outside the U.S. for Part I men (1.8 percent) and of multi-country experience only for Part II men (2.5 percent). Their finding would suggest that previous experience does not count for much in Bank initial salaries. Hence, it is probably

¹² Our only indication of pre-Bank work experience is in the time elapsed between the completion of a staff member's last degree and his or her start date at the World Bank. Because some staff finalize their degree after joining our variable for pre-Bank work experience is sometimes negative. A dummy

true that the farther away the origin of a job applicant is from Washington, DC, the more imperfect the information about the alternative labor market for a potential hire. As will become apparent below, we find that this imperfect information and possibly stereotypical assumptions about the alternative labor markets of particular groups of staff are a crucial part of the story about the patterns of entry salary and grade differentials at the Bank.

Salary growth is presumably the result of staff performance over time. Yet the size of the annual increase associated with the performance rating is well-structured, having a predetermined ceiling each year. Variation in performance is presumably predicted in part by characteristics already observed at entry and in part by those unobserved at entry (not closely correlated with observed characteristics) which become apparent to managers with time. Performance is also affected by internal job choices made by staff throughout their employment. The willingness and ability to travel for many months each year, to learn and master a new language quickly, or to manage a difficult or politically sensitive task are examples of these choices. It is also affected by the willingness of managers to give more responsibility and more rewarding assignments to certain staff. Lastly, the proportion of time spent in operational (lending) versus non-operational (e.g., personnel, accounting, research) jobs can affect one's long-term career at the World Bank. We do not have a history on these choices, but we do include variables on current job affiliation within the Bank.

variable captures this. We have singled out certain nationalities that consistently appear to be different in their effect and which each make up at least one percent of total staff.

C. Results

Current Salary

The decomposition results of predicted current salaries using the wage structure of Part I men as the reference are given in Table 3. The total difference in salary is given in the first column, followed by the component explained by characteristics and that attributable to structure. Standard errors for each of the two components are given below in parentheses. The underlying regressions are given in Appendix Table 2. Between 43 and 59 percent of the variation in the logs of current salaries is explained by the model, with the regressions for men having higher explanatory power than those for women. An F-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the regression coefficients are the same across the four staff groups.

Among Part I staff, women are paid 14.2 percent less than men. Of this difference, 8.6 percentage points are explained by women having different characteristics than men, but the remaining 5.6 percentage points (or 39 percent) are attributable to structure i.e., the same characteristics being valued differently for men and women. Controlling for Part II origin, women's salaries are still 14.3 percent less than men's, with 6.9 percentage points (48 percent) of this gap being due to structure rather than to characteristics. Controlling for gender, Part II men are paid 5.0 percent less than Part I men, of which 3.9 percentage points (78 percent) are due to structure; and Part II women are paid 5.1 percent less than Part I women, all of which is due to structure. The largest between-group difference is that between Part II women and Part I men—Part II women are paid 19.3 percent less on average than Part I men, with 10.6 percentage points (53 percent) being due to structure, not characteristics.

How do these results differ when we use the alternative pooled model coefficients as the reference wage structure? (The pooled regression model results are given in the last column of

Appendix Table 2). As can be seen also in Table 3, the portion of the difference in current salaries that is attributed to structure tends to be smaller under the alternative reference, though the differences are not large. For example, the largest change is that for the decomposition between Part I and Part II women. The previous unexplained difference of 5.1 percent declines to 2.5 percent. In one case—that comparing Part II men and Part I women—the unexplained component rises, from 1.7 to 2.5 percent.

Our current salary model controls for more variables than the one estimated by Oaxaca and Ransom (1993) for the World Bank in 1992. To check the consistency of our findings with theirs and to calculate any shift in salary patterns, we also estimated a simpler model that matches theirs closely. The results from this simpler model differ little from those presented here and are thus not reported. They suggest that total differences relative to Part I men have declined somewhat since 1992, and more so for women than for Part II men. But more importantly, the differences that cannot be explained by individual characteristics and thus are attributed to structure, have dropped considerably for women, especially from Part I countries, and slightly for Part II men. The difference due to structure relative to Part I men decreased by 43 percent for Part I women, by 28 percent for Part II women, and by 10 percent for Part II men.

Entry Salary and Growth in Pay

Between-group differences in salaries at entry are larger than in the case of current salaries, but follow the same overall pattern (Table 4). The results indicate that 8.7 percentage points of the 17 percent difference between the initial salaries of Part I men and women are attributable not to differences in observed characteristics for women but to structure. Similarly, had individual characteristics been valued in the same way for Part II women as for Part II men,

Part II women's starting salaries would have been, on average, 7.7 percent higher. The highest total, and unexplained, differences at 25 and 15 percent, respectively, are again between Part I men and Part II women. Comparing these results to those obtained when we use the pooled sample coefficients to weight the differences, we find again that the differences attributable to structure are generally reduced (Table 4). There is again one exception: the decomposition for Part II men versus Part I women gives a larger unexplained component under the pooled regression coefficients (3.7 versus 1.8 %).

Appendix Table 3 gives the regressions for annual growth in salaries. The explanatory power of the models is also high with from 55 to 69 percent of the variation explained. The variables controlled for are the same as in the current salary regression. The relatively high explanatory power of these models indicates that many of the factors that matter to annual increases in salaries are being captured despite the fact that we have been unable to include measures of actual performance. Interestingly, the year of entry dummies suggest that the salary boom of the 1980s was mainly enjoyed by men, but that the salary repression of the 1990s was shared by all.

Table 5 shows the decompositions of the differences in annual raises between groups. Overall, very small differences are observed. The negative signs mean that the raises are smaller for the first named group than for the second. For example, the average rate of annual salary growth is higher for Part II men than for Part I men in the first between-group comparison. These results suggest that some "catching up" occurs for those receiving lower entry salaries. The magnitude of this catch up, however, is quite small; for example, just 0.6 percent annually

for Part I women relative to Part I men, of which 0.2 percentage points is due to structure.¹³

Because of the meager differences in salary growth across the groups, between-group differences in entry salaries continue to dominate the patterns in current salaries, even in a sample with a mean tenure of 12 years. The same conclusions hold if we use the pooled regression model coefficients as reference instead (Table 5).

Current Grade

Current grade regressions are presented in Appendix Table 4. The explanatory power of the model varies from 30 percent for Part I women to 43 percent for Part II men. As with the salary regressions, the model controls for age and date of entry, level of education, dummy variables that interact the level of education with its location and discipline, universities where economics PhDs were obtained, years of work experience prior to joining the World Bank, marital status, dummy variables for nationality, and internal group affiliation.

Table 6 reports on the between-group grade differential decompositions. Controlling for Part I origin, women are 0.7 of a grade lower than men, on average; 0.2 (28 percent) of this gap is attributable to structure. Controlling for Part II origin, women are 0.7 of a grade lower, with 0.3 (43 percent) of this difference being due to structure. Controlling for gender, Part I and Part II men are 0.2 of a grade apart, while Part I and Part II women are 0.3 of a grade apart, with these gaps being almost entirely unexplained by observed characteristics. Similarly to what was found for salaries, the greatest difference is observed between Part I men and Part II women. The gap is close to a full grade. About half of this difference is attributable to characteristics being valued

¹³ We note that part or all of this catch-up is built into the structure of annual salary increases which stipulates that of staff who perform at the same level of satisfaction, those in lower salary levels get a

differently for men and women, meaning that Part II women with identical observed characteristics to Part I men are on average employed at approximately half a grade lower. Table 6 also presents the results using the pooled sample coefficients to weight the decomposition. The components attributable to structure are found again to be smaller than those which use Part I men as the reference, with the one exception of the Part II men versus Part I women comparison where the unexplained term is larger (0.07 versus 0.01 of a grade).

Entry Grade and Promotion

In general, women enter at significantly lower grades than do men, as do Part II staff relative to Part I staff (Table 7). Focusing on differences attributable to structure, women enter at between 0.7 (Part I) and 0.9 (Part II) of a grade lower than do men. Part II men enter at 0.4 of a grade lower than do Part I men, and Part II women 0.5 of a grade lower than Part I women. The largest unexplained gap is that between Part I men and Part II women and is over one full grade.

Turning next to promotion patterns, the data indicate that, on average, men can expect a promotion of about 0.19 of a grade each year; Part I women, 0.23; and Part II women, 0.25. These have direct implications for the number of years it takes to advance by one grade. We find considerable variance in the promotion models' explanatory power ranging from 16 to 49 percent of total variation explained, for Part I men and Part I women respectively (Appendix Table 5). The lower explanatory power of the models is somewhat inconsistent with the results we obtained for the salary growth regressions, since in neither case do we have satisfactory measures of performance.

slightly higher merit pay increase.

Table 8 shows between-group promotion decompositions. Differences in predicted average promotions between groups are small. The signs are negative with respect to the numeraire, meaning that the promotion rates are higher than would have been obtained by the numeraire group of similar characteristics. Again focusing on the differences due to structure, we see that Part I and Part II women have been catching up at the rate of 0.02 and 0.03 of a grade per year, respectively, relative to the corresponding male groups. Part II women have also been catching up at the rate of 0.02 of a grade per year relative to Part I women, and 0.04 of a grade relative to Part I men. Yet, these slightly faster promotions are not sufficient to compensate for the differences in grades at entry that we estimate to be attributable to different valuations of identical included characteristics.

In the case both of entry grade and promotion, the decompositions obtained using the pooled model parameters as reference give results consistent with those discussed above. In general the differences attributable to structure diminish.

D. Sources of Bias

In sum, the above analysis indicates that average salaries and grades differ significantly between men and women and between Part I and Part II staff. While these differences are partly explained by differing characteristics (such as education, age and tenure), a notable portion cannot be so explained. Although some catching up occurs after entry, salary differences at the time of hiring largely dictate inter-group differences in current pay. And current salary differences are absolutely larger except between Part I and Part II men. The pattern in grades is similar to salaries, with disparities in grade assignment at entry largely explaining variation in current grade. Well over one-half of a grade difference between men and women at entry is not

explained by differences in their mean observed characteristics. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we use the pooled model parameters as the reference weights rather than Part I men's wage structure parameters.

Do the differences in salaries and grades across staff groups—between men and women, and between Part I and Part II staff—that are not explained by differences in observable characteristics indicate discrimination in hiring and promotion?

Omitted variables might explain these results, provided that there is a reason for the bias to be consistently stronger in one group (say Part I males) than in another. Recall that the difference in salary and grade attributed to structure is given by the difference between the mean characteristics of group j evaluated using j 's set of estimated coefficients and their value using group k 's coefficients. The effects of education and previous experience (for example) may be influenced by characteristics such as the quality of education or individual ability which are omitted from our model but were observed at time of hire, promotion or salary raise.¹⁴ We are limited by the data that are available to us. We are able to include level of education completed, country and in some cases, university where degree was obtained—all likely to capture aspects of education quality and individual aptitude. But variables such as other aspects of education quality (controlling for country and university where the education degree has been completed), potential earnings in alternative jobs, and communication skills in various languages, are still missing and may well be correlated with the included variables. If for some reason, the distribution of such omitted characteristics is such that Part I men are relatively better endowed

¹⁴ For example, in the human capital economics literature, including a measure of education quality in earnings functions has been found to result in a reduction in the return usually attributed to years of education (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983). Similarly, ability results in a downward adjustment on the return to education (Griliches and Mason, 1972).

with them and hence have higher expected productivity, then the returns to their education (for example) would appear to be higher than for other staff groups or (equivalently) they will have higher salaries at the same levels of observed characteristics. This would not, however, be discrimination.

A relatively recent hiring policy is worth discussing here. As mentioned earlier, the Bank aims for a staff mix representing the different cultural and social backgrounds and languages of member countries. One consequence has been some tightening in the recruitment of U.S. men within the past decade.¹⁵ Such a “quota” might be expected to result in more selective hiring of U.S. men, which could in turn imply an increase in the quality of recent U.S. male hires, assuming no change in the applicant pool.

However, binding quotas alone cannot explain our results. Quotas change the attributes of recruits at the time of hiring and this will be reflected in salaries. Some of those attributes are observed by the researcher, others are not but may have been observed by the hiring manager or the personnel department. Explaining differences due to structure in the face of a quota still rests on there being omitted characteristics in our model which systematically apply to those hired under quotas, but not to others. There is one test. If the U.S. male quota entailed a higher quality in terms of variables that are unobserved by us, but were observed at hiring, then entry salary regressions for Part I men would show a positive coefficient for the dummy variable on U.S. nationality, holding all other included characteristics constant. We ran entry level regressions to test this hypothesis, including many of the characteristics that are included in the general model minus variables that were clearly not present at entry. We found the coefficient on

¹⁵ U.S. men comprise 16 percent of all staff in grades 22-30.

U.S. nationality to be negative (but insignificant) relative to Part I men from non-English-speaking countries.¹⁶

Another feature of recent hiring policy has been more aggressive recruitment of women, especially from Part II countries. Following the same logic, this policy might imply a less selective hiring process for Part II women and thus lower quality of hires than before, holding the applicant pool constant.

The actual quality of recent female and U.S. male recruits also depends on the effect of these hiring policies on the quality of the applicant pool itself for either group.¹⁷ If the quota on U.S. men is widely known inside and outside the World Bank and discourages many from applying, it could reduce the overall quality of U.S. male applicants. Hence, the more selective process could result in lower, not higher, quality of recent U.S. male hires relative to earlier recruits. This seems unlikely, though it is theoretically possible. Similarly, and more plausible, if the more aggressive recruitment of women results in a much larger pool of applicants from many more countries, it could lead to higher, not lower, quality of recent women recruits relative to earlier cohorts. While we cannot prove that any of these factors are actually at work, we let the data inform us in a later section by comparing two cohort groups—those hired between 1980-1986 and those between 1990-1997—to assess the implication of these recent hiring strategies on salary and grade differentials.

Another possible explanation for differences attributable to structure is that discussed in the introduction: controlling for observed individual characteristics, the alternative labor markets

¹⁶ One factor that makes it difficult to draw conclusions from this is that other Part I male recruits who are not “local” hires might be paid a premium to induce them to move to Washington. Note that the same dummy variable has a larger and more significant negative coefficient for U.S. women.

for women and Part II staff relative to Part I men are, on average, lower-paying, and this may be partially reflected in the World Bank's remuneration offers. The ability of the employer to pay these lower wages is reinforced by a lack of information on the part of new hires—particularly ones from very different labor markets—and cultural factors. For example, there are many countries where salaries are fixed by government, and few countries where wage bargaining is as culturally accepted, and expected, as in the U.S. However, if the World Bank is paying some employees less because they are willing to work at a lower rate even though they are equally productive, that is discrimination if the stated institutional goal is equal pay for equal work.

A third explanation is bias on the part of individuals. This is likely to be reinforced by imperfect information. As noted in the introduction, there are two major paths to getting a job at the World Bank. One is through the Young Professionals (YP) program which is considered further below. The less formal process includes open recruitment—over which Personnel presumably maintains substantial power to enforce institutional objectives—and another which allows line managers to identify, put forward and champion individuals of their choice. Here, discrimination may be reintroduced as managers follow their preferences for working with and better rewarding individuals they may already know well or for whom they have an affinity through being, for example, from the same part of the world and/or the same gender.

So far, the discussion has focused primarily on entry salaries and grades. This is because the patterns in current salaries and grades are dominated by those established at entry. In the next sections, we take different cuts of our sample in the hope of disentangling the different explanations for the pay and grade differentials that we attribute to structure. We first compare

¹⁷ Developments in alternative labor markets will clearly also affect the applicant pool.

YPs and non-YPs in order to learn more about the impact of the hiring process on pay and grade. We then compare recent staff cohorts in order to assess structural changes in the patterns of pay and grade differentials. We also examine how the recruitment quota on U.S. men might have affected these patterns.

E. Extensions

YPs Versus Non-YPs

Table 9 presents descriptive statistics on salaries (indexed to be 100 for Part I men) for YPs and non-YPs, analogously to Table 1. Non-YP current salaries follow a pattern similar to that found for the full sample: Part I men are paid more than Part II men who are paid more than Part I women who, in turn, get more than Part II women. YP mean current salaries also fit this pattern, though with a larger spread. But not salaries at entry. Interestingly, YP entry salaries are highest for Part II women, followed by Part I women, Part I men and lastly, Part II men. But here the differences are small—the widest differential (between Part II women and men) is of 7.2 percentage points. YPs do not all begin with the same salary. Although the starting range is narrower than for others, entry salaries are also determined based on education, work experience and other factors. In contrast, non-YP staff start salaries reveal much greater absolute differences—the largest, between Part I men and Part II women, is of 27.3 percentage points—and follow the same pattern as for current salaries. Mean annual pay growth is higher for YP men than for YP women, while the reverse is found for the non-YP staff where women's annual salary raises exceed those of men.

Table 10, analogously to Table 2, provides summary statistics on grades for YPs. Both Part I and Part II men who were recruited as YPs tend to be concentrated in grades 24 through 26. In contrast, the greatest concentrations of women who were YPs are at grades 22 through 24. This difference is probably due, at least in part, to the lower mean tenure of YP women (11 rather than 16 years) resulting from the relatively recent efforts to hire at least an equal share of women in each YP cohort (Table 9).

Using the same empirical models as above, we now explore the reasons for the noted differences in salary and grade in these two subsamples. Note that the remainder of the decomposition analysis uses Part I men as the reference wage structure.

Table 11 gives the decompositions of mean current salaries of YPs and non-YPs. The underlying regressions are given in Appendix Tables 6 and 7. The model's explanatory power is uniformly high across the YP regressions, though less so for the non-YP groups, particularly the women. There is more unobserved variance for non-YPs.

Part I and Part II YP women are predicted to be paid 17 and 20 percent less, respectively, than Part I YP men. Around 13 to 15 percentage points of this difference is explained by differences in characteristics. This leaves a 3.8 percentage point (29 percent) difference that is due to structure for Part I women and 5.1 percentage points (34 percent) for Part II women. There is little total difference, and no difference due to structure, between Part I and Part II YP men. We note much higher differences that are not due to characteristics in mean current salary predictions for the non-YP sample. For Part I women, 5.7 (42 percent) of 13.7 percent total difference relative to Part I men is attributable to structure, not characteristics; for Part II men, it is 5.2 (82 percent) of 6.3 percent; and for Part II women, 10.7 (55 percent) of 19.4 percent total difference.

For both the YP and non-YP samples, our salary growth regressions explain from 53 to 72 percent (Appendix Tables 8 and 9). Among YPs, starting salary differentials across the four groups are negligible (Table 12). Identical characteristics are essentially rewarded in the same way. There is very little difference that is not explained by observed characteristics. In contrast, for non-YPs (Table 12), we find even larger differences in entry level salaries than were found for the entire sample, with generally larger unexplained components as well. The patterns across gender and nationality groups are very similar to the ones we have previously seen. For example, of the total difference in mean entry salaries of 22 percent for Part I women relative to Part I men, 9 percentage points are due to structure. For Part II men, this portion is 9.2 of 10 percent; and for Part II women, 17 of 32 percent.

Turning to growth in pay over time, there is evidence of a catching-up process or convergence for non-YPs over time (Table 13). On average, those with initially low salaries receive higher increases. There are still differences in growth rates controlling for characteristics but there is some catching up. For example, non-YP Part II women have a mean annual salary raise of 3.9 percent, on average. This would have been slightly lower at 3.7 percent, if evaluated using the coefficients of Part I men.

Among YPs, the exact opposite is found (Table 13). While entry level salaries showed negligible differences across staff groups, growth rates favor Part I and Part II men. The model suggests divergence in salaries over time. To take the same example as above, Part II YP women are found to have mean annual pay raises of 3.4 percent. But with the same characteristics, yet based on the coefficients for Part I men, the rate of salary growth would have been 3.9 percent. This indicates a complete reversal of the non-YP case.

Turning to grade and promotions, the norm is that all YPs enter at grade 21. After entry, however, the grades of YPs diverge. The difference in mean current grade of Part I YP men and women is about 0.8 of a grade. Once we have controlled for year of entry and individual characteristics, the portion attributable to structure is relatively small at 0.09 of a grade (10 percent) (Table 14). Among Part II staff, men are 1.1 grades higher, on average, than women, of which 0.4 of a grade (36 percent) is due to structure. Part II men are 0.1 of a grade higher than Part I men, with most of this difference being due to structure. Among women, Part I YP graduates are 0.2 of a grade ahead of Part II graduates for reasons other than controlled for characteristics. The difference attributable to structure between Part I men and Part II women YPs is only 0.2 of a grade (22 percent of the total difference), compared with over one-half grade in the full and non-YP samples.

In the non-YP group, without the “equalizing” influence of the YP recruitment process, generally larger unexplained between-group differences emerge in current grades (Table 14). However, these differences are significantly smaller than for grades at the time of entry (Table 15), suggesting a readjustment over time as more information is revealed about staff’s ability to perform (Table 16). For example, the difference due to structure between Part II men and women at entry is cut by more than one-half of a grade at mean tenure of about twelve years.

To sum up our results on the YP and non-YP samples, the model suggests that the YP recruitment process largely eliminates inter-group differences in starting salaries for given values of the observed individual characteristics. Disparities in salaries at entry are roughly explained by differences in the attributes of new YPs. This is probably because the process of making offers to YPs is a more transparent and regulated one than for the non-YP hiring process.

Equally important, YPs are drawn from a very large pool of applicants each year and are likely to be quite homogeneous with respect to omitted characteristics as well, relative to non-YPs.

After YPs have entered the common staff pool, however, a divergence in the salaries and grades of men and women emerges. This divergence could indicate that individual characteristics observed at entry by the program administrators, and on the basis of which YPs are chosen, (presumably a richer set of information than our model can account for) are not, after all, good predictors of subsequent performance. It is, however, implausible that this would only apply to women. Alternatively, women as a group may be making different internal assignment choices than men, for example to control levels of travel and stress in their jobs. However, this could presumably have been anticipated at time of hiring.

Another possible explanation is that biases slowly emerge which render the work environment less conducive to the progress of women. Men may tend to receive more mentoring, benefit from greater numbers of role models and be favored in task assignments that have higher potential for promotion. In contrast to that for YPs, annual pay raises for non-YP staff appear to gradually compensate over time for the large unexplained differences in entry level salaries. Indeed, while unexplained differences for YPs are greater for current salaries, for non-YPs they are greater at entry level.

The World Bank's YP hiring process can help test our model. As discussed above, our results for the total sample could be due simply to the influence of gender or nationality correlated variables that have been omitted from the model yet were observed at the hiring stage. In this case, we could be attributing to discrimination what are in actual fact returns to omitted variables. On the assumption that the YP process is non-discriminatory—in that it follows a

systematic and controlled vetting and checking process which successfully eliminates bias across a set of variables that can be observed by the YP program administrators but which we do not know fully—estimating our model on the YP subsample provides a natural test of whether we have included the right set of variables. Large differences attributable to structure rather than to characteristics would then indicate that key explanatory variables are missing in the underlying model.

In fact, the YP model results indicate only small differences in mean salaries between groups that are not accounted for by characteristics. These differences can be interpreted as the effect of omitted characteristics on our estimates of the effect of structure. For example, under this interpretation, the return to the omitted characteristics of Part I men compared to Part I women would be 2.9 percent of entry level salary differentials (Table 12). If the omitted variables are similar for the YP and non-YP samples, this means that about 3 percent of the 22 percent premium paid at entry to non-YP Part I men compared to Part I women may be attributable to unobserved variables. The rest of the entry salary difference due to structure (about 6.4 percent) can then be attributed to discrimination.

Tale of Two Cohorts

We turn now to the analysis of two cohorts of Bank entrants, that is, individuals who entered between 1980 and 1986, and between 1990 and 1997. We focus on entry salaries and grades. Comparing these two groups is of interest for two reasons. It can help explore what impacts the Bank's recent more active efforts to increase diversity while treating staff fairly, may

have had and it allows us to further examine the possibility that implicit “quotas” explain our results.

Between the two periods, we find an increase in average entry salaries for all groups: the increase is 31 percent for Part I men, 29 percent for Part II men, 47 percent for Part I women, and 46 percent for Part II women. Since the underlying salaries are in 1990 US dollars, increases reflect increases in the “quality” of new employees as well as changes in the structure of their labor market alternatives, not cost of living adjustments.

Relative to Part I men, Part I women started at a 24 percent lower salary in the 1980-86 cohort (Table 17). (The current salary and growth in pay regressions from which these decompositions are derived are presented in Appendix Tables 14 and 15.) Of this difference, 8.1 percentage points (34 percent) are not explained by differences in characteristics. In the 1990-97 cohort, the salary differential is much reduced at 10 percent, of which only 4 percentage points (40 percent) are unexplained by differences in individual attributes. On average, Part II men started at 9.5 percent less than Part I men in the 1980-86 cohort, and this difference remains relatively constant at just under 9 percent in the 1990-97 cohort. However, while the difference for the earlier cohort is entirely attributable to structure, 3.1 percentage points are explained by differences in attributes for the latter, leaving 5.6 percentage points (62 percent) unexplained.

Relative to Part II men, Part II women started at 21 percent lower salaries in the 1980-86 cohort, a difference largely attributable to differences in characteristics. In the 1990-97 cohort, the difference declines to less than 7 percent, with most of it still attributable to differences in characteristics. Relative to Part I women, entry salaries for Part II women were 7 percent lower in the 1980-86 cohort, with a difference of 2.6 percentage points (37 percent) that is attributable

to structure. In the more recent cohort, the difference is reduced to 5 percent, with 2.3 (46 percent) of that still due to structure.

On average, Part II women started at 31 percent lower salary than Part I men in the 1980-86 cohort. One-third of the difference was attributable to differences in structure. For the 1990-97 cohort, the differential is reduced to about 15 percent, with just over one-third again not attributable to characteristics.

As with salaries, mean entry grades for the later cohort are higher than for the earlier cohort. The difference, shown in Table 18, is close to a full grade for Part I men, 1.2 grades for Part II men, 1.8 for Part I women, and 2.1 for Part II women. The current grade and promotion regressions from which the decompositions are derived can be found in Appendix Tables 18 through 21.

Table 18 shows the decompositions of the between-group differences in starting grades. A substantial reduction in the differences in entry grades of Part I women relative to Part I men has occurred between the two cohorts—from 1.5 grades to 0.5 of a grade. There is a similarly notable drop in the difference that is attributable to structure—from 0.5 of a grade to 0.1. The difference between Part II men and Part I men falls slightly from 0.6 grade to 0.4 grade, but where characteristics would have predicted a negative difference in the earlier cohort, the difference is evenly spread between that which can be explained by characteristics and that which cannot in the later cohort.

Relative to Part II men, the deficit for Part II women falls from the earlier to the later cohort, from 1.4 grades to 0.5 grades, most of which is explained by differences in characteristics. Relative to Part I women, Part II women entered at 0.5 grades lower in the earlier

cohort, a difference unaccounted for by differences in characteristics. By the 1990-97 cohort, the differential was reduced slightly to 0.3 of a grade, with 0.2 attributable to structure. Finally, Part II women tended to start at two grades lower than Part I men on average in the 1980-86 cohort, and 0.9 grade lower in the 1990-97 cohort. Again, the share that is explained by differences in characteristics rises, in this case from 50 percent to 62 percent.

Finally, we omit U.S. men from the recent cohort of 1990-97 in order to take account of the tightening of the Bank's hiring policy with respect to U.S. men. If this squeeze is resulting in a significantly higher quality of recent hires of U.S. men which in turn accounts for larger returns to their observable characteristics relative to others, then we would expect to see a decrease in the unexplained difference in entry salaries relative to Part I men when we leave U.S. men out of the sample. We now compare Table 19 which presents the results for the 1990-97 cohort with and without U.S. men.

We do find a slight decrease in the difference due to structure for Part I women, Part II men and Part II women relative to Part I men—0.2, 1.2 and 0.9 percent, respectively. One implication of this is that the tightening of recruitment for U.S. men has not really had much of an impact on the average quality of the recent U.S. male hires. Another is that the limitation on the hiring of U.S. men is occurring at a time when other structural changes are being made in hiring, salary and promotion policies that are meant to close some of the gap in entry salaries across staff groups that is not explained by observed characteristics.

In sum, the comparison of staff who were hired between 1980 and 1986 with those who entered the World Bank between 1990 and 1997 provides some evidence that Bank policies attempting to eliminate unwarranted differences are having the intended effects. The comparison

does not appear to support the view that quotas are driving our results. According to that hypothesis, quotas limiting the intake of Part I men and, in particular US men, together with those favoring higher Part II women hires, have led on average to higher quality Part I men hires and lower quality Part II women hires, and explain the large differences in salary and grade at entry not explained by our models. We have already shown that a substantial amount of the variation in rewards is explained by our model when it is run on the YP sample. We have also argued that for binding quotas to be responsible for the results, the omitted quality variables must favor Part I men most and Part II women least. We believe that for both these reasons, the quota story is not a compelling explanation for our results. The comparison of pre- and post-quota staff cohorts only reinforces this view. While the quotas came into force in the 90s, over time, between-group differences in entry salary and grades have diminished as has the component of that difference attributable to structure.

G. Conclusions

Our study has found differences in salaries and grades between men and women and between Part I and Part II staff in the Bank which are not readily accountable to differences in the attributes that one would expect to influence productivity. The difference in mean current salaries between men and women (holding nationality group constant) is 14 percent, almost half of which is structural in that it cannot be attributed to differences in observed characteristics such as age, education, and previous work experience. The differences in mean salaries between Part I and Part II staff (independently of gender) are much smaller—5 percent—and are largely attributable to structure rather than to differences in characteristics.

A comparison of Oaxaca and Ransom's (1993) earlier results with ours, and our own analysis of staff who entered between 1980 and 1986, show that overall salary and grade differences have declined, as have the components unexplained by differences in characteristics. Recent Bank policies appear to have successfully reduced differences across staff groups. However, significant unexplained differentials remain.

The paper has examined a number of explanations. One is omitted variable bias, whereby there are characteristics omitted from our model but observed by those making salary and promotion decisions which are correlated with observed variables. For omitted variables to be contributing to the component of unexplained differences in salary and grade between staff groups, they must be distributed across groups such that the bias is strongest for Part I men, followed by Part II men and so on. Our analysis of the YP sample, inarguably a more homogeneous group hired through a non-discriminatory process, indicates that only negligible inter-group differences in mean salaries are left unexplained by the variables included in our model. Based on these results, we would argue that omitted variable bias is not a compelling explanation for differences attributable to structure. The YP sample also suggests that horizontal inequities can be eliminated through a different hiring process.

A second possible explanation for salary and grade differentials which we are unable to explain is discrimination. We have identified two ways in which this could arise. In its attempt to reduce labor costs, the World Bank may be taking advantage of the fact that the four staff groups face different reservation wages. A third explanation puts more onus on individual managers and their preferences for discrimination coupled with imperfect information. We find that although YPs all begin at the same level and at salaries that differ only to reflect differences in characteristics, once they enter the general staff pool, their salary increases and promotions

begin to mirror the patterns found for the rest of the staff. This suggests that bias from both of these sources is present. Under a recently introduced system of dollar budgeting at the World Bank, the incentives to minimize labor costs on the part of managers, and thus to discriminate against certain groups, are likely to increase.

Nonetheless, a dramatic shift does appear to be occurring in the hiring process at the Bank. The possible sources of this shift include: (a) on the supply side, that the applicant pool, especially of women and Part II candidates, has significantly improved in quality; (b) that information gathering during hiring has intensified, thus decreasing room for guess work and the opportunities for stereotypes to bias grade assignment and wage offers; (c) that a renewed effort to balance the composition of Bank staff has meant providing more incentives to staff from minority groups; and (d) that as the institution has become more diversified—in terms of gender and nationality groups—it has become more conducive to high performance by women and Part II nationals, as well as less biased. The result of the shift has been to reduce salary and grade differences that cannot be attributed to observed differences in attributes.

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Figure 1

Distribution of staff across grades by staff group




Table 1: Descriptive statistics on pay and tenure of professional staff, May 1997

	Part I men	Part II men	Part I women	Part II women
Current salaries	100	95.3	86.6	82.5
Salaries at entry	100	91.4	86.4	80.6
Mean annual growth (%)	3.2	3.3	3.8	3.8
Mean tenure (years)	11.9	12.5	10.7	11.2
Number of staff	1356	857	537	250
(% of total staff)	(45%)	(29%)	(18%)	(8%)

Note: Data on World Bank (IBRD) professional staff pertain to those in grades 22-30.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics on grade of professional staff, May 1997

	Grade									
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	Total
Part I Men										
% in grade currently	7	16	37	19	15	3	3	1	0	100
Mean years in grade	2.5	3.9	6.0	4.3	6.7	4.0	5.0	3.0	--	5.09
N	98	214	506	254	197	36	36	15	0	1359
Part II Men										
% in grade currently	8	21	38	16	11	2	2	1	0	100
Mean years in grade	3.3	3.6	5.7	3.7	6.7	3.8	4.4	3.1	7.9	4.7
N	69	182	328	141	91	17	21	7	1	857
Part I Women										
% in grade currently	17	29	32	10	8	2	1	1	0	100
Mean years in grade	2.7	3.1	4.6	2.9	3.8	2.3	4.6	2.1	--	3.6
N	93	158	174	51	42	11	5	3	0	537
Part II Women										
% in grade currently	22	33	31	7	5	0	1	0	0	100
Mean years in grade	2.4	2.9	4.7	2.9	4.5	1.5	2.4	--	--	3.4
N	55	83	77	18	13	1	3	0	0	250
Total										
% in grade currently	11	21	36	15	11	2	2	1	0	100
Mean years in grade	2.7	3.5	5.6	3.9	6.3	3.6	4.7	3.3	7.9	4.6
N	315	637	1085	464	343	65	65	25	1	3000

Table 3: Between-group differences in current salaries

	Total Difference ^a	Part I men reference		Pooled parameter reference	
		Characteristics ^b	Structure ^c	Characteristics ^b	Structure ^c
M1-M2	5.0	1.06 (.688)	3.93 (.883)	2.54 (.401)	2.45 (.401)
M1-F1	14.23	8.64 (.439)	5.59 (.873)	9.23 (.285)	4.99 .644
M1-F2	19.33	8.75 (.722)	10.58 (1.16)	11.87 (.481)	7.46 (.684)
M2-F1	9.23	7.57 (.851)	1.66 (1.10)	6.69 (5.06)	2.54 (.428)
M2-F2	14.33	7.68 (.407)	6.65 (1.14)	9.32 (.315)	5.01 (.838)
F1-F2	5.10	0.11 (.745)	4.99 (1.76)	2.63 (.481)	2.47 (.690)

Notes: a - Percentage difference in mean annual salaries between indicated groups.
b - Differences in mean salary attributable to differences in included characteristics.
c - Differences in mean salary attributable to structure.
b and c may not add up to a due to rounding off.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.

Table 4: Between-group differences in entry level salaries

	Total Difference	Part I men reference		Pooled parameter reference	
		Characteristics	Structure	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	9.21	2.35	6.86	5.24	3.97
M1-F1	17.33	8.66	8.66	9.67	7.66
M1-F2	24.64	10.04	14.61	14.81	9.83
M2-F1	8.12	6.32	1.80	4.43	3.69
M2-F2	15.43	7.69	7.74	9.57	5.86
F1-F2	7.32	1.37	5.94	5.15	2.17

Table 5: Between-group differences in mean annual salary growth

	Total Difference	Part I men reference		Pooled parameter reference	
		Characteristics	Structure	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	-0.03	0.14 (.001)	-0.16 (.001)	0.01 (.000)	-0.03 (.000)
M1-F1	-0.63	-0.42 (.001)	-0.21 (.001)	-0.43 (.000)	-0.20 (.001)
M1-F2	-0.52	-0.45 (.001)	-0.07 (.001)	-0.56 (.001)	0.04 (.001)
M2-F1	-0.60	-0.55 (.001)	-0.05 (.001)	-0.44 (.001)	-0.17 (.001)
M2-F2	-0.49	-0.58 (.001)	0.09 (.001)	-0.57 (.000)	0.07 (.001)
F1-F2	0.11	-0.03 (.001)	0.14 (.003)	-0.13 (.001)	0.24 (.001)

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses

Table 6: Between-group differences in current grade

	Total Difference	Part I men reference		Pooled parameter reference	
		Characteristics	Structure	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	0.21	.01 (.053)	0.20 (.068)	0.09 (.030)	0.12 (.031)
M1-F1	0.66	0.45 (.035)	0.22 (.066)	0.46 (.021)	0.20 (.050)
M1-F2	0.93	0.39 (.057)	0.54 (.089)	0.57 (.036)	0.36 (.052)
M2-F1	0.45	0.44 (.067)	0.01 (.081)	.038 (.037)	.07 (.031)
M2-F2	0.72	0.38 (.032)	0.34 (.084)	0.48 (.023)	.24 (.062)
F1-F2	0.27	-0.06 (.059)	0.33 (.129)	0.11 (.036)	0.16 (.050)

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses

Table 7: Between-group differences in entry grade

	Total Difference	Part I men reference		Pooled parameter reference	
		Characteristics	Structure	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	0.50	0.15	0.36	0.26	0.24
M1-F1	1.36	0.66	0.70	0.75	0.61
M1-F2	1.96	0.72	1.24	1.00	0.96
M2-F1	0.86	0.51	0.35	0.49	0.37
M2-F2	1.46	0.57	0.89	0.74	0.71
F1-F2	0.60	0.06	0.54	0.25	0.34

Table 8: Between-group differences in annual rate of promotion

	Total Difference	Part I men reference		Pooled parameter reference	
		Characteristics	Structure	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	-0.01	-0.01 (.009)	-0.01 (.011)	-0.01 (.005)	-0.00 (.005)
M1-F1	-0.06	-0.04 (.006)	-0.02 (.010)	-0.04 (.003)	-0.02 (.007)
M1-F2	-0.08	-0.04 (.010)	-0.04 (.015)	-0.05 (.005)	-0.03 (.009)
M2-F1	-0.04	-0.03 (.011)	-0.02 (.011)	-0.03 (.006)	-0.01 (.004)
M2-F2	-0.06	-0.03 (.005)	-0.03 (.013)	-0.03 (.004)	-0.03 (.010)
F1-F2	-0.02	-0.00 (.010)	-0.02 (.018)	-0.01 (.005)	-0.01 (.007)

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses

Table 9: Descriptive statistics on pay and tenure for YPs and non-YPs , May 1997

YPs	Part I men	Part II men	Part I women	Part II women
Current salaries	100	99.5	83.3	81.2
Salaries at entry	100	97.8	103.6	105.0
Mean annual growth (%)	3.83	3.94	3.49	3.38
Mean tenure (years)	16.1	16.5	11.1	10.7
Non-YPs	Part I men	Part II men	Part I women	Part II women
Current salaries	100	92.6	87.2	82.4
Salaries at entry	100	90.5	80.1	72.7
Mean annual growth (%)	3.15	3.19	3.90	3.92
Mean tenure (years)	11.1	11.4	10.6	11.3

Table 10: Descriptive statistics on current grades of YP sample

	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	Total
Part I Men										
% at grade currently	14	6	23	23	23	4	7	3	--	100
Mean years in grade	1.8	1.9	7.9	4.7	8.3	4.2	6.4	4.6	--	5.7
N	30	14	50	50	49	9	15	6	--	217
Part I Women										
% at grade currently	23	21	25	12	13	3	5	--	--	100
Mean years in grade	1.8	2.3	5.4	1.8	3.3	0.7	4.6	--	--	3.1
N	25	23	28	13	14	3	5	--	--	111
Part II Men										
% at grade currently	5	12	28	21	22	4	8	2	--	100
Mean years in grade	1.7	2.8	6.8	3.6	6.1	5.1	4.7	4.0	--	5.0
N	9	21	48	35	37	6	14	4	--	170
Part II Women										
% at grade currently	22	18	35	13	8	0	3	--	--	100
Mean years in grade	2.1	2.3	5.7	3.6	3.4	0	1.8	--	--	3.7
N	13	11	21	8	5	0	2	--	--	60
Total										
% at grade currently	14	12	26	19	19	3	6	1	--	100
Mean years in grade	1.8	2.4	6.8	3.9	6.6	3.9	5.2	4.4	--	4.8
N	77	69	147	106	105	18	36	6	--	564

Table 11: Between-group differences in current salaries: YP and non-YP samples

	YP			Non-YP		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	0.07	1.75 (1.73)	-1.69 (2.06)	6.33	1.11 (0.741)	5.22 (0.965)
M1-F1	17.08	13.24 (1.23)	3.85 (1.77)	13.7	8.02 (0.478)	5.68 (0.974)
M1-F2	20.35	15.21 (1.81)	5.13 (2.22)	19.41	8.67 (0.846)	10.75 (1.34)
M2-F1	17.02	11.48 (2.08)	5.53 (1.90)	7.37	6.91 (0.940)	0.46 (1.237)
M2-F2	20.28	13.46 (1.43)	6.82 (1.95)	13.08	7.56 (0.518)	5.53 (1.34)
F1-F2	3.27	1.98 (1.88)	1.29 (3.21)	5.72	0.64 (0.834)	5.07 (2.12)

Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

Table 12: Between-group differences in entry salaries: YP and non-YP samples

	YP			Non-YP		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	0.20	4.35	-4.15	10.18	0.97	9.21
M1-F1	-5.21	-8.11	2.90	21.89	12.54	9.35
M1-F2	-6.43	-5.23	-1.20	31.99	15.16	16.82
M2-F1	-5.41	-12.46	7.06	11.71	11.58	0.14
M2-F2	-6.63	-9.58	2.95	21.81	14.20	7.61
F1-F2	-1.22	2.88	-4.10	10.10	2.62	7.47

Table 13: Between-group differences in annual salary growth: YP and non-YP sample

	YP			Non-YP		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	-0.13	-0.31 (0.001)	0.18 (0.001)	0.03	0.27 (0.001)	-0.24 (0.001)
M1-F1	0.33	0.28 (0.001)	0.05 (0.001)	-0.86	-0.58 (0.001)	-0.29 (0.002)
M1-F2	0.49	0.03 (0.001)	0.46 (0.002)	-0.77	-0.58 (0.001)	-0.20 (0.002)
M2-F1	0.46	0.59 (0.001)	-0.13 (0.001)	-0.89	-0.85 (0.001)	-0.04 (0.002)
M2-F2	0.62	0.34 (0.001)	0.28 (0.002)	-0.80	-0.85 (0.001)	0.05 (0.001)
F1-F2	0.16	-0.25 (0.001)	0.41 (0.003)	0.09	0.00 (0.001)	0.09 (0.004)

Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses

Table 14: Between-group differences in current grade: YP and non-YP sample

	YP			Non-YP		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	-0.12	0.05 (0.152)	-0.17 (0.178)	0.31	0.02 (0.059)	0.29 (0.074)
M1-F1	0.78	0.69 (0.108)	0.09 (0.157)	0.66	0.43 (0.038)	0.23 (0.071)
M1-F2	0.98	0.75 (0.159)	0.23 (0.203)	0.96	0.43 (0.067)	0.53 (0.101)
M2-F1	0.90	0.64 (0.182)	0.26 (0.160)	0.35	0.41 (0.074)	-0.06 (0.087)
M2-F2	1.10	0.70 (0.125)	0.40 (0.173)	0.65	0.41 (0.041)	0.24 (0.096)
F1-F2	0.20	0.06 (0.165)	0.14 (0.296)	0.30	0.003 (0.066)	0.30 (0.146)

Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses

Table 15: Between-group differences in entry grade: YP and non-YP sample

	YP			Non-YP		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.58	0.05	0.54
M1-F1	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.68	0.91	0.77
M1-F2	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.42	1.02	1.39
M2-F1	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.10	0.86	0.24
M2-F2	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.83	0.98	0.85
F1-F2	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.74	0.12	0.62

Note: Since all YPs enter at grade 21 there are no differences to decompose.

Table 16: Between-group differences in annual promotion rate: YP and non-YP sample

	YP			Non-YP		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	0.03	0.03 (0.016)	0.000 (0.018)	-0.02	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.01 (0.011)
M1-F1	-0.01	0.002 (0.011)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.06	-0.03 (0.005)	-0.02 (0.010)
M1-F2	0.002	0.005 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.023)	-0.08	-0.03 (0.010)	-0.05 (0.017)
M2-F1	-0.04	-0.03 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.011)	-0.04	-0.03 (0.011)	-0.01 (0.013)
M2-F2	-0.03	-0.03 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.06	-0.03 (0.006)	-0.03 (0.016)
F1-F2	0.01	0.003 (0.017)	0.01 (0.026)	-0.02	0.002 (0.009)	-0.02 (0.022)

Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses

Table 17. Between-group differences in entry salary: 1980-86 and 1990-97 cohorts

1980-86 Cohort				1990-97 Cohort		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	9.54	-1.86	11.40	8.75	3.13	5.62
M1-F1	23.82	15.70	8.12	10.29	6.27	4.02
M1-F2	30.86	20.12	10.74	15.34	9.02	6.32
M2-F1	14.28	17.56	-3.28	1.54	3.14	-1.60
M2-F2	21.32	21.98	-0.66	6.59	5.89	0.70
F1-F2	7.04	4.42	2.62	5.05	2.75	2.29

Table 18. Between-group differences in entry grade: 1980-86 and 1990-97 cohorts

1980-86 Cohort				1990-97 Cohort		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	0.56	-0.27	0.83	0.42	0.21	0.21
M1-F1	1.52	0.97	0.55	0.55	0.42	0.13
M1-F2	2.00	1.02	0.97	0.88	0.55	0.33
M2-F1	0.96	1.24	-0.28	0.13	0.22	-0.09
M2-F2	1.44	1.29	0.15	0.46	0.34	0.11
F1-F2	0.48	0.05	0.43	0.33	0.13	0.20

**Table 19. Between-group differences in entry salary: 1990-97 cohort,
with and without U.S. men**

1990-97 with U.S. Men				1990-97 without U.S. Men		
	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure	Total Difference	Characteristics	Structure
M1-M2	8.75	3.13	5.62	8.93	4.63	4.30
M1-F1	10.29	6.27	4.02	10.46	6.67	3.80
M1-F2	15.34	9.02	6.32	15.51	10.10	5.41
M2-F1	1.54	3.14	-1.60	1.54	2.04	-0.50
M2-F2	6.59	5.89	0.70	6.59	5.48	1.12
F1-F2	5.05	2.75	2.29	5.05	3.43	1.61

Appendix Table 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics

Variable	Description	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
		Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.
dy0e80	1=entered in 1980	0.0435	0.204	0.0443	0.206	0.0391	0.194	0.0320	0.176	0.0420	0.201
dy0e81	1=entered in 1981	0.0258	0.159	0.0467	0.211	0.0261	0.159	0.0360	0.187	0.0327	0.178
dy0e82	1=entered in 1982	0.0310	0.173	0.0222	0.147	0.0242	0.154	0.0600	0.238	0.0297	0.170
dy0e83	1=entered in 1983	0.0288	0.167	0.0362	0.187	0.0279	0.165	0.0320	0.176	0.0310	0.173
dy0e84	1=entered in 1984	0.0361	0.187	0.0350	0.184	0.0279	0.165	0.0320	0.176	0.0340	0.181
dy0e85	1=entered in 1985	0.0435	0.204	0.0513	0.221	0.0428	0.203	0.0160	0.126	0.0433	0.204
dy0e86	1=entered in 1986	0.0339	0.181	0.0455	0.209	0.0317	0.175	0.0200	0.140	0.0357	0.185
dy0e87	1=entered in 1987	0.0273	0.163	0.0233	0.151	0.0168	0.128	0.0280	0.165	0.0243	0.154
dy0e88	1=entered in 1988	0.0642	0.245	0.0665	0.249	0.0596	0.237	0.0440	0.206	0.0623	0.242
dy0e89	1=entered in 1989	0.0428	0.202	0.0513	0.221	0.0261	0.159	0.0440	0.206	0.0423	0.201
dy0e90	1=entered in 1990	0.0347	0.183	0.0443	0.206	0.0484	0.215	0.0400	0.196	0.0403	0.197
dy0e91	1=entered in 1991	0.0450	0.207	0.0618	0.241	0.0540	0.226	0.0400	0.196	0.0510	0.220
dy0e92	1=entered in 1992	0.0524	0.223	0.0688	0.253	0.0521	0.223	0.0720	0.259	0.0587	0.235
dy0e93	1=entered in 1993	0.0605	0.238	0.0420	0.201	0.0950	0.293	0.0960	0.295	0.0643	0.245
dy0e94	1=entered in 1994	0.0575	0.233	0.0338	0.181	0.0875	0.283	0.0680	0.252	0.0570	0.232
dy0e95	1=entered in 1995	0.0354	0.185	0.0163	0.127	0.0298	0.170	0.0440	0.206	0.0297	0.170
dy0e96	1=entered in 1996	0.0494	0.217	0.0362	0.187	0.0484	0.215	0.0280	0.165	0.0437	0.204
dy0e97	1=entered in 1997	0.0170	0.129	0.0035	0.059	0.0261	0.159	0.0280	0.165	0.0157	0.124
ageent	Age at entry to Bank	37.0301	7.666	35.5835	7.270	34.3540	7.682	32.8540	7.093	35.7898	7.626
ageen2	Age at entry to Bank squared	1429.9502	587.572	1318.9769	547.100	1239.1031	563.488	1129.4961	520.050	1339.0494	574.390
phd	1=PhD level	0.4146	0.493	0.4508	0.498	0.3148	0.465	0.3498	0.478	0.4018	0.490
mast	1=Masters level	0.4375	0.496	0.4508	0.498	0.5509	0.498	0.5021	0.501	0.4669	0.499
bach	1=Bachelors level	0.1141	0.318	0.0719	0.258	0.0965	0.296	0.0905	0.288	0.0968	0.296
dl_can	1=PhD from Canada	0.0088	0.094	0.0093	0.096	0.0019	0.043	0.0040	0.063	0.0073	0.085
dl_fra	1=PhD from France	0.0339	0.181	0.0210	0.143	0.0186	0.135	0.0080	0.089	0.0253	0.157
dl_grm	1=PhD from Germany	0.0147	0.121	0.0012	0.034	0.0112	0.105	0.0000	0.000	0.0090	0.094
dl_ukg	1=PhD from UK	0.0406	0.197	0.0443	0.206	0.0242	0.154	0.0400	0.196	0.0387	0.193
dl_usa	1=PhD from USA	0.2448	0.430	0.3174	0.466	0.2197	0.414	0.2320	0.423	0.2600	0.439
ml_can	1=Masters from Canada	0.0273	0.163	0.0093	0.096	0.0093	0.096	0.0080	0.089	0.0173	0.131
ml_fra	1=Masters from France	0.0280	0.165	0.0128	0.113	0.0261	0.159	0.0120	0.109	0.0220	0.147
ml_grm	1=Masters from Germany	0.0088	0.094	0.0012	0.034	0.0037	0.061	0.0000	0.000	0.0050	0.071
ml_ukg	1=Masters from UK	0.0745	0.263	0.0502	0.218	0.0447	0.207	0.0600	0.238	0.0610	0.239
ml_usa	1=Masters from USA	0.1858	0.389	0.2404	0.428	0.4041	0.491	0.2920	0.456	0.2493	0.433
bl_can	1=Bach from Canada	0.0052	0.072	0.0023	0.048	0.0074	0.086	0.0040	0.063	0.0047	0.068
bl_fra	1=Bach from France	0.0044	0.066	0.0000	0.000	0.0019	0.043	0.0000	0.000	0.0023	0.048
bl_grm	1=Bach from Germany	0.0022	0.047	0.0000	0.000	0.0000	0.000	0.0000	0.000	0.0010	0.032
bl_ukg	1=Bach from UK	0.0243	0.154	0.0105	0.102	0.0093	0.096	0.0040	0.063	0.0160	0.125
bl_usa	1=Bach from USA	0.0428	0.202	0.0105	0.102	0.0670	0.250	0.0200	0.140	0.0360	0.186
dl_eco	1=PhD lvl Economics	0.2345	0.424	0.2754	0.447	0.1639	0.371	0.1840	0.388	0.2293	0.420
dl_bus	1=PhD lvl Bus/Actng/Comrce	0.0044	0.066	0.0012	0.034	0.0000	0.000	0.0000	0.000	0.0023	0.048
dl_eng	1=PhD lvl Engineering	0.0236	0.152	0.0257	0.158	0.0019	0.043	0.0120	0.109	0.0193	0.138
dl_fin	1=PhD lvl Finance	0.0037	0.061	0.0140	0.118	0.0019	0.043	0.0040	0.063	0.0063	0.079
ml_eco	1=Masters lvl Economics	0.1829	0.387	0.1424	0.350	0.2011	0.401	0.1720	0.378	0.1737	0.379
ml_bus	1=Masters lvl Bus/Actng/Comrce	0.0088	0.094	0.0233	0.151	0.0223	0.148	0.0160	0.126	0.0160	0.125
ml_eng	1=Masters lvl Finance	0.0310	0.173	0.0373	0.190	0.0056	0.075	0.0080	0.089	0.0263	0.160
ml_fin	1=Masters lvl Engineering	0.0413	0.199	0.0828	0.276	0.0577	0.233	0.0680	0.252	0.0583	0.234
bl_eco	1=Bach lvl Economics	0.0302	0.171	0.0152	0.122	0.0130	0.114	0.0120	0.109	0.0213	0.145
bl_bus	1=Bach lvl Bus/Actng/Comrce	0.0052	0.072	0.0058	0.076	0.0074	0.086	0.0200	0.140	0.0070	0.083
bl_eng	1=Bach lvl Finance	0.0184	0.135	0.0187	0.135	0.0019	0.043	0.0000	0.000	0.0140	0.118
bl_fin	1=Bach lvl Engineering	0.0015	0.038	0.0012	0.034	0.0000	0.000	0.0000	0.000	0.0010	0.032

continued...

Appendix Table 1 continued: Variable definitions and summary statistics

Variable	Description	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
		Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.
wrkex	Yrs Work prior Bank	10.1924	8.037	8.0121	7.349	7.4018	6.990	6.1023	6.213	8.7236	7.649
d_exp	1=workexp<0 set to 0	0.0466	0.211	0.0890	0.285	0.1036	0.305	0.1157	0.321	0.0748	0.263
cvp	1=Central Vice Presidency	0.1976	0.398	0.1575	0.365	0.1620	0.369	0.1600	0.367	0.1767	0.381
oper	1=Operations	0.4985	0.500	0.5613	0.497	0.4320	0.496	0.5080	0.501	0.5053	0.500
marid	1=Married	0.8798	0.325	0.9207	0.270	0.6350	0.482	0.7120	0.454	0.8337	0.372
d2_US	1=Nationality USA	0.3606	0.480	0.0000	0.000	0.5866	0.493	0.0000	0.000	0.2680	0.443
d2_CAN	1=Nationality Canada	0.0752	0.264	0.0000	0.000	0.0503	0.219	0.0000	0.000	0.0430	0.203
d2_GBR	1=Nationality UK	0.1305	0.337	0.0000	0.000	0.0875	0.283	0.0000	0.000	0.0747	0.263
d2_AUS	1=Nationality Australia	0.0450	0.207	0.0000	0.000	0.0093	0.096	0.0000	0.000	0.0220	0.147
d2_IND	1=Nationality India	0.0000	0.000	0.2030	0.402	0.0000	0.000	0.1440	0.352	0.0700	0.255
d1_PAK	1=Nationality Pakistan	0.0000	0.000	0.0023	0.048	0.0000	0.000	0.0000	0.000	0.0007	0.026
d1_FIL	1=Nationality Philippines	0.0000	0.000	0.0283	0.166	0.0000	0.000	0.1000	0.301	0.0165	0.127
p_harv	1=econ phd harvard (last sch)	0.0081	0.090	0.0187	0.135	0.0130	0.114	0.0040	0.063	0.0117	0.107
p_mit	1=econ phd mit (last sch)	0.0140	0.118	0.0093	0.096	0.0056	0.075	0.0000	0.000	0.0100	0.100
p_chic	1=econ phd u of chicago (last sch)	0.0066	0.081	0.0140	0.118	0.0074	0.086	0.0040	0.063	0.0087	0.093
p_stan	1=econ phd stanford u (last sch)	0.0088	0.094	0.0117	0.107	0.0093	0.096	0.0040	0.063	0.0093	0.096
p_prin	1=econ phd princeton (last sch)	0.0059	0.077	0.0058	0.076	0.0000	0.000	0.0040	0.063	0.0047	0.068
p_lse	1=econ phd lse (last sch)	0.0052	0.072	0.0047	0.068	0.0019	0.043	0.0000	0.000	0.0040	0.063
p_oxfd	1=econ phd oxford (last sch)	0.0052	0.072	0.0047	0.068	0.0056	0.075	0.0040	0.063	0.0050	0.071
p_cmbg	1=econ phd cambridge (last sch)	0.0044	0.066	0.0035	0.059	0.0000	0.000	0.0040	0.063	0.0033	0.058
Num Obs	Number of observations	1356		857		537		250		3000	

Appendix Table 2: Regressions for log current salary, basic sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	-0.126	6.508	-0.178	7.324	-0.064	1.736	0.012	0.202	-0.127	9.154
dy0e81	-0.122	4.967	-0.149	6.195	-0.068	1.507	-0.002	0.045	-0.120	7.656
dy0e82	-0.157	6.975	-0.213	6.546	-0.094	2.061	-0.048	1.101	-0.159	9.864
dy0e83	-0.223	9.450	-0.209	7.671	-0.159	3.736	-0.083	1.583	-0.212	13.235
dy0e84	-0.215	10.143	-0.285	10.489	-0.161	3.702	-0.072	1.270	-0.220	14.330
dy0e85	-0.242	12.000	-0.271	11.480	-0.196	5.343	0.053	0.660	-0.235	16.626
dy0e86	-0.261	11.983	-0.308	12.272	-0.182	4.466	0.019	0.266	-0.250	16.384
dy0e87	-0.276	11.320	-0.276	8.476	-0.176	3.276	-0.199	3.546	-0.260	14.495
dy0e88	-0.327	18.516	-0.336	15.736	-0.276	8.289	-0.251	4.999	-0.320	25.745
dy0e89	-0.351	16.405	-0.343	14.622	-0.255	5.668	-0.169	3.349	-0.320	21.983
dy0e90	-0.359	16.574	-0.375	14.548	-0.332	9.213	-0.281	5.430	-0.360	24.768
dy0e91	-0.394	19.721	-0.407	18.115	-0.291	8.242	-0.232	4.694	-0.381	28.413
dy0e92	-0.408	21.291	-0.412	18.997	-0.338	9.802	-0.314	7.775	-0.398	31.275
dy0e93	-0.440	24.489	-0.464	17.921	-0.386	13.286	-0.327	8.733	-0.435	35.735
dy0e94	-0.466	24.924	-0.483	17.352	-0.415	13.595	-0.377	8.521	-0.458	35.489
dy0e95	-0.461	18.714	-0.524	13.152	-0.353	7.773	-0.339	6.670	-0.449	25.059
dy0e96	-0.444	22.418	-0.442	15.767	-0.402	10.827	-0.368	6.110	-0.438	30.175
dy0e97	-0.395	12.161	.	.	-0.370	7.411	-0.443	6.200	-0.424	17.233
ageent	0.004	0.817	-0.001	0.228	-0.007	0.850	0.000	0.038	0.005	1.668
ageen2	0.000	0.544	0.000	0.908	0.000	1.587	0.000	0.605	0.000	0.304
phd	0.020	0.749	0.047	1.219	0.203	3.770	0.194	3.131	0.096	4.923
mast	-0.017	0.690	-0.016	0.484	0.111	2.233	0.117	2.401	0.037	2.119
bach	-0.038	1.146	-0.058	1.401	-0.062	0.727	0.059	0.990	-0.026	1.155
dl_can	-0.031	0.716	-0.037	0.706	-0.079	0.506	0.082	0.567	-0.027	0.825
dl_fra	0.028	1.096	-0.016	0.422	-0.019	0.313	0.049	0.450	0.013	0.638
dl_grm	-0.001	0.028	-0.073	0.524	0.000	0.005	.	.	0.010	0.340
dl_ukg	0.031	1.027	0.007	0.192	-0.028	0.422	0.047	0.733	0.006	0.295
dl_usa	0.031	1.638	0.011	0.480	0.050	1.147	0.039	0.849	0.023	1.752
ml_can	0.032	1.045	0.121	2.260	-0.073	0.929	-0.133	1.294	0.028	1.140
ml_fra	0.016	0.630	0.036	0.825	-0.029	0.545	0.109	1.298	0.019	0.944
ml_grm	-0.042	1.035	.	.	-0.029	0.262	.	.	-0.010	0.259
ml_ukg	0.039	1.898	0.067	2.689	-0.004	0.096	0.093	1.975	0.039	2.704
ml_usa	0.000	0.028	-0.004	0.246	0.011	0.313	0.027	0.837	-0.007	0.667
bl_can	0.090	1.555	0.191	1.814	0.066	0.572	0.193	1.345	0.083	1.968
bl_fra	0.002	0.034	.	.	0.194	1.140	.	.	0.057	1.012
bl_grm	0.280	3.390	0.345	4.103
bl_ukg	0.025	0.718	0.080	1.535	0.267	2.523	-0.145	0.997	0.061	2.287
bl_usa	0.001	0.021	0.058	1.063	0.106	1.292	0.011	0.150	0.016	0.736
dl_eco	0.014	1.001	0.049	2.865	0.018	0.670	0.009	0.263	0.025	2.550
dl_bus	0.092	1.490	-0.094	0.669	0.080	1.356
dl_eng	-0.001	0.030	0.061	1.855	-0.056	0.370	-0.012	0.140	0.017	0.871
dl_fin	-0.002	0.031	0.094	2.230	0.160	1.042	.	.	0.066	1.982
ml_eco	0.040	3.039	0.039	2.179	0.052	2.502	0.052	1.714	0.047	5.176
ml_bus	-0.023	0.569	-0.022	0.669	0.094	2.057	0.178	2.395	0.028	1.314
ml_eng	-0.007	0.312	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.545	0.190	1.930	0.012	0.667
ml_fin	-0.003	0.156	0.048	2.279	0.073	2.345	0.074	1.796	0.039	3.080
bl_eco	0.014	0.506	0.113	2.402	0.087	1.388	0.025	0.274	0.064	2.922
bl_bus	0.013	0.233	-0.104	1.519	0.047	0.572	-0.102	1.341	-0.062	1.838
bl_eng	-0.004	0.109	-0.005	0.101	0.033	0.214	.	.	0.035	1.398
bl_fin	-0.015	0.155	-0.266	1.850	-0.015	0.185
wrkex	0.006	5.702	0.007	5.211	0.008	4.308	0.009	3.236	0.007	9.357
d_exp	-0.055	2.858	-0.078	4.240	-0.088	3.503	-0.104	3.067	-0.077	6.951
cvp	0.043	3.664	-0.004	0.253	0.004	0.185	-0.004	0.144	0.017	2.018
oper	0.006	0.652	-0.006	0.519	-0.004	0.224	-0.044	1.775	-0.005	0.802
marid	0.053	4.510	0.042	2.345	0.033	2.297	-0.021	1.011	0.048	6.710
d2_US	-0.007	0.597	.	.	-0.037	1.836	.	.	0.009	1.232
d2_CAN	0.000	0.021	.	.	0.051	1.308	.	.	0.032	2.038
d2_GBR	0.007	0.445	.	.	-0.005	0.172	.	.	0.036	2.958
d2_AUS	0.040	1.994	.	.	-0.045	0.567	.	.	0.074	3.909
d2_IND	.	.	0.015	1.169	.	.	-0.033	1.146	-0.002	0.214
d1_PAK	.	.	0.120	0.876	0.077	0.538
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.030	1.051	.	.	-0.073	2.059	-0.070	3.230
p_harv	0.093	2.212	0.122	3.413	-0.013	0.209	-0.108	0.795	0.080	3.195
p_mit	-0.007	0.209	0.070	1.422	0.022	0.246	.	.	0.028	1.030
p_chic	0.081	1.767	0.024	0.594	0.071	0.905	0.020	0.147	0.045	1.580
p_stan	0.037	0.930	0.119	2.697	0.016	0.228	0.187	1.281	0.075	2.716
p_prin	0.116	2.376	-0.076	1.108	.	.	0.062	0.436	0.052	1.307
p_lse	0.051	0.875	-0.012	0.157	0.057	0.354	.	.	0.038	0.843
p_oxfd	0.196	3.390	-0.038	0.511	0.097	0.934	0.099	0.645	0.108	2.649
p_cmbg	0.085	1.401	-0.133	1.606	.	.	-0.030	0.200	0.027	0.569
_cons	11.201	117.082	11.305	93.298	11.184	74.554	10.990	55.650	11.080	177.249
Num Obs	1295		835		518		242		2890	
Adj R-sq	0.570		0.590		0.425		0.469		0.557	

Appendix Table 3: Regressions for annual salary growth, basic sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.008	3.537	0.005	2.628	0.009	1.525	0.006	1.110	0.007	4.217
dy0e81	0.013	4.307	0.008	3.800	0.012	1.529	0.009	1.873	0.010	5.367
dy0e82	0.011	3.846	0.010	3.621	0.010	1.384	0.009	2.218	0.011	5.836
dy0e83	0.008	2.707	0.012	5.083	0.009	1.237	0.015	3.020	0.010	5.164
dy0e84	0.007	2.747	0.008	3.629	0.019	2.569	0.004	0.650	0.009	4.729
dy0e85	0.008	3.332	0.010	4.828	0.009	1.431	0.005	0.524	0.009	5.294
dy0e86	0.007	2.532	0.010	4.444	0.010	1.536	0.001	0.138	0.008	4.514
dy0e87	0.009	3.151	0.010	3.650	0.011	1.204	0.015	2.797	0.010	4.850
dy0e88	0.010	4.575	0.009	4.804	0.009	1.693	0.004	0.754	0.009	6.318
dy0e89	0.009	3.341	0.010	4.927	0.016	2.195	0.012	2.359	0.011	6.211
dy0e90	0.010	3.637	0.007	3.146	0.007	1.197	-0.006	1.287	0.007	4.282
dy0e91	-0.002	0.637	-0.001	0.365	-0.004	0.771	-0.005	1.124	-0.002	1.156
dy0e92	-0.006	2.448	-0.003	1.708	-0.006	1.074	-0.008	2.077	-0.005	3.487
dy0e93	-0.011	5.009	-0.010	4.703	-0.018	3.841	-0.022	5.984	-0.013	9.303
dy0e94	-0.015	6.427	-0.019	7.809	-0.020	3.932	-0.019	4.308	-0.016	10.679
dy0e95	-0.008	2.613	-0.012	3.426	-0.021	2.881	-0.019	3.851	-0.012	5.609
dy0e96	-0.002	0.715	-0.001	0.574	-0.008	1.285	-0.017	2.877	-0.003	1.975
dy0e97	0.155	37.499	.	.	0.148	17.618	0.097	11.136	0.149	48.365
ageent	-0.005	7.536	-0.004	7.647	-0.002	1.672	-0.004	3.815	-0.004	10.756
ageen2	0.000	5.880	0.000	5.579	0.000	0.971	0.000	3.275	0.000	8.273
phd	0.001	0.176	-0.008	2.551	-0.005	0.579	0.006	0.937	-0.004	1.729
mast	0.002	0.788	-0.003	0.992	0.019	2.355	-0.003	0.728	0.001	0.357
bach	-0.004	1.006	-0.005	1.483	0.010	0.712	0.005	0.924	0.000	0.174
dl_can	-0.002	0.448	0.004	0.938	-0.001	0.026	0.004	0.306	0.002	0.442
dl_fra	-0.002	0.564	0.000	0.055	0.009	0.931	-0.007	0.622	0.000	0.112
dl_grm	-0.001	0.136	0.011	0.915	0.001	0.054	.	.	0.001	0.226
dl_ukg	0.000	0.102	0.003	0.927	-0.007	0.633	0.000	0.015	0.001	0.251
dl_usa	-0.002	0.669	0.003	1.372	-0.005	0.642	-0.004	0.850	0.000	0.201
ml_can	-0.003	0.699	-0.009	1.982	-0.009	0.627	0.007	0.677	-0.003	0.918
ml_fra	-0.002	0.661	-0.004	0.973	-0.021	2.427	0.010	1.265	-0.003	1.317
ml_grm	-0.001	0.179	.	.	-0.017	0.919	.	.	-0.001	0.252
ml_ukg	-0.004	1.460	-0.003	1.547	-0.031	4.137	-0.001	0.303	-0.006	3.378
ml_usa	-0.003	1.360	-0.001	0.699	-0.026	4.416	0.004	1.305	-0.003	2.269
bl_can	0.003	0.398	-0.001	0.123	-0.014	0.753	-0.025	1.786	-0.004	0.827
bl_fra	0.008	1.067	.	.	-0.017	0.605	.	.	0.001	0.129
bl_grm	0.003	0.284	-0.005	0.532
bl_ukg	0.003	0.685	0.004	0.844	-0.018	1.051	0.024	1.692	-0.001	0.444
bl_usa	0.003	0.839	0.002	0.384	-0.014	1.018	-0.004	0.610	-0.002	0.679
dl_eco	0.000	0.038	0.000	0.275	-0.002	0.557	-0.006	1.853	-0.001	0.654
dl_bus	0.000	0.032	-0.016	1.332	-0.005	0.654
dl_eng	0.000	0.036	0.001	0.381	0.009	0.361	0.000	0.035	0.001	0.243
dl_fin	-0.003	0.432	-0.003	0.701	-0.010	0.404	.	.	-0.002	0.567
ml_eco	0.002	1.182	-0.002	1.629	-0.002	0.635	0.002	0.661	0.000	0.228
ml_bus	0.008	1.561	0.002	0.544	0.005	0.735	0.002	0.323	0.005	2.049
ml_eng	-0.001	0.362	0.001	0.477	-0.021	1.421	0.016	1.712	0.000	0.118
ml_fin	-0.003	1.130	-0.001	0.633	-0.001	0.172	-0.008	1.854	-0.002	1.192
bl_eco	0.002	0.459	0.001	0.161	-0.009	0.833	-0.002	0.244	-0.002	0.794
bl_bus	0.001	0.221	0.023	3.948	-0.008	0.630	-0.009	1.185	0.004	1.139
bl_eng	-0.002	0.586	0.005	1.374	-0.015	0.596	.	.	-0.002	0.554
bl_fin	-0.037	3.098	0.003	0.208	-0.025	2.593
wrkex	0.000	0.628	0.000	1.747	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.754	0.000	2.060
d_exp	0.002	0.691	0.003	1.676	0.010	2.476	0.010	3.047	0.005	3.444
cvp	0.000	0.029	0.002	1.321	0.000	0.091	-0.005	1.759	0.000	0.211
oper	-0.002	1.395	-0.001	1.083	0.002	0.823	-0.009	3.876	-0.002	2.118
marid	0.000	0.282	0.003	1.918	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.238	0.000	0.030
d2_US	0.003	2.062	.	.	0.007	1.995	.	.	0.002	2.447
d2_CAN	0.003	1.120	.	.	-0.003	0.497	.	.	0.000	0.226
d2_GBR	0.001	0.546	.	.	0.009	1.913	.	.	0.002	1.509
d2_AUS	0.012	4.800	.	.	0.016	1.195	.	.	0.010	4.340
d2_IND	.	.	0.002	1.548	.	.	0.000	0.058	0.001	1.081
d1_PAK	.	.	-0.022	1.884	-0.021	1.253
d1_FIL	.	.	0.000	0.178	.	.	-0.003	0.834	-0.001	0.411
p_harv	0.004	0.800	0.002	0.684	-0.002	0.153	-0.010	0.758	0.002	0.716
p_mit	-0.002	0.510	-0.004	0.927	0.000	0.012	.	.	-0.003	0.840
p_chic	0.002	0.431	-0.003	0.889	0.006	0.493	0.039	2.962	0.002	0.599
p_stan	0.003	0.599	-0.001	0.170	0.001	0.122	-0.013	0.920	0.001	0.367
p_prin	0.002	0.282	0.004	0.751	.	.	-0.004	0.291	0.003	0.607
p_lse	0.001	0.197	-0.001	0.138	0.002	0.426
p_oxfd	0.004	0.636	-0.002	0.246	0.031	1.846	-0.016	1.065	0.007	1.442
p_cmbg	0.006	0.833	-0.014	1.967	.	.	-0.009	0.618	0.000	0.003
p_cons	0.131	11.151	0.128	12.426	0.092	3.750	0.130	6.558	0.129	17.378
Num Obs	1292		833		510		238		2873	
Adj R-sq	0.623		0.547		0.545		0.691		0.588	

Appendix Table 4: Regressions for current grade, basic sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	-0.509	3.345	-0.882	4.957	-0.011	0.041	-0.055	0.130	-0.548	5.318
dy0e81	-0.474	2.437	-0.650	3.686	0.189	0.576	0.045	0.119	-0.442	3.809
dy0e82	-0.548	3.082	-0.961	4.020	-0.426	1.280	0.211	0.660	-0.558	4.659
dy0e83	-0.879	4.723	-0.837	4.189	-0.678	2.191	-0.277	0.721	-0.871	7.344
dy0e84	-0.772	4.628	-1.191	5.976	-0.504	1.597	-0.216	0.512	-0.831	7.284
dy0e85	-0.868	5.461	-1.162	6.710	-0.852	3.199	0.707	1.199	-0.919	8.785
dy0e86	-0.956	5.557	-1.334	7.239	-0.527	1.782	0.195	0.379	-0.940	8.327
dy0e87	-1.024	5.332	-0.883	3.699	-0.378	0.970	-0.771	1.864	-0.904	6.799
dy0e88	-1.368	9.820	-1.575	10.048	-1.197	4.937	-1.053	2.840	-1.399	15.172
dy0e89	-1.458	8.633	-1.503	8.734	-1.070	3.273	-0.854	2.294	-1.361	12.610
dy0e90	-1.500	8.780	-1.683	8.887	-1.468	5.607	-1.516	3.973	-1.589	14.746
dy0e91	-1.769	11.241	-1.729	10.501	-1.270	4.952	-0.995	2.728	-1.681	16.888
dy0e92	-1.932	12.776	-1.882	11.817	-1.505	6.002	-1.686	5.662	-1.850	19.627
dy0e93	-2.133	15.063	-2.346	12.334	-2.080	9.851	-1.722	6.230	-2.163	23.946
dy0e94	-2.280	15.474	-2.587	12.671	-2.133	9.618	-2.107	6.453	-2.301	24.046
dy0e95	-2.200	11.322	-2.545	8.695	-1.691	5.126	-1.991	5.310	-2.178	16.408
dy0e96	-2.133	13.656	-2.246	10.921	-2.148	7.955	-2.221	4.997	-2.188	20.308
dy0e97	-1.882	7.344	.	.	-1.885	5.192	-2.418	4.587	-2.082	11.412
ageent	-0.069	1.781	-0.088	1.916	-0.062	1.041	-0.067	0.827	-0.051	2.088
ageen2	0.001	2.147	0.001	1.942	0.001	1.420	0.001	1.068	0.001	2.708
phd	0.103	0.480	0.241	0.855	1.440	3.681	1.381	3.027	0.590	4.069
mast	-0.091	0.457	-0.137	0.563	0.752	2.088	0.852	2.367	0.216	1.680
bach	-0.288	1.104	-0.491	1.605	-0.849	1.361	0.189	0.433	-0.284	1.698
dl_can	0.148	0.437	-0.249	0.644	-0.509	0.446	0.748	0.699	-0.037	0.154
dl_fra	0.155	0.774	0.014	0.050	-0.548	1.227	0.504	0.633	0.024	0.159
dl_grm	0.170	0.627	-0.013	0.012	-0.246	0.462	.	.	0.152	0.685
dl_ukg	0.250	1.057	-0.003	0.011	-0.402	0.828	0.205	0.433	0.027	0.178
dl_usa	0.211	1.408	0.078	0.463	0.096	0.301	0.247	0.730	0.146	1.481
ml_can	0.263	1.107	0.682	1.742	-0.938	1.634	-0.391	0.516	0.145	0.805
ml_fra	-0.020	0.098	0.266	0.844	-0.486	1.273	0.500	0.807	-0.007	0.051
ml_grm	-0.307	0.955	.	.	-0.367	0.453	.	.	-0.122	0.423
ml_ukg	0.236	1.441	0.430	2.340	-0.288	0.856	0.517	1.489	0.236	2.214
ml_usa	-0.096	0.728	-0.067	0.530	-0.118	0.460	0.136	0.573	-0.090	1.139
bl_can	0.707	1.550	1.275	1.653	0.972	1.161	1.468	1.389	0.779	2.486
bl_fra	-0.098	0.208	.	.	1.318	1.065	.	.	0.270	0.652
bl_grm	1.639	2.512	2.129	3.419
bl_ukg	-0.115	0.414	0.733	1.919	1.981	2.572	-0.309	0.289	0.315	1.592
bl_usa	-0.203	0.834	-0.028	0.070	1.055	1.777	0.169	0.306	0.032	0.204
dl_eco	0.159	1.438	0.344	2.711	0.009	0.045	-0.034	0.141	0.172	2.351
dl_bus	0.389	0.797	-0.562	0.547	0.283	0.649
dl_eng	0.010	0.050	0.433	1.803	0.281	0.255	0.227	0.363	0.109	0.734
dl_fin	0.060	0.124	0.945	3.054	0.154	0.138	.	.	0.587	2.360
ml_eco	0.321	3.091	0.220	1.685	0.418	2.750	0.377	1.690	0.343	5.064
ml_bus	-0.069	0.219	0.136	0.557	0.723	2.174	1.358	2.482	0.378	2.373
ml_eng	0.004	0.022	-0.091	0.459	0.343	0.519	1.181	1.629	0.039	0.302
ml_fin	-0.107	0.648	0.364	2.368	0.439	1.930	0.348	1.137	0.232	2.453
bl_eco	0.222	1.010	0.907	2.633	0.562	1.227	0.469	0.688	0.510	3.130
bl_bus	0.073	0.171	-0.385	0.767	0.433	0.725	-0.825	1.470	-0.324	1.305
bl_eng	0.129	0.505	-0.088	0.262	0.034	0.030	.	.	0.188	1.004
bl_fin	-0.677	0.878	-0.687	0.650	-0.291	0.472
wrkex	0.032	4.178	0.033	3.257	0.040	2.983	0.057	2.762	0.035	6.764
d_exp	-0.404	2.655	-0.614	4.523	-0.493	2.698	-0.678	2.709	-0.514	6.236
cvp	0.347	3.767	0.109	0.937	-0.015	0.093	-0.070	0.308	0.163	2.638
oper	-0.043	0.576	-0.041	0.457	0.039	0.320	-0.352	1.937	-0.068	1.415
marid	0.304	3.253	0.360	2.721	0.216	2.061	-0.160	1.031	0.279	5.205
d2_US	-0.058	0.639	.	.	-0.162	1.107	.	.	0.035	0.661
d2_CAN	-0.132	0.886	.	.	0.556	1.950	.	.	0.138	1.200
d2_GBR	0.047	0.360	.	.	0.059	0.267	.	.	0.212	2.342
d2_AUS	0.155	0.976	.	.	-0.350	0.603	.	.	0.380	2.706
d2_IND	.	.	0.101	1.077	.	.	-0.220	1.028	0.004	0.055
d1_PAK	.	.	0.383	0.381	0.142	0.135
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.188	0.887	.	.	-0.594	2.280	-0.492	3.065
p_harv	0.972	2.943	1.048	3.983	0.010	0.023	-0.582	0.583	0.790	4.263
p_mit	-0.017	0.063	0.537	1.483	0.700	1.053	.	.	0.267	1.316
p_chic	0.660	1.818	0.174	0.583	0.456	0.804	0.366	0.368	0.373	1.758
p_stan	0.349	1.100	0.852	2.622	0.018	0.034	0.925	0.860	0.512	2.489
p_prin	1.391	3.621	-0.154	0.305	.	.	0.411	0.389	0.815	2.752
p_lse	0.598	1.300	0.166	0.309	1.174	1.004	.	.	0.538	1.618
p_oxfd	1.566	3.438	-0.259	0.482	1.177	1.561	0.309	0.273	0.942	3.116
p_cmbg	0.577	1.201	-1.052	1.726	.	.	0.216	0.195	0.185	0.520
cons	25.675	34.023	26.028	29.270	24.191	22.171	24.142	16.564	24.810	53.528
Num Obs	1295		835		518		242		2890	
Adj R-sq	0.368		0.427		0.300		0.356		0.386	

Appendix Table 5: Regressions for grade promotion, basic sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.058	2.294	0.024	1.075	0.057	1.689	0.011	0.155	0.040	2.631
dy0e81	0.055	1.718	0.069	3.115	0.050	1.226	-0.005	0.083	0.050	2.891
dy0e82	0.097	3.281	0.090	2.952	0.020	0.478	0.051	0.974	0.089	4.958
dy0e83	0.097	3.050	0.124	4.930	0.034	0.841	0.073	1.176	0.099	5.529
dy0e84	0.085	3.012	0.101	3.945	0.148	3.655	-0.005	0.066	0.089	5.134
dy0e85	0.091	3.428	0.101	4.601	0.090	2.689	0.096	1.018	0.091	5.758
dy0e86	0.110	3.901	0.121	5.218	0.123	3.328	-0.067	0.770	0.107	6.427
dy0e87	0.147	4.721	0.162	5.428	0.110	2.265	0.134	2.010	0.141	7.234
dy0e88	0.087	3.738	0.083	4.140	0.054	1.749	0.000	0.006	0.073	5.294
dy0e89	0.144	5.204	0.139	6.418	0.136	3.333	0.058	0.959	0.135	8.406
dy0e90	0.154	5.490	0.118	4.944	0.135	4.093	-0.052	0.845	0.120	7.521
dy0e91	0.131	5.067	0.117	5.634	0.068	2.123	0.054	0.915	0.111	7.507
dy0e92	0.106	4.246	0.148	7.304	0.120	3.798	0.039	0.792	0.116	8.204
dy0e93	0.113	4.825	0.107	4.507	0.042	1.560	0.029	0.631	0.101	7.420
dy0e94	0.121	4.958	0.026	1.015	0.083	2.960	0.028	0.519	0.088	6.177
dy0e95	0.084	2.643	0.089	2.434	-0.008	0.188	0.036	0.587	0.062	3.163
dy0e96	0.034	1.318	-0.040	1.544	-0.105	3.104	-0.172	2.394	-0.024	1.486
dy0e97	-0.053	1.224	.	.	-0.103	2.210	-0.094	0.897	-0.066	2.312
ageent	-0.040	6.087	-0.041	6.730	-0.025	3.217	-0.052	3.721	-0.042	11.064
ageen2	0.000	4.767	0.000	5.332	0.000	2.245	0.001	3.076	0.000	8.848
phd	0.009	0.239	-0.033	0.926	-0.126	2.527	0.009	0.124	-0.040	1.849
mast	0.033	0.982	-0.002	0.076	-0.041	0.893	-0.014	0.232	-0.005	0.254
bach	0.010	0.239	-0.055	1.431	-0.025	0.323	-0.008	0.114	-0.014	0.555
dl_can	0.010	0.188	0.008	0.157	0.093	0.669	0.133	0.785	0.019	0.548
dl_fra	0.021	0.647	0.015	0.428	0.104	1.883	-0.064	0.506	0.023	1.051
dl_grm	0.268	5.791	0.128	1.013	0.066	0.998	.	.	0.209	6.172
dl_ukg	0.024	0.598	0.037	1.170	-0.010	0.160	0.149	1.866	0.044	1.925
dl_usa	0.009	0.372	0.005	0.234	0.011	0.270	0.016	0.283	0.011	0.734
ml_can	-0.017	0.437	-0.103	2.122	-0.156	1.940	0.185	1.037	-0.042	1.565
ml_fra	-0.032	0.935	-0.047	1.103	-0.022	0.456	0.047	0.479	-0.029	1.328
ml_grm	-0.016	0.316	.	.	-0.074	0.751	.	.	-0.029	0.689
ml_ukg	-0.017	0.610	-0.050	2.164	-0.060	1.440	-0.035	0.637	-0.029	1.795
ml_usa	0.007	0.307	-0.029	1.798	-0.038	1.211	0.009	0.229	-0.006	0.500
bl_can	-0.015	0.197	0.124	1.294	-0.165	1.592	-0.248	1.486	-0.047	1.012
bl_fra	0.041	0.457	.	.	-0.201	1.329	.	.	-0.002	0.034
bl_grm	-0.071	0.685	-0.085	0.938
bl_ukg	-0.044	0.960	0.074	1.556	-0.088	0.894	0.425	2.497	-0.014	0.460
bl_usa	-0.034	0.833	-0.082	1.076	0.034	0.450	-0.051	0.442	-0.018	0.736
dl_eco	0.032	1.700	-0.001	0.066	-0.006	0.247	-0.033	0.854	0.016	1.486
dl_bus	-0.095	1.227	-0.124	0.976	-0.110	1.735
dl_eng	0.019	0.580	0.010	0.315	0.753	5.608	-0.102	0.859	0.018	0.799
dl_fin	0.016	0.188	-0.015	0.369	-0.015	0.110	.	.	-0.002	0.053
ml_eco	0.005	0.311	-0.017	1.011	-0.004	0.229	0.036	0.966	-0.005	0.491
ml_bus	0.058	1.055	0.054	1.668	0.008	0.178	0.022	0.250	0.044	1.789
ml_eng	0.016	0.524	0.017	0.698	-0.148	1.840	0.076	0.664	0.009	0.452
ml_fin	0.004	0.162	0.018	0.875	-0.022	0.775	-0.063	1.183	0.003	0.179
bl_eco	0.023	0.616	0.009	0.196	-0.178	2.651	-0.101	0.795	-0.017	0.658
bl_bus	0.073	0.922	0.353	5.188	-0.052	0.613	.	.	0.115	2.483
bl_eng	0.016	0.371	0.019	0.438	-0.073	0.533	.	.	-0.015	0.518
bl_fin	-0.031	0.255	0.193	1.332	-0.017	0.194
wrkex	0.001	0.560	-0.002	1.899	-0.002	1.230	0.002	0.587	-0.001	0.802
d_exp	0.019	0.689	0.027	1.419	0.091	3.577	0.091	2.188	0.048	3.559
cvp	0.016	1.032	0.036	2.430	-0.016	0.812	-0.055	1.466	0.010	1.031
oper	-0.001	0.110	0.020	1.719	0.016	1.046	-0.060	1.926	0.004	0.497
marid	-0.001	0.069	0.030	1.781	-0.017	1.256	-0.021	0.810	-0.005	0.663
d2_US	0.017	1.085	.	.	0.026	1.404	.	.	0.012	1.513
d2_CAN	0.003	0.115	.	.	0.071	1.858	.	.	0.009	0.512
d2_GBR	0.019	0.851	.	.	0.103	3.554	.	.	0.026	1.879
d2_AUS	0.014	0.527	.	.	-0.024	0.334	.	.	-0.001	0.033
d2_IND	.	.	-0.007	0.570	.	.	-0.003	0.087	-0.005	0.401
d1_PAK	.	.	-0.174	1.396	-0.185	1.211
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.025	0.968	.	.	-0.038	0.882	-0.026	1.072
p_harv	0.025	0.484	0.022	0.624	0.037	0.682	-0.077	0.486	0.021	0.757
p_mit	0.003	0.060	-0.043	0.969	0.130	1.605	.	.	-0.003	0.092
p_chic	0.005	0.089	-0.015	0.416	0.001	0.021	0.285	1.821	0.006	0.195
p_stan	0.054	1.070	-0.029	0.722	0.018	0.287	-0.135	0.799	0.009	0.316
p_prin	0.034	0.554	0.058	0.929	.	.	-0.001	0.004	0.037	0.872
p_lse	0.100	1.339	0.022	0.293	1.560	10.947	.	.	0.195	3.877
p_oxfd	0.145	1.958	-0.064	0.850	0.134	1.461	-0.233	1.289	0.055	1.206
p_cmbg	0.046	0.591	-0.167	2.220	.	.	-0.146	0.814	-0.043	0.832
cons	0.958	7.444	1.015	8.671	0.834	5.740	1.351	5.193	1.065	14.615
Num Obs	1169		782		474		219		2644	
Adj R-sq	0.164		0.332		0.490		0.253		0.242	

Appendix Table 6: Regressions for log current salary, YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	-0.078	1.812	-0.187	4.651	-0.115	2.330	0.081	1.088	-0.124	5.421
dy0e81	-0.128	2.158	-0.186	4.038	-0.101	1.601	0.069	0.983	-0.144	5.179
dy0e82	-0.139	2.477	-0.231	4.434	-0.234	2.089	-0.111	1.787	-0.187	6.498
dy0e83	-0.221	2.784	-0.218	3.397	-0.325	2.946	-0.083	0.872	-0.249	6.861
dy0e84	-0.150	1.172	-0.295	4.614	-0.076	0.928	-0.321	4.641	-0.272	7.994
dy0e85	-0.210	2.587	-0.245	5.132	-0.193	2.793	-0.193	2.015	-0.240	7.448
dy0e86	-0.345	5.931	-0.352	6.295	-0.176	2.432	-0.093	1.003	-0.301	9.223
dy0e87	-0.259	5.361	-0.331	5.516	-0.178	2.245	-0.278	3.667	-0.292	9.507
dy0e88	-0.359	6.840	-0.327	5.183	-0.345	6.193	-0.321	3.814	-0.362	12.912
dy0e89	-0.398	6.089	-0.471	9.228	-0.369	4.285	-0.230	1.836	-0.417	12.205
dy0e90	-0.415	5.314	-0.418	5.818	-0.414	7.572	-0.336	4.095	-0.461	13.677
dy0e91	-0.573	8.509	-0.433	8.265	-0.423	7.685	-0.373	4.972	-0.475	16.497
dy0e92	-0.497	8.266	-0.485	8.235	-0.494	7.674	-0.418	6.838	-0.515	17.785
dy0e93	-0.573	13.503	-0.554	9.772	-0.501	11.497	-0.433	6.914	-0.560	25.785
dy0e94	-0.593	13.534	-0.524	8.958	-0.588	12.727	-0.498	7.400	-0.603	26.344
dy0e95	-0.743	5.178	.	.	-0.629	5.050	-0.502	5.044	-0.643	10.266
dy0e96	-0.761	7.482	-0.611	4.705	-0.704	9.780
dy0e97
ageent	-0.074	3.157	-0.105	3.787	-0.124	2.517	-0.148	3.792	-0.085	6.065
ageen2	0.001	3.136	0.002	3.814	0.002	2.766	0.002	3.945	0.001	6.353
phd	0.149	1.390	-0.146	2.020	.	.	0.044	0.332	0.047	0.630
mast	0.011	0.110	.	.	0.087	0.571	-0.022	0.200	0.008	0.113
bach	0.213	1.303	0.140	1.113	.	.	-0.033	0.239	0.207	1.463
dl_can	0.047	0.359	0.019	0.240	0.002	0.034
dl_fra	0.012	0.191	0.121	1.378	0.109	0.666	.	.	0.029	0.737
dl_grm	0.126	1.778	.	.	0.081	0.513	.	.	0.060	1.396
dl_ukg	-0.097	0.856	0.066	0.923	0.085	0.506	0.074	0.723	0.023	0.575
dl_usa	-0.043	0.984	0.043	0.967	0.105	0.709	0.111	1.274	0.013	0.481
ml_can	0.075	0.891	-0.258	2.132	0.012	0.216
ml_fra	-0.093	1.147	-0.050	0.677	0.074	0.617	.	.	-0.055	1.182
ml_grm	-0.023	0.317	.	.	-0.131	1.163	.	.	-0.064	1.174
ml_ukg	0.040	0.961	0.082	1.259	-0.027	0.421	0.010	0.177	0.036	1.462
ml_usa	0.049	1.254	-0.024	0.612	0.009	0.161	0.044	0.976	0.027	1.351
bl_can
bl_fra
bl_grm	-0.115	0.583	-0.115	0.666
bl_ukg	-0.120	0.611	0.162	1.366
bl_usa	0.031	0.213
dl_eco	-0.039	0.827	0.105	2.599	0.010	0.212	-0.156	2.930	0.005	0.210
dl_bus	0.034	0.201	0.035	0.287
dl_eng	-0.055	0.752	0.116	1.935	-0.346	1.905	.	.	0.020	0.507
dl_fin	.	.	0.219	2.532	0.117	1.799
ml_eco	0.035	1.093	-0.046	1.026	-0.075	2.094	0.058	1.167	0.004	0.244
ml_bus	-0.015	0.157	-0.109	0.916	0.258	2.993	0.363	3.334	0.083	1.713
ml_eng	0.065	0.784	0.039	0.301	0.051	0.815
ml_fin	0.002	0.033	-0.008	0.153	-0.029	0.587	-0.082	1.114	-0.014	0.584
bl_eco	-0.149	0.795	-0.261	1.756
bl_bus
bl_eng	-0.015	0.086	.	.	-0.238	1.064
bl_fin
wrkex	0.011	1.976	-0.001	0.257	0.002	0.297	-0.003	0.389	0.005	1.831
d_exp	0.000	0.012	-0.032	1.069	-0.068	1.475	-0.042	0.525	-0.022	1.149
cvp	0.004	0.091	-0.013	0.330	-0.028	0.602	-0.044	0.848	-0.019	0.926
oper	-0.019	0.702	-0.029	0.947	-0.002	0.052	-0.061	1.476	-0.026	1.777
marid	0.004	0.150	0.026	0.804	0.025	0.895	0.011	0.251	0.016	1.155
d2_US	0.019	0.699	.	.	0.009	0.278	.	.	-0.002	0.120
d2_CAN	0.043	0.751	.	.	0.020	0.355	.	.	0.058	1.679
d2_GBR	0.044	1.268	.	.	0.035	0.643	.	.	0.048	2.171
d2_AUS	0.070	1.346	0.068	1.552
d2_IND	.	.	0.032	1.247	.	.	-0.006	0.171	0.029	1.533
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	0.118	1.378	.	.	-0.182	2.743	-0.064	1.276
p_harv	0.048	0.380	0.095	2.053	-0.036	0.525	-0.163	1.610	0.060	1.752
p_mit	0.007	0.082	0.031	0.346	0.231	1.457	.	.	0.044	0.861
p_chic	0.094	0.756	0.136	1.135	0.127	1.530
p_stan	0.139	1.996	0.142	2.431	0.009	0.097	0.103	0.781	0.131	3.597
p_prin	0.116	0.900	-0.109	0.976	0.059	0.702
p_lse	0.039	0.222	0.031	0.227	0.020	0.222
p_oxfd	0.201	1.478	0.093	0.671	0.083	1.206
p_cmbg	0.191	1.433	-0.109	0.793	.	.	0.115	0.900	0.015	0.256
cons	12.552	31.959	13.118	29.896	13.025	17.444	13.694	22.314	12.704	54.094
Num Obs	213		169		111		059		552	
Adj R-sq	0.782		0.789		0.822		0.870		0.802	

Appendix Table 7: Regressions for log current salary, non-YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	-0.120	5.725	-0.176	6.366	-0.085	1.721	-0.118	1.586	-0.126	7.986
dy0e81	-0.112	4.267	-0.132	4.894	-0.045	0.800	-0.019	0.307	-0.104	6.000
dy0e82	-0.138	5.654	-0.196	5.167	-0.049	1.001	-0.059	1.058	-0.137	7.634
dy0e83	-0.211	8.543	-0.184	6.403	-0.131	2.818	-0.076	1.253	-0.185	10.892
dy0e84	-0.190	8.985	-0.242	8.239	-0.159	3.224	-0.089	0.995	-0.194	11.870
dy0e85	-0.224	10.900	-0.253	9.866	-0.165	3.934	0.119	1.204	-0.215	14.413
dy0e86	-0.234	10.249	-0.268	10.009	-0.144	3.085	0.032	0.406	-0.219	13.465
dy0e87	-0.264	9.741	-0.235	6.571	-0.149	2.383	-0.219	3.271	-0.236	11.795
dy0e88	-0.304	16.309	-0.310	13.707	-0.246	6.412	-0.254	4.418	-0.289	21.744
dy0e89	-0.321	14.450	-0.298	11.809	-0.195	3.719	-0.160	3.013	-0.280	18.142
dy0e90	-0.335	15.128	-0.331	12.318	-0.289	6.720	-0.255	4.202	-0.326	21.090
dy0e91	-0.367	17.752	-0.375	15.725	-0.238	5.562	-0.232	3.854	-0.347	24.040
dy0e92	-0.377	18.752	-0.380	16.620	-0.283	7.241	-0.283	5.823	-0.359	26.412
dy0e93	-0.396	19.991	-0.429	14.827	-0.326	9.215	-0.325	7.118	-0.390	28.137
dy0e94	-0.426	20.633	-0.444	14.739	-0.338	8.689	-0.358	6.754	-0.408	27.829
dy0e95	-0.425	17.197	-0.506	12.934	-0.293	5.854	-0.311	5.087	-0.407	22.222
dy0e96	-0.420	20.980	-0.413	14.546	-0.355	8.989	-0.352	5.573	-0.408	27.665
dy0e97	-0.365	11.411	.	.	-0.319	6.055	-0.434	5.740	-0.393	16.207
ageent	0.026	4.550	0.028	3.915	0.001	0.152	0.008	0.662	0.025	7.066
ageen2	0.000	3.237	0.000	3.092	0.000	0.622	0.000	0.023	0.000	4.948
phd	0.012	0.443	0.063	1.627	0.166	2.993	0.170	2.503	0.085	4.256
mast	-0.019	0.731	-0.012	0.372	0.079	1.465	0.104	1.909	0.030	1.718
bach	-0.054	1.651	-0.051	1.270	-0.062	0.703	0.059	0.964	-0.033	1.474
dl_can	-0.022	0.491	-0.069	1.096	-0.075	0.473	.	.	-0.031	0.848
dl_fra	0.017	0.614	-0.035	0.844	-0.016	0.230	0.035	0.310	0.005	0.215
dl_grm	-0.031	0.764	-0.045	0.335	0.199	1.222	.	.	0.011	0.283
dl_ukg	0.056	1.788	-0.007	0.192	-0.057	0.732	0.111	1.267	0.016	0.728
dl_usa	0.039	1.904	0.011	0.452	0.044	0.948	0.017	0.325	0.024	1.653
ml_can	0.037	1.177	0.174	3.110	-0.087	1.052	-0.169	1.213	0.031	1.220
ml_fra	0.031	1.191	0.070	1.451	-0.016	0.266	0.130	1.463	0.032	1.553
ml_grm	-0.022	0.451	.	.	0.022	0.138	.	.	0.026	0.560
ml_ukg	0.041	1.732	0.060	2.277	-0.015	0.269	0.105	1.608	0.030	1.883
ml_usa	-0.003	0.170	0.002	0.128	0.002	0.056	0.050	1.220	-0.012	1.011
bl_can	0.110	1.948	0.203	2.007	0.018	0.154	0.193	1.329	0.082	1.977
bl_fra	0.032	0.543	.	.	0.183	1.057	.	.	0.078	1.439
bl_grm	0.389	4.050	0.436	4.401
bl_ukg	0.044	1.236	0.044	0.854	0.248	2.278	-0.115	0.765	0.057	2.143
bl_usa	0.033	1.067	0.119	2.241	0.102	1.223	0.029	0.383	0.041	1.946
dl_eco	0.019	1.274	0.037	2.001	0.027	0.844	0.049	1.263	0.024	2.303
dl_bus	0.093	1.387	-0.132	0.972	0.061	0.969
dl_eng	-0.008	0.300	0.043	1.159	.	.	-0.008	0.084	0.006	0.272
dl_fin	-0.001	0.009	0.049	1.048	0.160	1.034	.	.	0.040	1.086
ml_eco	0.026	1.799	0.022	1.141	0.069	2.814	0.027	0.734	0.035	3.447
ml_bus	-0.022	0.507	0.008	0.233	0.042	0.824	0.122	1.369	0.022	0.963
ml_eng	-0.013	0.560	0.001	0.026	0.042	0.454	0.183	1.825	0.013	0.741
ml_fin	-0.017	0.775	0.053	2.283	0.089	2.390	0.024	0.436	0.037	2.570
bl_eco	0.026	0.960	0.104	2.269	0.097	1.421	-0.044	0.401	0.068	3.097
bl_bus	0.051	0.970	-0.092	1.386	0.040	0.477	-0.094	1.204	-0.038	1.165
bl_eng	0.006	0.182	-0.009	0.195	0.042	1.677
bl_fin	-0.024	0.249	-0.285	2.057	-0.024	0.300
wrkex	0.005	5.267	0.008	5.555	0.007	3.334	0.010	3.125	0.006	8.686
d_exp	-0.045	2.038	-0.067	2.961	-0.083	2.732	-0.088	2.210	-0.065	5.053
cvp	0.036	2.971	-0.008	0.500	0.000	0.017	0.007	0.187	0.018	2.105
oper	0.001	0.117	-0.014	1.093	-0.001	0.027	-0.029	0.963	-0.007	0.969
marid	0.051	4.036	0.050	2.460	0.029	1.720	-0.041	1.719	0.046	5.880
d2_US	-0.012	0.945	.	.	-0.022	0.905	.	.	0.014	1.841
d2_CAN	-0.012	0.633	.	.	0.071	1.501	.	.	0.024	1.451
d2_GBR	-0.007	0.367	.	.	0.009	0.258	.	.	0.037	2.731
d2_AUS	0.021	0.991	.	.	-0.027	0.332	.	.	0.059	2.966
d2_IND	.	.	0.004	0.277	.	.	-0.025	0.656	-0.012	0.949
d1_PAK	.	.	0.118	0.895	0.097	0.704
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.051	1.733	.	.	-0.043	1.087	-0.068	3.011
p_harv	0.091	2.144	0.105	2.185	0.023	0.272	.	.	0.087	2.855
p_mit	-0.004	0.104	0.065	1.169	-0.034	0.299	.	.	0.029	0.957
p_chic	0.088	1.852	0.000	0.009	0.059	0.733	0.030	0.221	0.034	1.179
p_stan	0.015	0.316	0.013	0.216	-0.006	0.063	.	.	0.010	0.282
p_prin	0.134	2.650	-0.078	1.171	0.061	1.450
p_lse	0.063	1.038	-0.036	0.436	0.076	0.450	.	.	0.038	0.793
p_oxfd	0.201	2.822	-0.019	0.256	0.108	0.956	.	.	0.080	1.720
p_cmbg	0.179	1.857	-0.152	1.560	0.022	0.312
cons	10.757	94.507	10.685	75.795	11.010	67.126	10.840	50.523	10.668	152.947
Num Obs	1082	666	666	407	407	183	183	2338	2338	2338
Adj R-sq	0.539		0.564		0.326		0.408		0.525	

Appendix Table 8: Regressions for salary growth, YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.010	3.729	0.004	1.431	0.008	1.788	0.006	0.756	0.007	4.105
dy0e81	0.009	2.437	0.006	1.829	0.008	1.455	0.011	1.331	0.008	3.860
dy0e82	0.004	1.048	0.002	0.529	0.008	0.826	-0.002	0.272	0.002	1.094
dy0e83	0.000	0.047	0.005	1.005	-0.007	0.670	0.002	0.146	0.000	0.052
dy0e84	0.009	1.072	-0.002	0.483	0.012	1.662	-0.012	1.483	0.000	0.178
dy0e85	0.006	1.182	0.008	2.292	0.004	0.608	0.008	0.764	0.007	3.014
dy0e86	0.007	1.865	0.006	1.549	0.008	1.195	0.012	1.125	0.008	3.230
dy0e87	0.012	3.779	0.009	2.027	0.021	2.875	0.002	0.183	0.010	4.537
dy0e88	0.013	3.782	0.012	2.716	0.008	1.551	0.009	0.899	0.010	4.631
dy0e89	0.010	2.281	-0.001	0.343	0.006	0.733	0.013	0.914	0.004	1.737
dy0e90	0.012	2.332	-0.003	0.486	0.002	0.342	-0.002	0.264	0.001	0.580
dy0e91	-0.009	2.008	-0.002	0.512	-0.002	0.427	-0.009	1.073	-0.005	2.506
dy0e92	-0.011	2.933	-0.008	1.819	-0.015	2.572	-0.019	2.705	-0.014	6.386
dy0e93	-0.022	8.095	-0.017	4.061	-0.015	3.690	-0.015	2.095	-0.017	10.823
dy0e94	-0.023	8.151	-0.022	5.335	-0.021	4.943	-0.025	3.177	-0.023	13.363
dy0e95	-0.029	3.156	.	.	-0.016	1.447	-0.022	1.930	-0.018	3.990
dy0e96	0.005	0.770	0.038	4.095	0.017	3.145
dy0e97
ageent	-0.002	1.154	-0.003	1.731	-0.004	0.972	-0.005	1.093	-0.003	2.840
ageen2	0.000	0.433	0.000	1.231	0.000	0.652	0.000	0.915	0.000	1.870
phd	0.000	0.057	-0.009	1.716	.	.	0.001	0.042	-0.002	0.282
mast	-0.004	0.718	.	.	0.006	0.416	-0.012	0.952	-0.003	0.536
bach	-0.001	0.078	-0.002	0.242	.	.	-0.010	0.609	-0.002	0.173
dl_can	0.020	2.371	0.000	0.057	0.004	0.910
dl_fra	-0.002	0.434	0.002	0.309	0.001	0.041	.	.	0.000	0.094
dl_grm	0.001	0.286	.	.	-0.001	0.054	.	.	0.000	0.130
dl_ukg	-0.004	0.520	0.002	0.388	0.001	0.086	0.006	0.488	0.001	0.407
dl_usa	0.001	0.259	0.003	1.043	0.010	0.726	0.003	0.271	0.002	1.143
ml_can	-0.002	0.295	-0.005	0.559	-0.003	0.742
ml_fra	-0.009	1.793	0.000	0.012	0.004	0.364	.	.	-0.003	0.952
ml_grm	0.001	0.232	.	.	-0.002	0.152	.	.	0.000	0.034
ml_ukg	0.004	1.586	0.007	1.509	-0.007	1.169	0.003	0.424	0.003	1.413
ml_usa	0.002	0.665	-0.003	0.943	-0.002	0.351	0.002	0.335	0.000	0.035
bl_can
bl_fra
bl_grm	0.006	0.433	0.011	0.824
bl_ukg	-0.002	0.174	0.002	0.201
bl_usa	0.003	0.312
dl_eco	0.000	0.017	0.003	0.889	-0.002	0.469	-0.012	1.960	-0.001	0.660
dl_bus	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.036
dl_eng	-0.001	0.169	0.001	0.213	-0.012	0.752	.	.	-0.003	0.868
dl_fin	.	.	0.010	1.577	0.007	1.517
ml_eco	0.003	1.328	-0.005	1.444	-0.010	2.970	0.012	2.046	0.000	0.100
ml_bus	0.001	0.188	-0.013	1.512	0.007	0.884	0.027	2.161	0.004	1.061
ml_eng	0.001	0.228	0.009	0.934	0.000	0.096
ml_fin	0.003	0.881	-0.005	1.362	-0.007	1.492	-0.001	0.163	-0.002	0.869
bl_eco	-0.003	0.209	-0.003	0.255
bl_bus
bl_eng	-0.009	0.561	.	.	-0.012	0.702
bl_fin
wrkex	0.001	1.533	0.000	0.553	0.000	0.476	-0.001	0.702	0.000	0.580
d_exp	0.001	0.311	-0.001	0.284	-0.006	1.504	-0.007	0.709	-0.001	0.461
cvp	0.001	0.390	0.002	0.629	0.004	0.827	-0.002	0.394	0.001	0.347
oper	-0.002	1.355	-0.001	0.270	-0.001	0.441	-0.007	1.446	-0.002	2.005
marid	0.000	0.142	0.004	1.557	-0.001	0.256	-0.002	0.339	0.000	0.473
d2_US	-0.001	0.687	.	.	-0.005	1.774	.	.	-0.001	0.932
d2_CAN	-0.001	0.364	.	.	0.000	0.039	.	.	0.000	0.124
d2_GBR	0.000	0.178	.	.	-0.004	0.881	.	.	0.000	0.074
d2_AUS	0.003	0.872	0.004	1.213
d2_IND	.	.	0.002	0.827	.	.	-0.004	1.031	0.000	0.040
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.001	0.118	.	.	-0.016	2.079	-0.010	2.615
p_harv	0.012	1.467	0.005	1.445	-0.007	1.177	-0.013	1.157	0.002	0.865
p_mit	0.003	0.513	0.003	0.462	0.012	0.848	.	.	0.003	0.819
p_chic	-0.002	0.264	0.002	0.243	0.000	0.006
p_stan	-0.005	1.078	0.003	0.693	-0.009	1.111	0.012	0.779	0.000	0.162
p_prin	-0.001	0.142	-0.009	0.686	-0.004	0.648
p_lse	0.005	0.461	0.003	0.263	0.001	0.110
p_oxfd	0.009	1.044	-0.005	0.289	0.004	0.783
p_cmbg	0.016	1.797	-0.003	0.347	.	.	0.008	0.549	0.004	0.852
_cons	0.083	3.252	0.107	3.410	0.128	1.870	0.144	2.037	0.102	5.879
Num Obs	213		169		111		059		552	
Adj R-sq	0.656		0.531		0.610		0.670		0.603	

Appendix Table 9: Regressions for annual salary growth, non-YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.008	2.950	0.006	2.372	0.018	1.990	0.004	0.501	0.008	3.813
dy0e81	0.013	3.842	0.008	3.414	0.017	1.599	0.007	1.149	0.011	4.823
dy0e82	0.011	3.409	0.013	3.624	0.013	1.452	0.015	2.654	0.013	5.479
dy0e83	0.009	2.665	0.013	4.900	0.011	1.275	0.018	2.969	0.011	5.057
dy0e84	0.007	2.384	0.010	3.809	0.021	2.322	0.015	1.595	0.010	4.617
dy0e85	0.008	2.963	0.011	4.553	0.010	1.307	-0.004	0.292	0.010	4.910
dy0e86	0.008	2.490	0.010	4.127	0.013	1.580	-0.004	0.479	0.009	4.087
dy0e87	0.009	2.375	0.011	3.456	0.011	0.964	0.019	2.719	0.011	4.147
dy0e88	0.009	3.753	0.009	4.217	0.010	1.512	0.001	0.106	0.010	5.539
dy0e89	0.009	3.020	0.012	5.108	0.020	2.185	0.011	1.959	0.012	5.892
dy0e90	0.009	3.147	0.009	3.606	0.011	1.344	-0.008	1.288	0.009	4.389
dy0e91	-0.001	0.309	0.000	0.042	-0.004	0.574	-0.006	1.051	-0.001	0.304
dy0e92	-0.004	1.661	-0.002	1.012	-0.004	0.507	-0.005	0.987	-0.003	1.864
dy0e93	-0.009	3.271	-0.009	3.508	-0.016	2.476	-0.027	5.841	-0.012	6.503
dy0e94	-0.013	4.667	-0.018	6.323	-0.016	2.306	-0.019	3.462	-0.014	7.276
dy0e95	-0.007	2.039	-0.011	3.016	-0.020	2.189	-0.021	3.326	-0.011	4.422
dy0e96	-0.002	0.599	-0.002	0.922	-0.006	0.896	-0.017	2.622	-0.003	1.522
dy0e97	0.156	34.831	.	.	0.148	15.223	0.092	9.591	0.150	44.763
ageent	-0.006	7.175	-0.005	7.852	-0.003	1.692	-0.004	3.166	-0.005	10.742
ageen2	0.000	5.904	0.000	6.112	0.000	1.066	0.000	2.752	0.000	8.609
phd	0.001	0.246	-0.008	2.172	-0.005	0.530	0.010	1.445	-0.004	1.461
mast	0.003	0.849	-0.003	1.074	0.025	2.647	-0.002	0.448	0.002	0.682
bach	-0.005	1.076	-0.006	1.514	0.007	0.421	0.003	0.503	-0.001	0.269
dl_can	-0.004	0.680	0.004	0.759	0.002	0.075	.	.	0.000	0.047
dl_fra	-0.002	0.565	0.000	0.036	0.012	0.954	-0.015	1.294	-0.001	0.315
dl_grm	-0.002	0.373	0.011	0.883	-0.001	0.036	.	.	0.000	0.010
dl_ukg	0.001	0.159	0.000	0.008	-0.009	0.666	-0.009	1.027	0.000	0.016
dl_usa	-0.002	0.836	0.003	1.178	-0.007	0.797	-0.009	1.594	0.000	0.015
ml_can	-0.003	0.775	-0.010	2.023	-0.014	0.820	0.000	0.010	-0.004	1.086
ml_fra	-0.002	0.440	-0.003	0.720	-0.029	2.803	0.009	0.941	-0.004	1.375
ml_grm	-0.001	0.162	.	.	-0.015	0.520	.	.	-0.001	0.114
ml_ukg	-0.005	1.498	-0.004	1.617	-0.043	4.204	-0.002	0.300	-0.007	3.558
ml_usa	-0.004	1.496	-0.001	0.484	-0.033	4.475	0.002	0.558	-0.004	2.506
bl_can	0.003	0.399	-0.002	0.189	-0.009	0.422	-0.024	1.585	-0.004	0.752
bl_fra	0.008	1.029	.	.	-0.016	0.505	.	.	0.000	0.028
bl_grm	0.000	0.037	-0.007	0.533
bl_ukg	0.004	0.862	0.004	0.918	-0.019	0.964	0.019	1.227	-0.001	0.379
bl_usa	0.002	0.592	0.000	0.014	-0.012	0.807	-0.004	0.455	-0.002	0.909
dl_eco	-0.001	0.472	0.000	0.023	-0.004	0.604	-0.007	1.648	-0.001	0.612
dl_bus	-0.001	0.107	-0.015	1.227	-0.006	0.725
dl_eng	0.000	0.118	0.002	0.655	.	.	-0.006	0.632	0.001	0.365
dl_fin	-0.004	0.476	-0.005	1.191	-0.007	0.257	.	.	-0.004	0.935
ml_eco	0.002	1.246	-0.001	0.742	0.001	0.325	-0.001	0.171	0.001	0.666
ml_bus	0.009	1.630	0.003	0.943	0.003	0.341	0.001	0.123	0.006	1.902
ml_eng	0.000	0.151	0.001	0.418	-0.025	1.530	0.016	1.545	0.000	0.075
ml_fin	-0.005	1.495	0.001	0.546	0.000	0.064	-0.002	0.299	-0.001	0.500
bl_eco	0.001	0.320	0.001	0.251	-0.006	0.518	0.003	0.265	-0.002	0.634
bl_bus	0.000	0.016	0.022	3.623	-0.007	0.499	-0.009	1.138	0.004	0.881
bl_eng	-0.002	0.567	0.006	1.394	-0.001	0.315
bl_fin	-0.036	2.823	0.004	0.340	-0.024	2.315
wrkex	0.000	0.890	0.000	1.662	0.000	0.068	0.000	1.150	0.000	2.267
d_exp	0.000	0.142	0.002	0.869	0.011	1.950	0.007	1.711	0.004	2.448
cvp	0.000	0.246	0.002	1.258	-0.002	0.357	-0.004	1.186	0.000	0.062
oper	-0.001	0.457	-0.001	0.434	0.003	0.952	-0.008	2.731	-0.001	0.799
marid	0.000	0.275	0.002	1.320	0.001	0.436	-0.001	0.335	0.000	0.094
d2_US	0.004	2.481	.	.	0.008	1.907	.	.	0.003	2.520
d2_CAN	0.004	1.373	.	.	-0.006	0.678	.	.	0.001	0.421
d2_GBR	0.002	0.638	.	.	0.013	1.930	.	.	0.003	1.641
d2_AUS	0.014	4.781	.	.	0.017	1.158	.	.	0.011	4.121
d2_IND	.	.	0.001	0.578	.	.	0.001	0.133	0.001	0.886
d1_PAK	.	.	-0.025	2.011	-0.022	1.231
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.001	0.279	.	.	0.000	0.075	0.000	0.012
p_harv	0.004	0.630	0.000	0.037	0.001	0.095	.	.	0.002	0.590
p_mit	-0.002	0.487	-0.005	0.917	0.008	0.397	.	.	-0.003	0.822
p_chic	0.003	0.501	-0.005	1.346	0.006	0.440	0.042	3.020	0.002	0.422
p_stan	0.006	0.865	-0.003	0.631	0.011	0.632	.	.	0.003	0.614
p_prin	0.002	0.301	0.003	0.482	0.004	0.717
p_lse	0.004	0.530	-0.002	0.246	0.004	0.662
p_oxfd	-0.001	0.054	-0.001	0.136	0.032	1.578	.	.	0.007	1.102
p_cmbg	0.013	0.985	-0.014	1.605	-0.001	0.070
cons	0.151	9.846	0.151	11.597	0.098	3.365	0.127	5.616	0.147	16.047
Num Obs	1079		664		399		179		2321	
Adj R-sq	0.622		0.552		0.549		0.715		0.594	

Appendix Table 10: Regressions for current grade, YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	-0.037	0.098	-1.012	3.065	-0.564	1.262	0.695	0.884	-0.462	2.384
dy0e81	-0.468	0.896	-0.725	1.914	-0.072	0.125	1.144	1.536	-0.443	1.878
dy0e82	-0.395	0.802	-0.977	2.280	-1.041	1.021	0.109	0.165	-0.675	2.756
dy0e83	-0.828	1.192	-0.916	1.737	-1.529	1.526	-0.540	0.538	-1.089	3.537
dy0e84	-0.665	0.591	-1.350	2.566	1.019	1.372	-1.474	2.008	-1.083	3.756
dy0e85	-0.558	0.783	-0.652	1.661	-0.193	0.308	0.066	0.065	-0.685	2.502
dy0e86	-1.382	2.707	-1.382	3.004	-0.757	1.152	0.307	0.311	-1.167	4.210
dy0e87	-1.091	2.577	-0.759	1.537	-0.615	0.853	-0.913	1.135	-1.086	4.162
dy0e88	-1.559	3.388	-1.088	2.095	-1.622	3.204	-1.460	1.639	-1.585	6.655
dy0e89	-1.559	2.720	-2.489	5.922	-1.679	2.145	-1.271	0.958	-2.017	6.957
dy0e90	-1.996	2.911	-2.144	3.629	-1.747	3.512	-1.360	1.561	-2.264	7.917
dy0e91	-2.938	4.968	-1.854	4.300	-2.278	4.553	-1.629	2.046	-2.327	9.529
dy0e92	-2.454	4.653	-2.262	4.669	-2.750	4.700	-2.033	3.132	-2.620	10.664
dy0e93	-3.372	9.048	-3.023	6.481	-2.790	7.043	-1.958	2.949	-3.077	16.683
dy0e94	-3.432	8.922	-2.800	5.822	-3.261	7.766	-2.704	3.792	-3.457	17.783
dy0e95	-4.217	3.349	.	.	-3.434	3.034	-2.422	2.296	-3.536	6.647
dy0e96	-4.562	5.110	-3.163	2.964	-3.988	6.526
dy0e97
ageent	-0.374	1.812	-0.490	2.150	-1.082	2.410	-1.335	3.230	-0.534	4.471
ageen2	0.006	1.747	0.008	2.079	0.018	2.426	0.019	3.060	0.008	4.414
phd	0.672	0.715	-1.428	2.396	.	.	1.441	1.033	0.286	0.449
mast	-0.280	0.333	.	.	1.006	0.723	0.219	0.189	-0.029	0.049
bach	2.050	1.426	0.926	0.892	.	.	0.143	0.099	2.029	1.694
dl_can	1.001	0.862	-0.232	0.349	-0.181	0.361
dl_fra	0.332	0.630	0.921	1.272	1.134	0.763	.	.	0.215	0.641
dl_grm	1.131	1.816	.	.	0.883	0.617	.	.	0.491	1.343
dl_ukg	-0.679	0.682	0.414	0.703	0.767	0.501	-0.479	0.442	0.069	0.199
dl_usa	-0.141	0.372	0.192	0.521	1.280	0.955	-0.174	0.188	0.071	0.312
ml_can	0.536	0.729	-1.901	1.912	0.004	0.009
ml_fra	-0.624	0.882	-0.129	0.211	-0.253	0.233	.	.	-0.413	1.038
ml_grm	-0.189	0.298	.	.	-1.019	0.995	.	.	-0.519	1.118
ml_ukg	0.431	1.178	0.857	1.606	-0.090	0.156	0.012	0.020	0.405	1.916
ml_usa	0.368	1.077	-0.219	0.688	-0.123	0.240	0.237	0.494	0.172	1.015
bl_can
bl_fra
bl_grm	-2.557	1.475	-2.037	1.384
bl_ukg	-1.198	0.697	1.102	1.094
bl_usa	0.270	0.217
dl_eco	-0.177	0.429	0.726	2.194	-0.282	0.688	-0.885	1.572	-0.004	0.021
dl_bus	-0.418	0.280	-0.337	0.322
dl_eng	-0.401	0.620	0.869	1.760	-2.108	1.278	.	.	0.110	0.332
dl_fin	.	.	2.106	2.963	1.270	2.310
ml_eco	0.316	1.115	-0.816	2.196	-0.606	1.869	0.512	0.977	-0.006	0.041
ml_bus	0.053	0.062	-1.183	1.207	2.412	3.076	1.988	1.721	0.728	1.765
ml_eng	0.587	0.807	0.208	0.197	0.299	0.567
ml_fin	-0.142	0.321	-0.475	1.142	-0.120	0.266	-0.580	0.744	-0.107	0.513
bl_eco	-1.675	1.020	-2.472	1.959
bl_bus
bl_eng	-0.131	0.085	.	.	-2.516	1.324
bl_fin
wrkex	0.062	1.235	-0.029	0.612	0.024	0.366	-0.001	0.009	0.034	1.362
d_exp	0.010	0.028	-0.301	1.212	-0.666	1.591	0.587	0.688	-0.167	1.041
cvp	0.045	0.129	-0.061	0.187	-0.178	0.418	-0.434	0.787	-0.147	0.844
oper	-0.409	1.749	-0.474	1.914	0.095	0.304	-0.423	0.966	-0.397	3.155
marid	-0.128	0.504	0.256	0.969	0.175	0.586	0.143	0.306	0.098	0.826
d2_US	0.040	0.164	.	.	0.124	0.412	.	.	-0.019	0.157
d2_CAN	0.065	0.129	.	.	0.097	0.188	.	.	0.254	0.868
d2_GBR	0.340	1.114	.	.	0.104	0.213	.	.	0.270	1.427
d2_AUS	0.085	0.184	0.014	0.037
d2_IND	.	.	0.186	0.886	.	.	-0.196	0.560	0.229	1.423
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	1.003	1.429	.	.	-1.679	2.391	-0.592	1.390
p_harv	0.531	0.483	1.169	3.056	-0.494	0.786	-0.562	0.522	0.699	2.388
p_mit	-0.024	0.032	0.548	0.749	2.821	1.955	.	.	0.520	1.187
p_chic	0.731	0.670	1.694	1.714	1.225	1.736
p_stan	0.619	1.010	1.493	3.111	-0.560	0.697	-0.085	0.061	0.883	2.855
p_prin	0.699	0.619	-1.124	0.953	0.194	0.274
p_lse	0.641	0.421	0.572	0.506	0.612	0.784
p_oxfd	1.940	1.627	0.005	0.003	0.901	1.551
p_cmbg	1.511	1.294	-0.823	0.727	.	.	0.983	0.726	0.247	0.501
cons	31.447	9.123	34.071	9.441	40.385	5.953	46.861	7.201	33.827	16.971
Num Obs	213		169		111		059		552	
Adj R-sq	0.574		0.642		0.691		0.695		0.643	

Appendix Table 11: Regressions for current grade, non-YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	-0.496	2.989	-0.888	4.481	0.038	0.115	-1.021	1.904	-0.557	4.833
dy0e81	-0.423	2.045	-0.599	3.091	0.504	1.333	-0.292	0.671	-0.376	2.966
dy0e82	-0.459	2.387	-0.984	3.618	-0.096	0.290	0.076	0.190	-0.482	3.681
dy0e83	-0.816	4.172	-0.692	3.352	-0.521	1.651	-0.211	0.487	-0.717	5.796
dy0e84	-0.605	3.620	-0.862	4.079	-0.608	1.819	-0.387	0.599	-0.684	5.740
dy0e85	-0.759	4.677	-1.103	5.982	-0.705	2.477	0.730	1.030	-0.834	7.657
dy0e86	-0.779	4.313	-1.119	5.804	-0.159	0.504	0.162	0.289	-0.754	6.370
dy0e87	-0.912	4.253	-0.733	2.852	-0.072	0.170	-0.992	2.062	-0.758	5.196
dy0e88	-1.224	8.318	-1.442	8.877	-0.992	3.806	-1.144	2.776	-1.210	12.478
dy0e89	-1.265	7.196	-1.216	6.699	-0.580	1.631	-0.830	2.169	-1.097	9.748
dy0e90	-1.344	7.668	-1.368	7.078	-1.171	4.016	-1.516	3.475	-1.363	12.113
dy0e91	-1.612	9.858	-1.540	8.986	-0.799	2.759	-1.062	2.455	-1.452	13.812
dy0e92	-1.728	10.877	-1.688	10.280	-1.047	3.949	-1.540	4.411	-1.593	16.094
dy0e93	-1.801	11.504	-2.101	10.108	-1.610	6.703	-1.742	5.317	-1.845	18.253
dy0e94	-1.965	12.048	-2.326	10.735	-1.485	5.634	-1.998	5.243	-1.921	17.988
dy0e95	-1.950	9.979	-2.442	8.688	-1.185	3.496	-1.953	4.448	-1.891	14.155
dy0e96	-1.959	12.377	-2.091	10.249	-1.775	6.636	-2.190	4.827	-1.983	18.436
dy0e97	-1.673	6.625	.	.	-1.468	4.113	-2.400	4.419	-1.876	10.613
ageent	0.071	1.568	0.102	2.004	0.017	0.282	0.010	0.116	0.087	3.321
ageen2	-0.001	1.093	-0.001	1.729	0.000	0.240	0.000	0.224	-0.001	2.386
phd	0.069	0.317	0.354	1.272	1.142	3.039	1.115	2.286	0.504	3.484
mast	-0.075	0.372	-0.091	0.390	0.513	1.403	0.752	1.928	0.186	1.449
bach	-0.424	1.631	-0.424	1.464	-0.903	1.521	0.166	0.378	-0.336	2.071
dl_can	0.200	0.576	-0.349	0.768	-0.526	0.486	.	.	0.009	0.036
dl_fra	0.025	0.116	-0.091	0.307	-0.560	1.185	0.479	0.595	-0.051	0.319
dl_grm	-0.061	0.190	0.169	0.173	1.268	1.151	.	.	0.186	0.671
dl_ukg	0.419	1.702	-0.133	0.489	-0.547	1.034	0.567	0.898	0.102	0.624
dl_usa	0.236	1.473	0.126	0.692	-0.050	0.159	0.182	0.492	0.147	1.409
ml_can	0.276	1.109	1.020	2.539	-1.048	1.864	-0.868	0.868	0.159	0.852
ml_fra	0.047	0.226	0.486	1.396	-0.342	0.863	0.614	0.963	0.061	0.407
ml_grm	-0.142	0.373	.	.	-0.103	0.094	.	.	0.138	0.402
ml_ukg	0.181	0.980	0.327	1.730	-0.611	1.591	0.516	1.101	0.108	0.919
ml_usa	-0.136	0.952	-0.011	0.083	-0.235	0.840	0.306	1.033	-0.128	1.504
bl_can	0.880	1.967	1.289	1.771	0.637	0.787	1.409	1.348	0.775	2.568
bl_fra	0.149	0.322	.	.	1.396	1.188	.	.	0.449	1.130
bl_grm	2.579	3.396	2.947	4.078
bl_ukg	0.045	0.159	0.509	1.362	1.871	2.533	-0.053	0.049	0.300	1.536
bl_usa	0.044	0.182	0.399	1.043	1.052	1.867	0.289	0.531	0.223	1.451
dl_eco	0.164	1.427	0.269	2.011	0.076	0.346	0.173	0.619	0.166	2.145
dl_bus	0.431	0.815	-0.740	0.760	0.197	0.429
dl_eng	-0.019	0.090	0.317	1.198	.	.	0.345	0.511	0.041	0.258
dl_fin	0.073	0.155	0.521	1.564	0.223	0.212	.	.	0.333	1.250
ml_eco	0.226	1.991	0.144	1.043	0.591	3.540	0.137	0.512	0.268	3.629
ml_bus	-0.073	0.217	0.376	1.561	0.273	0.793	1.170	1.832	0.334	2.029
ml_eng	-0.027	0.149	-0.085	0.445	0.306	0.484	1.159	1.608	0.051	0.404
ml_fin	-0.175	0.983	0.432	2.571	0.464	1.842	-0.130	0.322	0.184	1.764
bl_eco	0.291	1.341	0.829	2.510	0.642	1.389	0.285	0.362	0.517	3.223
bl_bus	0.322	0.778	-0.298	0.628	0.385	0.681	-0.796	1.417	-0.159	0.666
bl_eng	0.188	0.754	-0.091	0.286	0.231	1.274
bl_fin	-0.698	0.932	-0.791	0.794	-0.331	0.562
wrkex	0.029	3.791	0.038	3.766	0.029	2.174	0.057	2.611	0.033	6.326
d_exp	-0.346	1.991	-0.580	3.561	-0.420	2.050	-0.547	1.908	-0.417	4.439
cvp	0.318	3.332	0.051	0.429	-0.080	0.492	0.030	0.118	0.175	2.759
oper	-0.037	0.463	-0.074	0.782	0.072	0.563	-0.260	1.220	-0.047	0.929
marid	0.293	2.910	0.425	2.890	0.158	1.400	-0.256	1.504	0.252	4.401
d2_US	-0.070	0.711	.	.	0.053	0.324	.	.	0.084	1.474
d2_CAN	-0.192	1.234	.	.	0.741	2.319	.	.	0.090	0.755
d2_GBR	-0.031	0.214	.	.	0.279	1.122	.	.	0.239	2.434
d2_AUS	0.071	0.418	.	.	-0.102	0.184	.	.	0.321	2.208
d2_IND	.	.	-0.001	0.008	.	.	-0.136	0.502	-0.061	0.681
d1_PAK	.	.	0.309	0.325	0.329	0.326
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.346	1.632	.	.	-0.380	1.339	-0.439	2.660
p_harv	1.009	2.992	0.694	2.000	0.437	0.780	.	.	0.841	3.782
p_mit	0.021	0.074	0.438	1.101	-0.040	0.052	.	.	0.209	0.962
p_chic	0.723	1.931	-0.082	0.273	0.465	0.849	0.445	0.449	0.280	1.313
p_stan	0.335	0.892	-0.261	0.607	-0.018	0.029	.	.	0.056	0.217
p_prin	1.610	4.025	-0.184	0.385	0.984	3.189
p_lse	0.779	1.617	-0.167	0.285	1.306	1.141	.	.	0.572	1.634
p_oxfd	1.328	2.354	-0.043	0.083	1.231	1.601	.	.	0.691	2.051
p_cmbg	1.031	1.355	-1.118	1.598	0.044	0.084
cons	22.810	25.357	21.938	21.643	22.495	20.233	22.638	14.693	21.947	43.177
Num Obs	1082		666		407		183		2338	
Adj R-sq	0.328		0.379		0.240		0.280		0.348	

Appendix Table 12: Regressions for grade promotion, YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.085	2.135	0.014	0.659	0.019	0.517	0.055	0.542	0.050	2.623
dy0e81	0.045	0.813	0.022	0.884	0.074	1.591	0.111	1.163	0.049	2.087
dy0e82	0.111	2.140	0.045	1.573	0.003	0.035	0.091	1.076	0.066	2.731
dy0e83	0.048	0.658	0.076	2.166	0.000	0.001	0.051	0.398	0.051	1.681
dy0e84	0.099	0.832	0.015	0.445	0.164	2.710	-0.005	0.055	0.052	1.806
dy0e85	0.065	0.868	0.115	4.440	0.136	2.660	0.130	0.994	0.112	4.126
dy0e86	0.119	2.213	0.109	3.588	0.122	2.274	0.236	1.859	0.125	4.542
dy0e87	0.144	3.229	0.171	5.230	0.179	3.042	0.132	1.283	0.147	5.666
dy0e88	0.152	3.132	0.184	5.346	0.108	2.624	0.095	0.832	0.138	5.825
dy0e89	0.202	3.336	0.082	2.932	0.100	1.568	0.169	0.993	0.126	4.401
dy0e90	0.136	1.883	0.122	3.119	0.131	3.219	0.130	1.165	0.117	4.141
dy0e91	0.117	1.880	0.211	7.394	0.123	3.002	0.163	1.592	0.166	6.842
dy0e92	0.118	2.110	0.227	7.060	0.152	3.194	0.150	1.805	0.146	5.986
dy0e93	0.140	3.557	0.181	5.844	0.149	4.613	0.204	2.389	0.147	8.024
dy0e94	0.226	5.565	0.223	7.007	0.149	4.348	0.175	1.913	0.188	9.737
dy0e95	0.328	2.462	.	.	0.306	3.313	0.398	2.939	0.387	7.333
dy0e96	0.982	10.414	0.572	8.088	0.914	15.097
dy0e97
ageent	-0.198	9.091	-0.055	3.669	-0.191	5.220	-0.175	3.296	-0.153	12.927
ageen2	0.003	10.004	0.001	4.047	0.003	5.599	0.003	3.391	0.003	14.159
phd	-0.043	0.428	-0.070	1.767	.	.	0.105	0.588	-0.026	0.418
mast	-0.132	1.484	.	.	0.076	0.665	0.001	0.004	-0.066	1.107
bach	0.046	0.306	-0.028	0.414	.	.	0.018	0.100	0.045	0.377
dl_can	0.194	1.583	-0.017	0.398	0.025	0.505
dl_fra	0.075	1.341	-0.003	0.058	0.039	0.318	.	.	0.035	1.042
dl_grm	0.165	2.507	.	.	0.019	0.161	.	.	0.115	3.180
dl_ukg	-0.059	0.558	0.011	0.283	0.017	0.139	-0.038	0.274	-0.014	0.417
dl_usa	-0.006	0.149	0.004	0.179	0.097	0.886	-0.021	0.178	0.014	0.640
ml_can	-0.006	0.077	-0.060	0.916	-0.010	0.217
ml_fra	-0.004	0.048	0.014	0.354	-0.017	0.197	.	.	-0.003	0.073
ml_grm	0.010	0.151	.	.	-0.012	0.140	.	.	0.009	0.195
ml_ukg	0.055	1.431	0.072	2.047	-0.020	0.415	-0.002	0.024	0.053	2.544
ml_usa	0.000	0.011	-0.018	0.874	0.006	0.145	0.025	0.411	0.030	1.808
bl_can
bl_fra
bl_grm	-0.220	1.204	-0.106	0.725
bl_ukg	-0.043	0.236	-0.019	0.188
bl_usa	-0.040	0.325
dl_eco	0.000	0.005	0.032	1.439	-0.011	0.343	-0.056	0.768	0.016	0.864
dl_bus	0.012	0.079	-0.003	0.028
dl_eng	-0.065	0.956	0.022	0.687	-0.258	1.915	.	.	-0.004	0.115
dl_fin	.	.	0.104	2.217	0.086	1.586
ml_eco	0.037	1.243	-0.052	2.093	-0.067	2.543	0.062	0.926	0.007	0.459
ml_bus	0.051	0.565	-0.076	1.173	0.053	0.824	0.192	1.292	0.051	1.256
ml_eng	0.011	0.140	0.110	1.571	0.039	0.742
ml_fin	0.042	0.889	-0.024	0.868	-0.039	1.068	-0.044	0.442	0.017	0.806
bl_eco	-0.079	0.454	-0.070	0.558
bl_bus
bl_eng	-0.078	0.621	.	.	-0.113	0.599
bl_fin
wrkex	-0.006	1.051	-0.004	1.163	0.000	0.024	0.004	0.416	0.001	0.303
d_exp	-0.015	0.398	-0.017	1.048	-0.048	1.404	0.079	0.719	-0.013	0.823
cvp	0.029	0.787	0.013	0.588	-0.011	0.325	-0.062	0.878	-0.001	0.060
oper	0.016	0.646	-0.015	0.909	0.014	0.544	-0.003	0.050	-0.007	0.586
marid	0.015	0.573	0.014	0.771	-0.003	0.135	0.005	0.077	0.004	0.302
d2_US	0.008	0.325	.	.	-0.003	0.127	.	.	-0.001	0.069
d2_CAN	-0.016	0.290	.	.	-0.010	0.231	.	.	-0.001	0.018
d2_GBR	0.002	0.059	.	.	0.016	0.392	.	.	0.015	0.789
d2_AUS	-0.044	0.903	-0.036	0.991
d2_IND	.	.	0.018	1.261	.	.	-0.012	0.277	0.021	1.334
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	0.022	0.463	.	.	-0.070	0.778	-0.025	0.599
p_harv	0.092	0.792	0.055	2.165	-0.051	0.997	0.048	0.348	0.020	0.683
p_mit	0.026	0.315	0.052	1.079	0.174	1.477	.	.	0.042	0.977
p_chic	-0.019	0.161	0.086	1.312	0.039	0.562
p_stan	-0.031	0.482	0.052	1.627	-0.042	0.636	-0.045	0.253	0.011	0.354
p_prin	-0.007	0.057	0.011	0.075	0.000	0.004
p_lse	0.046	0.288	0.072	0.967	0.095	1.227
p_oxfd	0.142	1.128	-0.004	0.023	0.065	1.125
p_cmbg	0.126	1.022	-0.117	1.561	.	.	0.079	0.456	0.044	0.891
cons	3.090	8.485	1.021	4.269	2.820	5.095	2.877	3.443	2.412	12.209
Num Obs	213		169		111		059		552	
Adj R-sq	0.796		0.693		0.630		0.391		0.711	

Appendix Table 13: Regressions for grade promotion, non-YP sample

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.040	1.700	0.013	0.462	0.119	2.677	-0.025	0.287	0.028	1.720
dy0e81	0.033	1.139	0.060	2.275	0.040	0.794	-0.053	0.758	0.028	1.563
dy0e82	0.064	2.338	0.082	2.178	0.003	0.075	0.056	0.850	0.060	3.147
dy0e83	0.077	2.696	0.109	3.841	0.011	0.264	0.046	0.655	0.075	4.177
dy0e84	0.059	2.429	0.088	2.951	0.119	2.602	-0.006	0.048	0.062	3.549
dy0e85	0.061	2.630	0.081	3.172	0.068	1.798	0.057	0.503	0.059	3.749
dy0e86	0.101	4.026	0.108	4.101	0.087	2.082	-0.144	1.589	0.085	5.087
dy0e87	0.115	3.896	0.145	4.182	0.085	1.528	0.136	1.752	0.114	5.562
dy0e88	0.053	2.512	0.055	2.443	0.027	0.773	-0.064	0.933	0.041	2.887
dy0e89	0.120	4.863	0.130	5.251	0.116	2.477	0.007	0.118	0.110	6.869
dy0e90	0.127	5.174	0.103	3.891	0.124	3.198	-0.112	1.559	0.097	6.053
dy0e91	0.110	4.784	0.082	3.510	0.010	0.263	-0.025	0.351	0.076	5.063
dy0e92	0.075	3.322	0.116	5.143	0.093	2.605	-0.013	0.219	0.082	5.720
dy0e93	0.072	3.236	0.033	1.172	-0.025	0.777	-0.113	2.077	0.036	2.480
dy0e94	0.044	1.903	-0.045	1.528	-0.003	0.088	-0.044	0.702	0.015	0.956
dy0e95	0.047	1.740	0.068	1.815	-0.078	1.739	-0.083	1.109	0.014	0.749
dy0e96	-0.047	2.092	-0.079	2.889	-0.134	3.730	-0.212	2.822	-0.083	5.386
dy0e97	-0.071	1.999	.	.	-0.147	3.042	-0.180	1.661	-0.091	3.495
ageent	-0.049	7.304	-0.054	7.190	-0.034	3.916	-0.048	3.116	-0.052	12.872
ageen2	0.001	6.214	0.001	6.295	0.000	3.149	0.001	2.785	0.001	11.107
phd	0.010	0.320	-0.034	0.924	-0.100	1.997	0.052	0.638	-0.038	1.818
mast	0.036	1.271	-0.016	0.532	-0.031	0.631	-0.029	0.440	-0.009	0.496
bach	0.025	0.700	-0.059	1.531	-0.057	0.731	-0.020	0.269	-0.009	0.379
dl_can	-0.007	0.146	-0.009	0.146	0.101	0.728	.	.	-0.003	0.078
dl_fra	-0.003	0.089	0.029	0.731	0.086	1.413	-0.106	0.824	0.006	0.271
dl_grm	0.009	0.188	0.114	0.885	-0.035	0.252	.	.	0.008	0.191
dl_ukg	0.014	0.391	-0.007	0.192	-0.039	0.570	-0.013	0.123	0.012	0.527
dl_usa	0.009	0.401	-0.006	0.252	-0.030	0.731	-0.014	0.225	0.005	0.360
ml_can	-0.036	1.061	-0.098	1.852	-0.168	1.997	.	.	-0.051	1.901
ml_fra	-0.017	0.587	-0.013	0.256	-0.040	0.775	0.101	0.990	-0.016	0.718
ml_grm	-0.019	0.366	.	.	-0.035	0.250	.	.	-0.024	0.504
ml_ukg	-0.036	1.348	-0.050	1.957	-0.081	1.603	-0.010	0.137	-0.036	2.108
ml_usa	-0.006	0.288	-0.024	1.332	-0.064	1.757	0.033	0.667	-0.013	1.078
bl_can	-0.036	0.568	0.099	1.022	-0.149	1.407	-0.216	1.303	-0.045	1.060
bl_fra	0.046	0.625	.	.	-0.194	1.292	.	.	-0.003	0.052
bl_grm	-0.079	0.780	-0.089	0.900
bl_ukg	-0.061	1.565	0.077	1.551	-0.055	0.558	0.437	2.536	-0.015	0.559
bl_usa	-0.056	1.641	-0.086	1.109	0.042	0.567	-0.035	0.298	-0.035	1.528
dl_eco	0.006	0.348	0.006	0.328	-0.002	0.058	-0.036	0.815	0.004	0.365
dl_bus	-0.060	0.853	-0.148	1.153	-0.092	1.469
dl_eng	0.024	0.805	0.011	0.298	.	.	-0.068	0.562	0.009	0.411
dl_fin	0.001	0.011	-0.021	0.422	0.006	0.045	.	.	-0.022	0.540
ml_eco	-0.004	0.268	0.001	0.069	0.008	0.332	-0.003	0.066	-0.004	0.360
ml_bus	0.066	1.332	0.066	1.909	0.033	0.711	-0.038	0.370	0.048	1.973
ml_eng	0.029	1.108	0.016	0.622	-0.110	1.362	0.057	0.497	0.016	0.899
ml_fin	-0.033	1.321	0.022	0.937	-0.019	0.571	-0.022	0.307	-0.010	0.661
bl_eco	0.018	0.596	0.014	0.297	-0.164	2.245	-0.068	0.391	-0.014	0.587
bl_bus	0.037	0.575	0.373	5.448	-0.053	0.627	.	.	0.106	2.547
bl_eng	0.011	0.316	0.023	0.507	-0.018	0.675
bl_fin	-0.045	0.453	0.147	1.004	-0.035	0.429
wrkex	0.000	0.080	-0.002	1.697	-0.001	0.305	0.000	0.119	-0.001	1.365
d_exp	0.016	0.579	0.048	1.850	0.134	4.312	0.068	1.351	0.066	4.325
cvp	0.025	1.910	0.038	2.337	-0.015	0.677	-0.054	1.256	0.013	1.460
oper	0.000	0.003	0.017	1.305	0.003	0.185	-0.095	2.495	0.001	0.068
marid	0.009	0.656	0.045	2.283	-0.004	0.236	-0.030	1.019	0.001	0.063
d2_us	0.035	2.488	.	.	0.035	1.533	.	.	0.020	2.451
d2_CAN	0.020	0.912	.	.	0.091	1.940	.	.	0.017	1.009
d2_GBR	0.039	1.905	.	.	0.073	2.073	.	.	0.029	2.005
d2_AUS	0.019	0.811	.	.	-0.032	0.454	.	.	0.003	0.127
d2_IND	.	.	-0.012	0.813	.	.	-0.002	0.042	-0.007	0.528
d1_PAK	.	.	-0.183	1.458	-0.183	1.328
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.031	1.092	.	.	-0.008	0.158	-0.016	0.677
p_harv	0.025	0.557	0.026	0.494	0.045	0.630	.	.	0.025	0.792
p_mit	0.008	0.186	-0.041	0.775	0.154	1.557	.	.	0.004	0.132
p_chic	0.018	0.343	-0.012	0.313	0.020	0.292	0.391	2.506	0.019	0.645
p_stan	0.062	1.240	-0.070	1.239	0.052	0.638	.	.	0.007	0.207
p_prin	0.044	0.833	0.054	0.857	0.049	1.156
p_lse	0.130	1.985	-0.028	0.296	1.612	11.019	.	.	0.254	5.034
p_oxfd	0.183	2.411	-0.005	0.060	0.170	1.725	.	.	0.109	2.254
p_cmbg	-0.075	0.735	-0.159	1.731	-0.111	1.552
cons	1.156	8.464	1.279	8.502	0.992	6.084	1.282	4.478	1.279	16.099
Num Obs	956		613		363		160		2092	
Adj R-sq	0.222		0.344		0.543		0.364		0.302	

Appendix Table 14: Regressions for log current salary, 1980-86 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.080	2.666	0.029	0.892	0.037	0.545	0.125	0.776	0.081	3.892
dy0e81	0.077	2.190	0.045	1.398	0.034	0.451	0.047	0.352	0.084	3.786
dy0e82	0.059	1.822	0.002	0.053	.	.	-0.071	0.580	0.051	2.282
dy0e83	-0.058	0.838	0.018	0.123	.	.
dy0e84	-0.001	0.046	-0.080	2.275	-0.076	1.092	-0.107	0.794	-0.015	0.712
dy0e85	-0.036	1.160	-0.085	2.582	-0.138	2.103	.	.	-0.031	1.502
dy0e86	-0.030	0.949	-0.117	3.407	-0.069	0.958	-0.043	0.265	-0.039	1.793
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90
dy0e91
dy0e92
dy0e93
dy0e94
dy0e95
dy0e96
dy0e97
ageent	0.018	1.193	0.017	1.124	0.009	0.284	-0.003	0.026	0.014	1.461
ageen2	0.000	1.110	0.000	0.849	0.000	0.209	0.000	0.090	0.000	1.132
phd	-0.018	0.299	0.003	0.047	0.061	0.339	0.247	1.034	0.101	2.279
mast	0.015	0.259	-0.007	0.126	0.206	1.122	0.232	1.269	0.071	1.861
bach	-0.005	0.047	-0.082	1.144	-0.236	1.229	0.019	0.087	-0.061	1.148
dl_can	0.049	0.684	-0.007	0.067	0.013	0.204
dl_fra	0.014	0.285	-0.071	1.003	-0.007	0.160
dl_grm	0.008	0.089	.	.	0.286	1.321	.	.	0.057	0.742
dl_ukg	0.184	3.352	0.027	0.426	0.124	0.784	0.160	0.606	0.074	1.855
dl_usa	0.108	2.565	0.050	1.136	0.364	2.663	0.087	0.669	0.079	2.764
ml_can	0.099	1.418	.	.	-0.302	1.280	-0.133	0.570	0.066	1.133
ml_fra	0.007	0.112	-0.013	0.194	-0.144	1.002	0.270	0.776	-0.017	0.433
ml_grm	-0.151	1.508	-0.083	0.794
ml_ukg	0.072	1.659	0.107	2.759	-0.079	0.512	-0.029	0.183	0.055	2.004
ml_usa	-0.023	0.625	-0.044	1.574	0.022	0.164	-0.174	1.081	-0.021	0.970
bl_can	-0.015	0.086	0.081	0.520
bl_fra	0.037	0.333	0.150	1.632
bl_grm
bl_ukg	0.013	0.136	0.163	1.948	0.313	1.362	-0.037	0.152	0.080	1.498
bl_usa	-0.029	0.288	0.003	0.026	0.296	1.971	.	.	0.050	0.990
dl_eco	0.007	0.246	0.065	1.902	0.028	0.407	-0.081	0.735	0.018	0.833
dl_bus	0.020	0.203	-0.066	0.474	0.021	0.243
dl_eng	-0.030	0.549	0.127	2.082	.	.	-0.132	0.445	0.005	0.114
dl_fin	0.034	0.417	0.184	1.960	0.061	0.904
ml_eco	0.004	0.128	-0.001	0.040	-0.002	0.028	0.162	1.637	0.028	1.470
ml_bus	0.025	0.304	-0.051	0.994	0.021	0.242	0.260	1.594	0.015	0.399
ml_eng	0.051	0.901	-0.022	0.501	0.010	0.282
ml_fin	-0.022	0.585	0.042	1.200	0.001	0.010	0.046	0.322	0.028	1.191
bl_eco	-0.072	1.009	0.185	2.266	0.101	1.917
bl_bus	0.083	0.558	.	.	-0.111	1.038
bl_eng	0.025	0.389	0.025	0.311	0.069	1.328
bl_fin	-0.009	0.067	0.042	0.286
wrkex	0.009	3.523	0.009	3.085	0.013	2.419	-0.009	0.581	0.010	5.510
d_exp	-0.107	3.201	-0.046	1.402	-0.170	2.940	-0.106	1.040	-0.088	4.171
cvp	0.058	2.280	-0.019	0.664	0.023	0.398	-0.068	0.513	0.015	0.832
oper	0.020	0.986	0.020	0.884	0.001	0.036	-0.116	1.341	-0.005	0.340
marid	0.044	1.773	0.003	0.101	0.037	0.976	-0.057	0.703	0.025	1.612
d2_US	-0.057	2.436	.	.	-0.081	1.411	.	.	0.002	0.127
d2_CAN	-0.065	1.484	.	.	0.158	1.397	.	.	0.028	0.745
d2_GBR	-0.081	2.511	.	.	0.035	0.423	.	.	0.012	0.516
d2_AUS	0.057	1.118	0.111	2.431
d2_IND	.	.	0.048	1.976	.	.	-0.136	1.164	0.008	0.326
d1_PAK	.	.	0.163	1.274	0.073	0.497
d1_FIL	.	.	0.002	0.053	.	.	-0.311	2.791	-0.072	2.010
p_harv	0.084	1.164	0.167	2.981	0.002	0.013	.	.	0.096	2.145
p_mit	-0.064	1.212	0.030	0.387	0.121	0.643	.	.	-0.024	0.534
p_chic	0.072	1.013	0.086	1.148	0.106	0.594	.	.	0.071	1.325
p_stan	-0.037	0.450	0.102	1.329	0.072	0.530	0.230	1.071	0.068	1.326
p_prin	0.201	1.449	-0.365	2.723	.	.	-0.038	0.158	-0.043	0.494
p_lse	0.142	0.961	-0.093	0.694	0.009	0.084
p_oxfd	0.230	1.578	-0.015	0.115	0.118	1.093
p_cmbg	-0.063	0.430	-0.017	0.153
cons	10.833	38.583	10.787	38.794	10.784	18.528	11.164	6.449	10.748	59.620
Num Obs	324		736		115		056		731	
Adj R-sq	0.389		0.472		0.347		0.165		0.374	

Appendix Table 15: Regressions for log current salary, 1990-97 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	0.057	1.713	0.160	4.665	0.067	1.497	0.118	2.784	0.090	4.129
dy0e91	0.021	0.645	0.115	3.606	0.083	1.845	0.146	3.542	0.062	2.945
dy0e92	-0.004	0.142	0.115	3.666	0.039	0.879	0.076	1.972	0.044	2.137
dy0e93	-0.028	0.897	0.075	2.228	-0.006	0.146	0.016	0.426	0.010	0.500
dy0e94	-0.059	1.913	0.049	1.392	-0.024	0.593	-0.004	0.085	-0.014	0.688
dy0e95	-0.048	1.419	.	.	0.032	0.680	0.041	0.938	-0.006	0.248
dy0e96	-0.055	1.740	0.055	1.589	-0.038	0.870	.	.	-0.007	0.336
dy0e97	-0.116	2.152	.	.
ageent	0.042	4.725	0.044	4.432	0.018	1.448	0.025	1.905	0.033	6.224
ageen2	0.000	3.635	0.000	3.737	0.000	0.764	0.000	1.108	0.000	4.545
phd	0.019	0.544	0.070	1.808	0.175	3.031	0.151	2.724	0.061	2.703
mast	-0.010	0.305	-0.049	1.326	0.107	1.862	0.070	1.480	0.008	0.398
bach	-0.050	1.291	-0.057	1.345	0.068	0.541	0.061	1.142	-0.038	1.470
dl_can	0.007	0.113	-0.016	0.160	-0.115	0.928	.	.	-0.017	0.387
dl_fra	0.047	1.249	-0.036	0.938	-0.049	0.871	-0.047	0.688	0.008	0.349
dl_grm	0.041	0.849	.	.	-0.101	1.428	.	.	0.011	0.306
dl_ukg	-0.038	0.851	0.005	0.132	-0.090	1.119	-0.056	1.065	-0.028	1.119
dl_usa	0.021	0.747	-0.001	0.039	-0.052	1.296	-0.089	2.320	-0.006	0.365
ml_can	0.035	0.886	0.204	3.353	-0.154	1.967	.	.	0.032	1.110
ml_fra	0.061	1.726	0.103	1.714	0.036	0.578	0.046	0.734	0.061	2.409
ml_grm	0.048	0.882	.	.	0.010	0.082	.	.	0.082	1.742
ml_ukg	-0.051	1.617	0.083	2.177	-0.074	1.309	0.024	0.468	-0.018	0.884
ml_usa	0.018	0.749	0.075	2.902	-0.040	1.113	0.020	0.645	0.016	1.089
bl_can	0.047	0.693	0.192	2.204	-0.122	0.865	0.076	0.828	0.038	0.948
bl_fra	0.094	0.763	.	.	0.038	0.229	.	.	0.096	1.185
bl_grm	0.454	3.776	0.487	4.299
bl_ukg	0.002	0.033	-0.011	0.178	0.069	0.477	.	.	0.025	0.746
bl_usa	0.081	1.987	.	.	-0.027	0.215	.	.	0.064	2.272
dl_eco	0.028	1.375	0.016	0.783	0.020	0.672	-0.009	0.360	0.023	1.884
dl_bus	0.177	1.488	0.195	1.739
dl_eng	-0.032	0.793	-0.032	0.736	0.004	0.035	-0.079	1.240	-0.028	1.047
dl_fin	-0.023	0.192	0.030	0.496	0.203	1.685	.	.	0.065	1.263
ml_eco	0.021	1.012	0.000	0.008	0.025	0.937	-0.014	0.495	0.017	1.292
ml_bus	0.007	0.120	0.085	0.854	0.151	1.788	.	.	0.053	1.305
ml_eng	-0.042	1.372	-0.006	0.166	0.031	0.427	-0.023	0.270	-0.021	0.966
ml_fin	-0.013	0.387	0.064	1.723	0.011	0.267	-0.104	1.661	0.009	0.461
bl_eco	0.063	1.611	-0.009	0.148	-0.054	0.697	-0.100	1.044	0.034	1.230
bl_bus	0.346	2.878	-0.052	0.853	0.012	0.227
bl_eng	-0.029	0.696	0.006	0.104	-0.019	0.154	.	.	0.002	0.073
bl_fin	0.008	0.062	0.099	0.866
wrkex	0.006	3.985	0.006	3.768	0.005	2.597	0.004	1.668	0.006	6.981
d_exp	0.041	0.574	-0.023	0.489	-0.024	0.435	0.009	0.142	-0.001	0.035
cvp	0.034	2.142	0.032	1.515	-0.014	0.577	-0.033	1.172	0.021	2.045
oper	-0.026	1.818	0.014	0.808	-0.008	0.359	-0.017	0.699	-0.009	0.993
marid	0.031	1.831	0.046	2.115	0.004	0.227	0.000	0.022	0.031	3.431
d2_US	0.002	0.087	.	.	0.011	0.485	.	.	0.013	1.253
d2_CAN	0.004	0.163	.	.	0.108	2.390	.	.	0.031	1.670
d2_GBR	0.078	2.861	.	.	0.049	1.116	.	.	0.074	4.038
d2_AUS	0.009	0.334	.	.	-0.014	0.215	.	.	0.033	1.448
d2_IND	.	.	0.010	0.534	.	.	-0.031	1.348	-0.021	1.391
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.058	1.227	.	.	-0.050	1.079	-0.072	1.900
p_harv	0.097	1.388	-0.075	1.055	-0.032	0.440	.	.	0.034	0.844
p_mit	-0.015	0.171	0.430	4.266	0.015	0.173	.	.	0.108	2.104
p_chic	0.064	0.753	-0.020	0.439	0.074	0.857	0.068	0.862	0.021	0.588
p_stan	0.014	0.257	-0.033	0.469	-0.014	0.195	.	.	0.006	0.172
p_prin	0.164	1.866	-0.004	0.054	0.074	1.300
p_lse	0.143	1.793	0.146	1.370	0.126	0.895	.	.	0.115	2.067
p_oxfd	0.230	2.834	-0.095	1.229	0.134	1.320	.	.	0.108	2.334
p_cmbg	0.106	1.357	-0.118	1.788	0.006	0.126
cons	9.985	53.417	9.836	48.051	10.363	40.371	10.228	39.901	10.111	92.294
Num Obs	453		257		231		101		42	
Adj R-sq	0.548		0.565		0.423		0.593		0.542	

Appendix Table 16: Regressions annual salary growth, 1980-86 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled	Sample
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.000	0.067	-0.006	2.140	-0.001	0.106	-0.012	0.828	-0.003	1.510
dy0e81	0.003	1.120	-0.004	1.252	0.005	0.786	-0.013	1.031	0.000	0.092
dy0e82	0.002	0.670	-0.002	0.678	.	.	-0.006	0.575	0.001	0.342
dy0e83	0.001	0.118	-0.005	0.402	.	.
dy0e84	0.000	0.142	-0.003	0.878	0.010	1.595	-0.012	0.977	0.000	0.242
dy0e85	0.001	0.339	-0.002	0.599	-0.001	0.151	.	.	0.000	0.125
dy0e86	-0.001	0.358	-0.002	0.509	0.002	0.296	-0.017	1.187	-0.001	0.638
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90
dy0e91
dy0e92
dy0e93
dy0e94
dy0e95
dy0e96
dy0e97
ageent	-0.006	4.963	-0.005	3.809	-0.005	1.757	-0.027	3.082	-0.005	6.459
ageen2	0.000	3.613	0.000	2.859	0.000	1.362	0.000	2.894	0.000	4.512
phd	-0.008	1.629	-0.009	1.393	-0.006	0.369	-0.038	2.067	-0.008	2.359
mast	0.000	0.021	0.005	1.148	0.008	0.482	-0.018	1.294	0.001	0.274
bach	-0.001	0.173	-0.002	0.325	0.035	2.000	-0.013	0.742	0.001	0.338
dl_can	0.005	0.824	0.008	0.874	0.005	1.006
dl_fra	0.002	0.578	0.002	0.378	0.003	0.908
dl_grm	0.001	0.092	.	.	0.023	1.139	.	.	0.006	0.898
dl_ukg	0.005	1.212	0.002	0.266	0.002	0.132	0.029	1.652	0.002	0.764
dl_usa	0.001	0.394	0.008	2.002	0.011	0.839	0.004	0.437	0.004	1.920
ml_can	0.001	0.256	.	.	0.013	0.589	0.010	0.585	-0.001	0.113
ml_fra	0.000	0.038	-0.008	1.378	0.009	0.699	-0.026	0.970	-0.001	0.259
ml_grm	-0.007	0.897	-0.006	0.653
ml_ukg	-0.003	0.787	-0.005	1.420	-0.005	0.343	-0.012	1.017	-0.002	1.044
ml_usa	0.000	0.113	-0.001	0.352	0.004	0.279	-0.011	0.863	0.001	0.606
bl_can	-0.014	1.058	-0.021	1.651
bl_fra	0.001	0.110	0.003	0.373
bl_grm
bl_ukg	-0.005	0.684	0.018	2.426	-0.034	1.605	0.017	0.924	0.000	0.109
bl_usa	-0.006	0.690	0.005	0.584	-0.022	1.565	.	.	-0.003	0.836
dl_eco	0.005	1.984	0.002	0.543	-0.004	0.607	0.012	1.461	0.003	1.512
dl_bus	0.003	0.395	-0.017	1.374	-0.001	0.081
dl_eng	0.004	0.924	0.008	1.430	0.006	1.766
dl_fin	-0.001	0.140	-0.004	0.532	-0.002	0.351
ml_eco	-0.002	0.783	-0.004	1.312	-0.011	2.236	-0.005	0.599	-0.004	2.551
ml_bus	-0.008	1.161	-0.001	0.141	0.002	0.221	0.006	0.451	0.000	0.081
ml_eng	0.001	0.216	0.001	0.292	-0.001	0.264
ml_fin	-0.005	1.610	-0.004	1.437	-0.005	0.742	-0.020	1.782	-0.004	2.277
bl_eco	-0.005	0.944	0.006	0.861	-0.005	1.262
bl_bus	-0.015	1.122	.	.	0.005	0.629
bl_eng	0.003	0.552	-0.002	0.341	-0.004	0.837
bl_fin	-0.011	0.987	-0.017	1.409
wrkex	0.000	0.234	0.000	1.852	0.000	0.262	-0.002	1.486	0.000	0.455
d_exp	0.001	0.486	0.008	2.733	0.013	2.338	0.008	1.067	0.006	3.584
cvp	0.001	0.657	0.000	0.070	0.005	0.944	-0.004	0.412	0.000	0.222
oper	-0.001	0.641	-0.003	1.364	-0.002	0.597	-0.016	2.407	-0.003	2.832
marid	-0.003	1.286	0.005	1.830	0.000	0.011	-0.005	0.739	-0.001	0.880
d2_US	0.003	1.342	.	.	0.008	1.367	.	.	0.002	1.951
d2_CAN	0.000	0.035	.	.	0.011	1.050	.	.	0.002	0.588
d2_GBR	0.001	0.345	.	.	0.008	1.064	.	.	0.001	0.739
d2_AUS	0.001	0.200	0.000	0.114
d2_IND	.	.	0.003	1.248	.	.	0.011	1.202	0.003	1.773
d1_PAK	.	.	-0.026	2.287	-0.027	2.241
d1_FIL	.	.	0.002	0.421	.	.	0.000	0.032	-0.002	0.530
p_harv	0.005	0.856	0.001	0.177	0.006	0.502	.	.	0.002	0.645
p_mit	-0.008	1.855	-0.009	1.262	-0.017	0.962	.	.	-0.008	2.255
p_chic	0.001	0.095	0.008	1.152	0.009	0.568	.	.	0.003	0.787
p_stan	-0.001	0.147	-0.004	0.570	-0.011	0.840	-0.026	1.571	-0.005	1.178
p_prin	0.009	0.773	0.001	0.052	.	.	-0.018	0.980	0.000	0.039
p_lse	0.004	0.338	0.009	0.760	0.008	0.911
p_oxfd	0.000	0.028	-0.002	0.201	0.002	0.257
p_cmbg	0.002	0.174	-0.054	2.357	-0.004	0.473
cons	0.177	7.930	0.154	6.263	0.140	2.602	0.538	3.952	0.163	11.084
Num Obs	324		236		113		055		728	
Adj R-sq	0.488		0.536		0.218		0.440		0.478	

Appendix Table 17: Regressions for annual salary growth, 1990-97 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	-0.144	19.492	0.017	3.467	-0.140	10.140	0.013	2.021	-0.142	28.958
dy0e91	-0.157	21.986	0.008	1.792	-0.152	11.271	0.012	1.950	-0.152	31.899
dy0e92	-0.162	23.295	0.007	1.498	-0.153	11.462	0.009	1.512	-0.156	33.203
dy0e93	-0.166	24.110	-0.001	0.242	-0.166	13.624	-0.005	0.822	-0.163	34.987
dy0e94	-0.169	24.453	-0.010	1.899	-0.168	13.518	-0.002	0.289	-0.166	35.373
dy0e95	-0.162	21.525	.	.	-0.166	11.468	-0.006	0.900	-0.162	31.671
dy0e96	-0.156	22.265	0.009	1.849	-0.156	11.778	.	.	-0.153	31.875
dy0e97	0.103	10.417	.	.
ageent	-0.003	1.315	-0.004	2.661	-0.001	0.184	-0.004	2.191	-0.003	2.678
ageen2	0.000	1.212	0.000	2.093	0.000	0.013	0.000	2.133	0.000	2.212
phd	0.006	0.804	-0.010	1.752	-0.002	0.102	0.019	2.161	-0.001	0.292
mast	0.007	1.025	-0.006	1.156	0.027	1.591	0.000	0.043	0.005	1.172
bach	0.003	0.360	-0.010	1.573	0.012	0.323	-0.003	0.305	0.000	0.063
dl_can	-0.006	0.471	0.017	1.124	-0.004	0.099	.	.	0.002	0.202
dl_fra	-0.007	0.818	0.001	0.183	0.011	0.669	-0.019	1.818	0.000	0.091
dl_grm	-0.002	0.164	.	.	-0.002	0.073	.	.	-0.001	0.185
dl_ukg	-0.005	0.541	0.005	0.834	0.000	0.014	-0.010	1.215	0.001	0.137
dl_usa	-0.008	1.273	0.002	0.517	-0.003	0.253	-0.016	2.620	-0.001	0.414
ml_can	-0.005	0.607	-0.011	1.220	-0.017	0.577	.	.	-0.004	0.608
ml_fra	-0.005	0.603	0.006	0.733	-0.035	1.945	0.011	1.133	-0.008	1.418
ml_grm	0.002	0.150	.	.	-0.017	0.477	.	.	0.001	0.104
ml_ukg	-0.010	1.513	-0.005	0.864	-0.056	3.390	-0.002	0.280	-0.017	3.942
ml_usa	-0.007	1.420	0.002	0.503	-0.030	2.870	0.001	0.137	-0.008	2.568
bl_can	0.010	0.703	-0.004	0.316	-0.007	0.167	-0.014	0.986	0.001	0.173
bl_fra	0.007	0.276	.	.	-0.015	0.313	.	.	-0.001	0.077
bl_grm	-0.004	0.156	-0.004	0.166
bl_ukg	0.010	0.974	-0.002	0.271	-0.016	0.373	.	.	0.000	0.019
bl_usa	0.000	0.001	.	.	-0.017	0.470	.	.	-0.002	0.390
dl_eco	-0.001	0.313	0.002	0.608	-0.001	0.160	-0.006	1.536	0.000	0.140
dl_bus	-0.006	0.231	-0.001	0.060
dl_eng	0.003	0.337	-0.001	0.104	0.010	0.280	-0.008	0.837	0.000	0.024
dl_fin	0.003	0.112	0.004	0.431	-0.006	0.157	.	.	0.001	0.133
ml_eco	0.007	1.561	-0.007	1.719	0.002	0.303	0.000	0.034	0.003	1.141
ml_bus	0.022	1.904	-0.009	0.644	0.009	0.355	.	.	0.014	1.622
ml_eng	-0.002	0.377	0.004	0.839	-0.024	1.103	0.010	0.751	0.000	0.046
ml_fin	-0.002	0.291	0.004	0.780	-0.007	0.599	0.000	0.034	-0.001	0.182
bl_eco	-0.003	0.337	0.003	0.359	-0.010	0.458	0.011	0.766	-0.001	0.189
bl_bus	0.020	0.783	0.031	3.513	0.026	2.366
bl_eng	-0.014	1.548	0.011	1.265	-0.011	0.303	.	.	-0.005	0.854
bl_fin	-0.062	2.364	-0.061	2.509
wrkex	0.000	1.065	0.000	0.139	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.616	0.000	0.976
d_exp	-0.011	0.703	0.003	0.418	0.004	0.266	-0.004	0.445	0.000	0.016
cvp	0.000	0.120	0.004	1.379	-0.005	0.649	-0.003	0.765	0.000	0.190
oper	0.001	0.289	0.003	1.073	0.005	0.748	-0.006	1.610	0.001	0.379
marid	0.003	0.960	0.003	1.112	0.001	0.216	0.002	0.484	0.002	1.240
d2_US	0.006	1.640	.	.	0.006	0.916	.	.	0.003	1.603
d2_CAN	0.007	1.204	.	.	-0.012	0.872	.	.	0.000	0.066
d2_GBR	0.002	0.307	.	.	0.008	0.623	.	.	0.006	1.417
d2_AUS	0.025	4.277	.	.	0.017	0.884	.	.	0.021	4.356
d2_IND	.	.	0.001	0.410	.	.	0.002	0.537	0.001	0.181
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.006	0.889	.	.	-0.007	1.047	-0.004	0.552
p_harv	0.003	0.227	0.006	0.548	-0.007	0.322	.	.	0.000	0.024
p_mit	0.005	0.260	-0.026	1.802	0.004	0.142	.	.	-0.002	0.167
p_chic	0.001	0.051	-0.010	1.453	0.009	0.346	0.038	3.150	0.001	0.166
p_stan	0.005	0.441	-0.003	0.279	0.008	0.395	.	.	0.002	0.301
p_prin	0.002	0.129	0.002	0.211	0.002	0.155
p_lse	0.005	0.267	-0.010	0.626	0.002	0.148
p_oxfd	-0.004	0.251	-0.003	0.249	0.024	0.804	.	.	0.007	0.761
p_cmbg	0.010	0.602	-0.018	1.894	-0.004	0.416
_cons	0.230	5.661	0.109	3.693	0.203	2.660	0.109	2.744	0.247	10.466
Num Obs	451		257		228		99		1035	
Adj R-sq	0.626		0.326		0.518		0.755		0.590	

Appendix Table 18: Regressions for current grade, 1980-86 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	0.220	0.944	-0.132	0.562	0.438	0.845	0.139	0.119	0.274	1.772
dy0e81	0.231	0.850	0.102	0.431	0.734	1.298	-0.043	0.044	0.378	2.289
dy0e82	0.301	1.194	-0.185	0.641			-0.266	0.300	0.295	1.756
dy0e83					-0.189	0.361	-0.216	0.207		
dy0e84	0.043	0.180	-0.394	1.542	-0.106	0.203	-0.589	0.601	0.003	0.020
dy0e85	-0.101	0.426	-0.422	1.752	-0.630	1.278			-0.066	0.429
dy0e86	-0.037	0.151	-0.589	2.353	0.014	0.025	-0.981	0.836	-0.065	0.404
dy0e87										
dy0e88										
dy0e89										
dy0e90										
dy0e91										
dy0e92										
dy0e93										
dy0e94										
dy0e95										
dy0e96										
dy0e97										
ageent	0.026	0.224	0.102	0.907	-0.043	0.174	-0.504	0.607	0.001	0.012
ageen2	-0.001	0.404	-0.002	1.012	0.000	0.080	0.008	0.556	0.000	0.266
phd	-0.238	0.500	-0.221	0.427	1.384	1.028	1.709	0.983	0.591	1.793
mast	0.143	0.321	-0.261	0.671	1.267	0.917	1.649	1.240	0.355	1.241
bach	0.020	0.024	-0.915	1.747	-1.509	1.044	-1.359	0.835	-0.747	1.886
dl_can	0.768	1.377	-0.382	0.537					0.213	0.463
dl_fra	0.284	0.728	-0.151	0.293					0.072	0.227
dl_grm	0.120	0.178			1.423	0.871			0.479	0.831
dl_ukg	1.518	3.564	0.030	0.065	0.126	0.106	0.619	0.323	0.570	1.910
dl_usa	0.743	2.283	0.279	0.868	1.622	1.576	0.172	0.182	0.504	2.344
ml_can	0.789	1.465			-2.261	1.272	0.184	0.108	0.501	1.150
ml_fra	-0.138	0.297	-0.204	0.417	-0.745	0.688	0.869	0.344	-0.225	0.758
ml_grm	-1.101	1.423							-0.561	0.721
ml_ukg	0.549	1.627	0.750	2.644	-0.634	0.543	-0.846	0.743	0.444	2.147
ml_usa	-0.252	0.890	-0.338	1.660	0.394	0.387	-1.372	1.172	-0.130	0.789
bl_can	-0.221	0.166							0.606	0.520
bl_fra	0.081	0.093							1.222	1.779
bl_grm										
bl_ukg	-0.130	0.173	1.614	2.654	2.051	1.183	1.194	0.681	0.805	2.012
bl_usa	-0.322	0.414	-0.799	1.060	1.998	1.765			0.437	1.167
dl_eco	0.149	0.656	0.630	2.548	-0.084	0.165	-0.305	0.382	0.193	1.225
dl_bus	-0.063	0.081	-0.528	0.518					-0.021	0.033
dl_eng	-0.177	0.425	1.041	2.352			-1.055	0.489	-0.005	0.017
dl_fin	0.454	0.714	1.788	2.614					0.721	1.436
ml_eco	0.217	0.990	0.109	0.471	0.009	0.022	1.101	1.526	0.356	2.513
ml_bus	-0.041	0.064	-0.121	0.320	0.003	0.004	0.528	0.444	0.118	0.429
ml_eng	0.345	0.793	-0.119	0.380					0.021	0.076
ml_fin	-0.246	0.846	0.551	2.149	-0.201	0.378	-0.489	0.470	0.240	1.355
bl_eco	-0.328	0.591	1.408	2.363					0.868	2.213
bl_bus					0.366	0.327			-0.724	0.906
bl_eng	0.391	0.792	-0.097	0.164					0.340	0.874
bl_fin	-0.623	0.572							-0.262	0.236
wrkex	0.051	2.590	0.042	2.073	0.087	2.139	-0.073	0.640	0.057	4.366
d_exp	-0.611	2.355	-0.142	0.589	-0.991	2.269	-0.949	1.278	-0.488	3.112
cvp	0.452	2.297	-0.024	0.114	0.200	0.455	-0.878	0.910	0.143	1.057
oper	0.070	0.459	0.149	0.882	0.062	0.210	-1.188	1.884	-0.084	0.839
marid	0.186	0.974	0.094	0.388	0.203	0.706	-0.511	0.864	0.104	0.892
d2_US	-0.423	2.322			-0.390	0.907			-0.021	0.195
d2_CAN	-0.504	1.485			1.660	1.950			0.195	0.692
d2_GBR	-0.716	2.871			0.391	0.629			-0.100	0.566
d2_AUS	0.208	0.532							0.646	1.900
d2_IND			0.164	0.918			-1.089	1.282	-0.030	0.175
d1_PAK			0.698	0.747					0.103	0.094
d1_FIL			-0.088	0.286			-1.895	2.332	-0.620	2.323
p_harv	0.974	1.737	1.151	2.820	0.472	0.466			0.856	2.555
p_mit	-0.129	0.315	0.159	0.282	2.083	1.468			0.061	0.181
p_chic	0.764	1.382	0.828	1.514	0.619	0.461			0.673	1.683
p_stan	-0.154	0.239	0.913	1.642	0.623	0.606	1.062	0.681	0.496	1.285
p_prin	2.517	2.339	-2.459	2.520			-0.498	0.285	0.023	0.036
p_lse	1.956	1.709	-0.501	0.514					0.628	0.777
p_oxfd	2.429	2.152	-0.437	0.446					1.067	1.318
p_cmbg	-0.913	0.811							-0.316	0.390
cons	23.756	10.928	22.316	11.017	23.180	5.287	33.494	2.657	23.441	17.388
Num Obs	324		236		115		056		731	
Adj R-sq	0.240		0.308		0.231		0.154		0.208	

Appendix Table 19: Regressions for current grade, 1990-97 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	0.575	2.148	0.936	4.050	0.632	1.889	0.993	3.229	0.688	4.231
dy0e91	0.283	1.101	0.803	3.728	0.689	2.065	1.347	4.505	0.546	3.452
dy0e92	0.032	0.130	0.699	3.303	0.485	1.479	0.686	2.453	0.353	2.269
dy0e93	-0.132	0.538	0.324	1.439	-0.096	0.322	0.336	1.235	0.069	0.445
dy0e94	-0.299	1.215	0.075	0.320	-0.074	0.244	0.074	0.246	-0.080	0.512
dy0e95	-0.164	0.604	.	.	0.270	0.768	0.232	0.725	0.028	0.162
dy0e96	-0.246	0.986	0.158	0.681	-0.293	0.898	.	.	-0.054	0.339
dy0e97	-0.488	1.250	.	.
ageent	0.180	2.507	0.235	3.526	0.116	1.220	0.110	1.166	0.152	3.868
ageen2	-0.002	1.808	-0.003	3.107	-0.001	0.842	-0.001	0.636	-0.001	2.893
phd	0.063	0.225	0.482	1.839	1.276	2.960	1.163	2.900	0.459	2.717
mast	-0.035	0.135	-0.212	0.858	0.716	1.667	0.598	1.760	0.132	0.850
bach	-0.339	1.089	-0.271	0.947	0.031	0.033	0.510	1.312	-0.212	1.104
dl_can	0.147	0.310	0.082	0.119	-0.709	0.769	.	.	-0.071	0.212
dl_fra	0.100	0.330	-0.139	0.535	-0.450	1.068	-0.144	0.289	-0.052	0.295
dl_grm	0.222	0.579	.	.	-0.812	1.542	.	.	0.005	0.018
dl_ukg	-0.210	0.594	0.041	0.155	-0.998	1.657	-0.273	0.720	-0.250	1.314
dl_usa	0.102	0.459	0.023	0.145	-0.578	1.932	-0.648	2.334	-0.104	0.899
ml_can	0.344	1.077	1.045	2.555	-1.192	2.049	.	.	0.186	0.850
ml_fra	0.177	0.630	1.001	2.483	-0.051	0.111	0.261	0.581	0.245	1.293
ml_grm	0.331	0.754	.	.	-0.202	0.219	.	.	0.508	1.449
ml_ukg	-0.368	1.463	0.491	1.906	-0.643	1.532	0.285	0.780	-0.158	1.024
ml_usa	-0.079	0.407	0.306	1.769	-0.429	1.612	0.017	0.077	-0.054	0.512
bl_can	0.463	0.858	0.927	1.580	-0.164	0.156	0.595	0.898	0.397	1.333
bl_fra	0.311	0.316	.	.	0.175	0.142	.	.	0.293	0.482
bl_grm	2.436	2.537	2.651	3.134
bl_ukg	-0.316	0.839	-0.018	0.044	0.672	0.622	.	.	-0.055	0.222
bl_usa	0.365	1.127	.	.	0.098	0.105	.	.	0.316	1.507
dl_eco	0.269	1.627	0.128	0.934	-0.003	0.014	-0.151	0.821	0.144	1.591
dl_bus	0.450	0.476	0.579	0.689
dl_eng	-0.259	0.815	-0.341	1.159	0.645	0.725	0.034	0.073	-0.246	1.219
dl_fin	0.552	0.575	0.581	1.424	0.478	0.531	.	.	0.570	1.490
ml_eco	0.166	1.017	0.006	0.032	0.274	1.364	-0.011	0.055	0.149	1.561
ml_bus	0.242	0.559	0.766	1.144	1.025	1.628	.	.	0.475	1.580
ml_eng	-0.286	1.177	-0.051	0.206	0.194	0.358	-0.755	1.203	-0.183	1.138
ml_fin	-0.001	0.004	0.519	2.073	-0.030	0.096	-0.646	1.425	0.066	0.435
bl_eco	0.632	2.026	-0.114	0.279	-0.304	0.525	-0.169	0.245	0.372	1.797
bl_bus	3.344	3.482	0.030	0.072	0.579	1.463
bl_eng	-0.164	0.490	0.155	0.391	-0.207	0.223	.	.	-0.055	0.248
bl_fin	-0.642	0.653	-0.096	0.112
wrkex	0.025	2.065	0.032	2.987	0.027	1.820	0.019	1.061	0.031	4.879
d_exp	0.352	0.621	-0.353	1.121	-0.021	0.050	0.156	0.338	-0.029	0.127
cvp	0.352	2.777	0.243	1.710	-0.191	1.073	-0.230	1.139	0.174	2.285
oper	-0.128	1.125	0.107	0.903	-0.098	0.606	-0.123	0.691	-0.038	0.570
marid	0.185	1.389	0.276	1.900	0.040	0.311	-0.055	0.355	0.185	2.776
d2_US	-0.033	0.234	.	.	0.130	0.752	.	.	0.076	1.009
d2_CAN	-0.170	0.812	.	.	0.751	2.239	.	.	0.133	0.973
d2_GBR	0.556	2.552	.	.	0.439	1.334	.	.	0.538	3.928
d2_AUS	-0.073	0.330	.	.	-0.120	0.249	.	.	0.087	0.514
d2_IND	.	.	0.104	0.857	.	.	-0.200	1.188	-0.114	1.015
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.411	1.294	.	.	-0.380	1.124	-0.414	1.459
p_harv	0.672	1.208	-0.565	1.185	-0.244	0.450	.	.	0.181	0.595
p_mit	-0.221	0.324	2.958	4.357	0.256	0.385	.	.	0.772	2.017
p_chic	0.322	0.472	-0.328	1.054	0.600	0.937	0.707	1.236	0.081	0.297
p_stan	0.096	0.219	-0.713	1.497	-0.236	0.439	.	.	-0.106	0.389
p_prin	1.434	2.038	0.277	0.578	0.893	2.091
p_lse	0.928	1.455	1.333	1.862	1.851	1.769	.	.	0.974	2.352
p_oxfd	1.274	1.962	-0.484	0.925	1.666	2.198	.	.	0.899	2.607
p_cmbg	0.705	1.127	-0.975	2.199	0.023	0.060
cons	18.325	12.282	16.585	12.027	19.169	10.023	18.880	10.187	18.524	22.622
Num Obs	453		257		231		101		1042	
Adj R-sq	0.337		0.483		0.267		0.399		0.365	

Appendix Table 20: Regressions for grade promotion, 1980-86 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80	-0.047	1.911	-0.100	4.016	-0.016	0.304	-0.167	1.622	-0.056	3.490
dy0e81	-0.056	1.930	-0.056	2.226	.	.	-0.219	2.559	-0.053	3.097
dy0e82	-0.026	0.962	-0.051	1.647	-0.067	1.094	-0.060	0.774	-0.018	1.028
dy0e83	-0.024	0.395	-0.127	1.383	.	.
dy0e84	-0.025	0.975	-0.021	0.763	0.071	1.200	-0.113	1.312	-0.005	0.270
dy0e85	-0.023	0.898	-0.029	1.143	-0.005	0.096	.	.	-0.010	0.642
dy0e86	0.008	0.311	-0.004	0.150	0.022	0.392	-0.239	2.318	0.005	0.278
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90
dy0e91
dy0e92
dy0e93
dy0e94
dy0e95
dy0e96
dy0e97
ageent	-0.052	4.253	-0.044	3.720	-0.033	1.235	-0.228	3.133	-0.047	6.260
ageen2	0.001	3.334	0.001	2.987	0.000	0.874	0.003	2.882	0.000	4.687
phd	-0.064	1.304	-0.069	1.219	-0.022	0.150	-0.289	1.894	-0.073	2.163
mast	0.018	0.377	0.026	0.625	-0.001	0.003	-0.172	1.476	-0.005	0.167
bach	-0.026	0.301	-0.048	0.873	0.256	1.626	-0.230	1.613	-0.028	0.703
dl_can	0.056	0.971	-0.016	0.205	0.024	0.523
dl_fra	0.021	0.513	0.008	0.140	0.012	0.369
dl_grm	0.003	0.036	.	.	0.071	0.401	.	.	0.024	0.413
dl_ukg	0.064	1.407	-0.049	0.940	-0.003	0.020	-0.176	1.043	0.027	0.844
dl_usa	0.022	0.633	0.008	0.227	0.015	0.131	0.006	0.066	0.018	0.796
ml_can	0.060	1.018	.	.	-0.027	0.138	0.221	1.478	0.017	0.377
ml_fra	-0.014	0.289	-0.070	1.364	0.088	0.746	-0.322	1.449	-0.017	0.561
ml_grm	-0.053	0.664	-0.032	0.411
ml_ukg	-0.038	1.045	-0.046	1.521	-0.001	0.010	-0.067	0.675	-0.024	1.143
ml_usa	-0.021	0.686	-0.012	0.567	0.052	0.468	-0.011	0.110	0.004	0.231
bl_can	-0.093	0.669	-0.153	1.297
bl_fra	0.028	0.312	0.048	0.688
bl_grm
bl_ukg	-0.050	0.644	0.152	2.366	-0.309	1.637	0.381	2.474	0.024	0.594
bl_usa	-0.044	0.544	-0.031	0.390	-0.165	1.341	.	.	-0.021	0.541
dl_eco	0.028	1.149	0.043	1.633	-0.038	0.676	0.087	1.247	0.025	1.545
dl_bus	-0.010	0.127	-0.187	1.728	-0.021	0.324
dl_eng	0.085	1.972	0.088	1.872	0.081	2.496
dl_fin	-0.005	0.080	0.009	0.120	0.003	0.051
ml_eco	-0.009	0.396	-0.033	1.331	-0.056	1.264	-0.087	1.380	-0.026	1.780
ml_bus	-0.100	1.267	0.001	0.024	-0.018	0.260	-0.030	0.287	-0.012	0.403
ml_eng	-0.004	0.093	0.024	0.730	-0.007	0.249
ml_fin	-0.046	1.528	-0.007	0.247	-0.028	0.479	-0.158	1.724	-0.026	1.453
bl_eco	-0.024	0.411	0.090	1.421	-0.021	0.532
bl_bus	-0.154	1.262	.	.	0.007	0.084
bl_eng	0.043	0.846	-0.031	0.501	-0.034	0.872
bl_fin	-0.091	0.807	-0.147	1.312
wrkex	0.001	0.614	-0.006	2.815	0.000	0.027	-0.008	0.833	-0.001	0.541
d_exp	0.047	1.752	0.074	2.916	0.118	2.459	-0.007	0.100	0.064	3.983
cvp	0.033	1.589	0.006	0.276	0.027	0.574	-0.044	0.520	0.018	1.294
oper	-0.010	0.643	-0.014	0.785	-0.023	0.718	-0.073	1.318	-0.017	1.664
marid	-0.018	0.888	0.044	1.735	0.004	0.138	-0.010	0.187	-0.002	0.184
d2_US	0.027	1.411	.	.	0.048	0.988	.	.	0.017	1.526
d2_CAN	-0.032	0.877	.	.	0.164	1.741	.	.	0.008	0.260
d2_GBR	0.001	0.054	.	.	0.038	0.548	.	.	-0.009	0.483
d2_AUS	-0.024	0.601	-0.029	0.855
d2_IND	.	.	-0.005	0.282	.	.	0.059	0.795	0.009	0.513
d1_PAK	.	.	-0.227	2.301	-0.229	2.067
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.016	0.488	.	.	0.073	1.022	-0.025	0.914
p_harv	0.037	0.641	0.007	0.168	0.101	0.916	.	.	0.016	0.462
p_mit	-0.036	0.803	-0.106	1.776	-0.014	0.091	.	.	-0.055	1.566
p_chic	-0.016	0.271	0.047	0.817	0.057	0.388	.	.	0.019	0.466
p_stan	0.028	0.422	-0.002	0.037	-0.059	0.524	-0.156	1.139	-0.016	0.420
p_prin	0.106	0.952	-0.023	0.226	.	.	-0.026	0.172	0.013	0.196
p_lse	-0.028	0.237	0.051	0.493	0.009	0.113
p_oxfd	0.126	1.074	0.183	1.611
p_cmbg	0.003	0.023	-0.045	0.542
_cons	1.350	5.953	1.193	5.539	0.918	1.932	4.419	3.994	1.291	9.416
Num Obs	312		232		113		055		712	
Adj R-sq	0.306		0.526		0.175		0.483		0.393	

Appendix Table 21: Regressions for grade promotion, 1990-97 cohort

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	0.207	2.911	0.000	0.000	0.153	3.007	0.145	1.583	0.179	4.370
dy0e91	0.184	2.684	-0.009	0.175	0.081	1.560	0.248	2.790	0.173	4.340
dy0e92	0.154	2.314	0.041	0.800	0.130	2.547	0.194	2.328	0.174	4.445
dy0e93	0.163	2.463	-0.019	0.347	0.055	1.194	0.208	2.570	0.161	4.125
dy0e94	0.181	2.733	-0.099	1.757	0.087	1.860	0.177	1.982	0.146	3.714
dy0e95	0.156	2.151	0.165	1.726	0.129	3.032
dy0e96	0.105	1.567	-0.155	2.785	-0.095	1.891	.	.	0.042	1.040
dy0e97	-0.086	1.417	0.031	0.225	.	.
ageent	-0.052	2.791	-0.070	4.359	-0.046	2.943	-0.089	3.109	-0.056	5.928
ageen2	0.001	2.411	0.001	3.881	0.000	2.453	0.001	2.959	0.001	5.165
phd	0.037	0.512	-0.029	0.466	-0.017	0.238	0.142	1.172	0.006	0.149
mast	0.057	0.864	-0.012	0.205	0.048	0.683	0.133	1.320	0.037	1.015
bach	0.062	0.783	-0.071	1.035	-0.085	0.552	0.015	0.134	0.009	0.197
dl_can	-0.034	0.281	0.181	1.086	0.112	0.740	.	.	0.025	0.309
dl_fra	0.020	0.258	-0.017	0.269	0.121	1.737	-0.120	0.795	0.026	0.621
dl_grm	0.517	5.257	.	.	0.048	0.558	.	.	0.363	5.792
dl_ukg	0.006	0.062	0.059	0.920	-0.017	0.170	0.173	1.496	0.076	1.677
dl_usa	-0.004	0.078	0.000	0.012	0.035	0.702	-0.057	0.648	0.009	0.336
ml_can	-0.026	0.322	-0.164	1.669	-0.151	1.243	.	.	-0.048	0.900
ml_fra	-0.046	0.639	0.012	0.122	-0.074	0.981	-0.038	0.282	-0.046	1.029
ml_grm	-0.019	0.170	.	.	-0.082	0.541	.	.	-0.027	0.322
ml_ukg	-0.009	0.138	-0.050	0.807	-0.080	1.156	-0.075	0.676	-0.054	1.469
ml_usa	0.025	0.499	-0.041	0.985	-0.008	0.183	-0.106	1.603	-0.011	0.427
bl_can	0.003	0.019	0.060	0.422	0.044	0.255	-0.138	0.703	-0.017	0.247
bl_fra	0.051	0.203	.	.	-0.077	0.377	.	.	-0.025	0.176
bl_grm	-0.061	0.249	0.025	0.123
bl_ukg	-0.016	0.160	0.086	0.872	0.025	0.142	.	.	-0.019	0.327
bl_usa	-0.079	0.953	.	.	0.166	1.074	.	.	-0.007	0.142
dl_eco	0.046	1.085	0.001	0.023	0.012	0.334	-0.005	0.095	0.027	1.280
dl_bus	-0.104	0.430	-0.090	0.450
dl_eng	0.009	0.105	-0.037	0.518	0.756	5.149	-0.078	0.563	0.002	0.049
dl_fin	0.106	0.432	0.051	0.522	-0.011	0.073	.	.	0.037	0.410
ml_eco	0.004	0.104	-0.061	1.386	0.046	1.372	0.115	1.849	0.013	0.551
ml_bus	0.116	1.042	-0.050	0.311	0.002	0.017	.	.	0.066	0.931
ml_eng	-0.014	0.221	0.072	1.218	-0.134	1.501	0.035	0.186	0.004	0.112
ml_fin	0.062	0.901	0.119	1.980	-0.073	1.442	0.108	0.794	0.044	1.236
bl_eco	0.037	0.460	-0.030	0.302	-0.143	1.490	-0.029	0.139	0.014	0.279
bl_bus	0.386	1.569	0.382	3.861	0.333	3.552
bl_eng	-0.041	0.482	0.100	1.044	-0.038	0.247	.	.	0.005	0.101
bl_fin	0.029	0.113	0.042	0.209
wrkex	0.002	0.631	-0.002	0.691	-0.001	0.290	0.002	0.291	0.001	0.430
d_exp	-0.037	0.253	-0.014	0.188	-0.019	0.281	-0.055	0.401	-0.016	0.291
cvp	0.004	0.129	0.066	1.931	-0.028	0.970	-0.010	0.168	0.006	0.350
oper	0.030	1.038	0.079	2.764	0.001	0.019	-0.040	0.724	0.030	1.927
marid	0.033	0.978	0.036	1.015	-0.010	0.458	-0.001	0.029	0.022	1.418
d2_US	0.027	0.737	.	.	0.005	0.183	.	.	0.017	0.964
d2_CAN	0.025	0.463	.	.	0.022	0.373	.	.	0.012	0.368
d2_GBR	-0.016	0.292	.	.	0.149	2.751	.	.	0.045	1.389
d2_AUS	0.013	0.237	.	.	-0.017	0.214	.	.	0.010	0.256
d2_IND	.	.	-0.018	0.630	.	.	-0.028	0.565	-0.016	0.594
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.028	0.360	.	.	-0.096	0.959	-0.009	0.136
p_harv	0.043	0.301	0.028	0.243	0.009	0.102	.	.	0.024	0.334
p_mit	0.089	0.509	0.015	0.091	0.131	1.199	.	.	0.086	0.954
p_chic	0.066	0.377	-0.065	0.874	-0.046	0.438	0.277	1.630	-0.002	0.038
p_stan	0.055	0.488	-0.148	1.290	0.047	0.533	.	.	0.005	0.081
p_prin	-0.059	0.327	0.102	0.884	0.010	0.102
p_lse	0.227	1.379	-0.082	0.478	1.533	8.880	.	.	0.356	3.622
p_oxfd	-0.106	0.633	-0.108	0.860	0.120	0.962	.	.	-0.089	1.083
p_cmbg	0.130	0.804	-0.215	2.012	-0.085	0.946
cons	1.057	2.703	1.700	5.125	1.154	3.735	1.727	3.094	1.203	6.099
Num Obs	451		257		230		99		1037	
Adj R-sq	0.109		0.295		0.562		0.201		0.206	

Appendix Table 22: Regressions for log current salary, 1990-97 cohort, excluding US men

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	.	.	0.160	4.665	0.067	1.497	0.118	2.784	0.073	3.075
dy0e91	-0.022	0.729	0.115	3.606	0.083	1.845	0.146	3.542	0.054	2.333
dy0e92	-0.056	1.881	0.115	3.666	0.039	0.879	0.076	1.972	0.035	1.542
dy0e93	-0.078	2.785	0.075	2.228	-0.006	0.146	0.016	0.426	-0.003	0.131
dy0e94	-0.100	3.499	0.049	1.392	-0.024	0.593	-0.004	0.085	-0.023	1.016
dy0e95	-0.062	1.858	.	.	0.032	0.680	0.041	0.938	-0.004	0.148
dy0e96	-0.096	3.081	0.055	1.589	-0.038	0.870	.	.	-0.018	0.769
dy0e97	-0.011	0.248	-0.116	2.152	.	.
ageent	0.042	4.159	0.044	4.432	0.018	1.448	0.025	1.905	0.032	5.876
ageen2	0.000	3.077	0.000	3.737	0.000	0.764	0.000	1.108	0.000	4.226
phd	-0.006	0.154	0.070	1.808	0.175	3.031	0.151	2.724	0.052	2.266
mast	-0.044	1.251	-0.049	1.326	0.107	1.862	0.070	1.480	-0.003	0.152
bach	-0.055	1.289	-0.057	1.345	0.068	0.541	0.061	1.142	-0.028	1.059
dl_can	-0.005	0.080	-0.016	0.160	-0.115	0.928	.	.	-0.018	0.397
dl_fra	0.047	1.217	-0.036	0.938	-0.049	0.871	-0.047	0.688	0.008	0.357
dl_grm	0.046	0.926	.	.	-0.101	1.428	.	.	0.012	0.339
dl_ukg	-0.085	1.800	0.005	0.132	-0.090	1.119	-0.056	1.065	-0.042	1.665
dl_usa	-0.002	0.063	-0.001	0.039	-0.052	1.296	-0.089	2.320	-0.010	0.617
ml_can	0.020	0.467	0.204	3.353	-0.154	1.967	.	.	0.027	0.910
ml_fra	0.067	1.874	0.103	1.714	0.036	0.578	0.046	0.734	0.062	2.489
ml_grm	0.045	0.806	.	.	0.010	0.082	.	.	0.078	1.703
ml_ukg	-0.063	1.893	0.083	2.177	-0.074	1.309	0.024	0.468	-0.021	1.023
ml_usa	0.031	1.063	0.075	2.902	-0.040	1.113	0.020	0.645	0.018	1.241
bl_can	0.023	0.343	0.192	2.204	-0.122	0.865	0.076	0.828	0.021	0.539
bl_fra	0.142	1.131	.	.	0.038	0.229	.	.	0.095	1.193
bl_grm	0.433	3.552	0.471	4.233
bl_ukg	0.015	0.312	-0.011	0.178	0.069	0.477	.	.	0.022	0.670
bl_usa	-0.044	0.500	.	.	-0.027	0.215	.	.	-0.027	0.732
dl_eco	0.033	1.219	0.016	0.783	0.020	0.672	-0.009	0.360	0.023	1.796
dl_bus	0.184	1.545	0.200	1.811
dl_eng	0.007	0.129	-0.032	0.736	0.004	0.035	-0.079	1.240	-0.020	0.642
dl_fin	-0.021	0.169	0.030	0.496	0.203	1.685	.	.	0.073	1.445
ml_eco	0.054	2.313	0.000	0.008	0.025	0.937	-0.014	0.495	0.026	1.930
ml_bus	0.015	0.266	0.085	0.854	0.151	1.788	.	.	0.056	1.423
ml_eng	-0.019	0.573	-0.006	0.166	0.031	0.427	-0.023	0.270	-0.013	0.579
ml_fin	0.005	0.129	0.064	1.723	0.011	0.267	-0.104	1.661	0.015	0.708
bl_eco	0.022	0.477	-0.009	0.148	-0.054	0.697	-0.100	1.044	0.005	0.186
bl_bus	.	.	-0.052	0.853	-0.098	1.679
bl_eng	-0.032	0.690	0.006	0.104	-0.019	0.154	.	.	0.004	0.121
bl_fin	-0.025	0.195	0.080	0.706
wrkex	0.005	2.798	0.006	3.768	0.005	2.597	0.004	1.668	0.006	6.283
d_exp	-0.018	0.201	-0.023	0.489	-0.024	0.435	0.009	0.142	-0.009	0.299
cvp	0.018	0.969	0.032	1.515	-0.014	0.577	-0.033	1.172	0.013	1.218
oper	-0.029	1.754	0.014	0.808	-0.008	0.359	-0.017	0.699	-0.010	1.102
marid	0.037	1.873	0.046	2.115	0.004	0.227	0.000	0.022	0.028	2.991
d2_US	0.011	0.485	.	.	-0.008	0.658
d2_CAN	0.025	0.921	.	.	0.108	2.390	.	.	0.035	1.939
d2_GBR	0.082	2.860	.	.	0.049	1.116	.	.	0.076	4.209
d2_AUS	0.024	0.839	.	.	-0.014	0.215	.	.	0.035	1.545
d2_IND	.	.	0.010	0.534	.	.	-0.031	1.348	-0.019	1.307
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.058	1.227	.	.	-0.050	1.079	-0.070	1.876
p_harv	0.289	2.411	-0.075	1.055	-0.032	0.440	.	.	0.037	0.813
p_mit	.	.	0.430	4.266	0.015	0.173	.	.	0.174	2.687
p_chic	0.084	0.969	-0.020	0.439	0.074	0.857	0.068	0.862	0.032	0.896
p_stan	0.109	1.268	-0.033	0.469	-0.014	0.195	.	.	0.020	0.480
p_prin	0.178	1.959	-0.004	0.054	0.081	1.444
p_lse	0.178	2.153	0.146	1.370	0.126	0.895	.	.	0.131	2.392
p_oxfd	.	.	-0.095	1.229	0.134	1.320	.	.	0.064	1.177
p_cmbg	0.151	1.867	-0.118	1.788	0.020	0.389
cons	10.032	47.449	9.836	48.051	10.363	40.371	10.228	39.901	10.154	90.000
Num Obs	328		257		231		101		917	
Adj R-sq	0.548		0.565		0.423		0.593		0.544	

Appendix Table 23: Regressions for annual salary growth, 1990-97 cohort, excluding US men

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	.	.	0.017	3.467	-0.140	10.140	0.013	2.021	0.019	4.963
dy0e91	-0.012	1.789	0.008	1.792	-0.152	11.271	0.012	1.950	0.010	2.664
dy0e92	-0.020	2.979	0.007	1.498	-0.153	11.462	0.009	1.512	0.005	1.489
dy0e93	-0.021	3.346	-0.001	0.242	-0.166	13.624	-0.005	0.822	-0.002	0.449
dy0e94	-0.024	3.772	-0.010	1.899	-0.168	13.518	-0.002	0.289	-0.005	1.360
dy0e95	-0.017	2.234	.	.	-0.166	11.468	-0.006	0.900	.	.
dy0e96	-0.015	2.217	0.009	1.849	-0.156	11.778	.	.	0.006	1.629
dy0e97	0.169	17.041	0.103	10.417	0.170	29.448
ageent	-0.002	0.709	-0.004	2.661	-0.001	0.184	-0.004	2.191	-0.003	2.305
ageen2	0.000	0.670	0.000	2.093	0.000	0.013	0.000	2.133	0.000	1.915
phd	0.007	0.858	-0.010	1.752	-0.002	0.102	0.019	2.161	-0.002	0.331
mast	0.007	0.921	-0.006	1.156	0.027	1.591	0.000	0.043	0.005	1.021
bach	0.002	0.178	-0.010	1.573	0.012	0.323	-0.003	0.305	-0.002	0.330
dl_can	-0.006	0.411	0.017	1.124	-0.004	0.099	.	.	0.002	0.196
dl_fra	-0.006	0.655	0.001	0.183	0.011	0.669	-0.019	1.818	0.000	0.006
dl_grm	0.001	0.090	.	.	-0.002	0.073	.	.	-0.001	0.113
dl_ukg	-0.008	0.767	0.005	0.834	0.000	0.014	-0.010	1.215	0.000	0.083
dl_usa	-0.003	0.472	0.002	0.517	-0.003	0.253	-0.016	2.620	0.000	0.078
ml_can	-0.005	0.512	-0.011	1.220	-0.017	0.577	.	.	-0.003	0.445
ml_fra	-0.004	0.530	0.006	0.733	-0.035	1.945	0.011	1.133	-0.007	1.308
ml_grm	-0.002	0.174	.	.	-0.017	0.477	.	.	0.000	0.028
ml_ukg	-0.011	1.542	-0.005	0.864	-0.056	3.390	-0.002	0.280	-0.018	4.004
ml_usa	-0.008	1.266	0.002	0.503	-0.030	2.870	0.001	0.137	-0.008	2.459
bl_can	0.014	0.936	-0.004	0.316	-0.007	0.167	-0.014	0.986	0.003	0.397
bl_fra	0.011	0.385	.	.	-0.015	0.313	.	.	0.001	0.034
bl_grm	0.003	0.129	0.000	0.001
bl_ukg	0.015	1.397	-0.002	0.271	-0.016	0.373	.	.	0.002	0.270
bl_usa	0.015	0.773	.	.	-0.017	0.470	.	.	-0.001	0.083
dl_eco	-0.005	0.760	0.002	0.608	-0.001	0.160	-0.006	1.536	-0.001	0.358
dl_bus	-0.007	0.274	-0.001	0.056
dl_eng	-0.002	0.198	-0.001	0.104	0.010	0.280	-0.008	0.837	-0.003	0.374
dl_fin	0.002	0.065	0.004	0.431	-0.006	0.157	.	.	0.001	0.096
ml_eco	0.008	1.630	-0.007	1.719	0.002	0.303	0.000	0.034	0.003	1.115
ml_bus	0.019	1.579	-0.009	0.644	0.009	0.355	.	.	0.013	1.500
ml_eng	-0.005	0.645	0.004	0.839	-0.024	1.103	0.010	0.751	-0.001	0.123
ml_fin	0.002	0.185	0.004	0.780	-0.007	0.599	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.102
bl_eco	-0.003	0.320	0.003	0.359	-0.010	0.458	0.011	0.766	-0.001	0.179
bl_bus	.	.	0.031	3.513	0.030	2.335
bl_eng	-0.018	1.725	0.011	1.265	-0.011	0.303	.	.	-0.005	0.815
bl_fin	-0.085	3.028	-0.068	2.736
wrkex	0.000	1.028	0.000	0.139	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.616	0.000	1.181
d_exp	-0.009	0.471	0.003	0.418	0.004	0.266	-0.004	0.445	0.000	0.043
cvp	0.001	0.216	0.004	1.379	-0.005	0.649	-0.003	0.765	0.000	0.153
oper	0.005	1.222	0.003	1.073	0.005	0.748	-0.006	1.610	0.002	0.898
marid	0.004	0.982	0.003	1.112	0.001	0.216	0.002	0.484	0.002	1.146
d2_US	0.006	0.916	.	.	0.003	1.121
d2_CAN	0.006	0.992	.	.	-0.012	0.872	.	.	0.000	0.027
d2_GBR	0.002	0.327	.	.	0.008	0.623	.	.	0.006	1.605
d2_AUS	0.025	4.057	.	.	0.017	0.884	.	.	0.021	4.331
d2_IND	.	.	0.001	0.410	.	.	0.002	0.537	0.001	0.264
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.006	0.889	.	.	-0.007	1.047	-0.004	0.498
p_harv	0.003	0.097	0.006	0.548	-0.007	0.322	.	.	-0.002	0.160
p_mit	.	.	-0.026	1.802	0.004	0.142	.	.	-0.005	0.385
p_chic	0.000	0.010	-0.010	1.453	0.009	0.346	0.038	3.150	0.001	0.072
p_stan	0.008	0.428	-0.003	0.279	0.008	0.395	.	.	0.001	0.158
p_prin	0.003	0.150	0.002	0.211	0.002	0.158
p_lse	0.011	0.591	-0.010	0.626	0.004	0.310
p_oxfd	.	.	-0.003	0.249	0.024	0.804	.	.	0.016	1.313
p_cmbg	0.015	0.830	-0.018	1.894	-0.003	0.254
cons	0.063	1.318	0.109	3.693	0.203	2.660	0.109	2.744	0.080	3.251
Num Obs	326		257		228		99		910	
Adj R-sq	0.624		0.326		0.518		0.755		0.578	

Appendix Table 24: Regressions for current grade, 1990-97 cohort, excluding US men

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	.	.	0.936	4.050	0.632	1.889	0.993	3.229	0.588	3.332
dy0e91	-0.202	0.825	0.803	3.728	0.689	2.065	1.347	4.505	0.492	2.884
dy0e92	-0.570	2.376	0.699	3.303	0.485	1.479	0.686	2.453	0.288	1.705
dy0e93	-0.685	3.045	0.324	1.439	-0.096	0.322	0.336	1.235	-0.031	0.185
dy0e94	-0.779	3.380	0.075	0.320	-0.074	0.244	0.074	0.246	-0.131	0.776
dy0e95	-0.445	1.655	.	.	0.270	0.768	0.232	0.725	0.043	0.233
dy0e96	-0.734	2.935	0.158	0.681	-0.293	0.898	.	.	-0.140	0.804
dy0e97	-0.312	0.914	-0.488	1.250	.	.
ageent	0.177	2.158	0.235	3.526	0.116	1.220	0.110	1.166	0.150	3.705
ageen2	-0.001	1.475	-0.003	3.107	-0.001	0.842	-0.001	0.636	-0.001	2.753
phd	-0.101	0.329	0.482	1.839	1.276	2.960	1.163	2.900	0.398	2.336
mast	-0.328	1.165	-0.212	0.858	0.716	1.667	0.598	1.760	0.022	0.137
bach	-0.439	1.287	-0.271	0.947	0.031	0.033	0.510	1.312	-0.166	0.852
dl_can	0.121	0.247	0.082	0.119	-0.709	0.769	.	.	-0.061	0.186
dl_fra	0.134	0.431	-0.139	0.535	-0.450	1.068	-0.144	0.289	-0.049	0.282
dl_grm	0.295	0.743	.	.	-0.812	1.542	.	.	0.027	0.103
dl_ukg	-0.623	1.649	0.041	0.155	-0.998	1.657	-0.273	0.720	-0.378	1.998
dl_usa	-0.042	0.164	0.023	0.145	-0.578	1.932	-0.648	2.334	-0.121	1.034
ml_can	0.301	0.892	1.045	2.555	-1.192	2.049	.	.	0.174	0.792
ml_fra	0.253	0.878	1.001	2.483	-0.051	0.111	0.261	0.581	0.260	1.402
ml_grm	0.305	0.683	.	.	-0.202	0.219	.	.	0.484	1.411
ml_ukg	-0.418	1.568	0.491	1.906	-0.643	1.532	0.285	0.780	-0.162	1.055
ml_usa	0.041	0.178	0.306	1.769	-0.429	1.612	0.017	0.077	-0.023	0.210
bl_can	0.334	0.608	0.927	1.580	-0.164	0.156	0.595	0.898	0.290	0.992
bl_fra	0.780	0.773	.	.	0.175	0.142	.	.	0.292	0.492
bl_grm	2.274	2.324	2.537	3.063
bl_ukg	-0.186	0.477	-0.018	0.044	0.672	0.622	.	.	-0.058	0.238
bl_usa	0.204	0.287	.	.	0.098	0.105	.	.	-0.119	0.442
dl_eco	0.243	1.105	0.128	0.934	-0.003	0.014	-0.151	0.821	0.120	1.254
dl_bus	0.487	0.507	0.599	0.730
dl_eng	-0.078	0.173	-0.341	1.159	0.645	0.725	0.034	0.073	-0.189	0.830
dl_fin	0.564	0.577	0.581	1.424	0.478	0.531	.	.	0.592	1.575
ml_eco	0.429	2.275	0.006	0.032	0.274	1.364	-0.011	0.055	0.240	2.423
ml_bus	0.300	0.677	0.766	1.144	1.025	1.628	.	.	0.496	1.687
ml_eng	-0.094	0.351	-0.051	0.206	0.194	0.358	-0.755	1.203	-0.114	0.695
ml_fin	0.056	0.168	0.519	2.073	-0.030	0.096	-0.646	1.425	0.085	0.530
bl_eco	0.343	0.930	-0.114	0.279	-0.304	0.525	-0.169	0.245	0.152	0.695
bl_bus	.	.	0.030	0.072	-0.275	0.631
bl_eng	-0.192	0.515	0.155	0.391	-0.207	0.223	.	.	-0.055	0.244
bl_fin	-0.791	0.783	-0.217	0.258
wrkex	0.020	1.459	0.032	2.987	0.027	1.820	0.019	1.061	0.029	4.459
d_exp	-0.123	0.175	-0.353	1.121	-0.021	0.050	0.156	0.338	-0.109	0.480
cvp	0.194	1.272	0.243	1.710	-0.191	1.073	-0.230	1.139	0.086	1.075
oper	-0.215	1.601	0.107	0.903	-0.098	0.606	-0.123	0.691	-0.073	1.068
marid	0.281	1.770	0.276	1.900	0.040	0.311	-0.055	0.355	0.185	2.686
d2_US	0.130	0.752	.	.	-0.013	0.139
d2_CAN	-0.047	0.216	.	.	0.751	2.239	.	.	0.155	1.150
d2_GBR	0.560	2.447	.	.	0.439	1.334	.	.	0.542	4.019
d2_AUS	0.049	0.214	.	.	-0.120	0.249	.	.	0.103	0.615
d2_IND	.	.	0.104	0.857	.	.	-0.200	1.188	-0.111	1.005
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.411	1.294	.	.	-0.380	1.124	-0.401	1.443
p_harv	1.855	1.924	-0.565	1.185	-0.244	0.450	.	.	0.113	0.330
p_mit	.	.	2.958	4.357	0.256	0.385	.	.	1.247	2.591
p_chic	0.490	0.701	-0.328	1.054	0.600	0.937	0.707	1.236	0.145	0.540
p_stan	0.838	1.210	-0.713	1.497	-0.236	0.439	.	.	-0.092	0.291
p_prin	1.561	2.137	0.277	0.578	0.939	2.243
p_lse	1.314	1.978	1.333	1.862	1.851	1.769	.	.	1.138	2.799
p_oxfd	.	.	-0.484	0.925	1.666	2.198	.	.	0.825	2.042
p_cmbg	1.156	1.775	-0.975	2.199	0.161	0.432
cons	18.953	11.159	16.585	12.027	19.169	10.023	18.880	10.187	18.762	22.339
Num Obs	328		257		231		101		917	
Adj R-sq	0.311		0.483		0.267		0.399		0.364	

Appendix Table 25: Regressions for grade promotion, 1990-97 cohort, excluding US men

	Part 1 Men		Part 2 Men		Part 1 Women		Part 2 Women		Pooled Sample	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
dy0e80
dy0e81
dy0e82
dy0e83
dy0e84
dy0e85
dy0e86
dy0e87
dy0e88
dy0e89
dy0e90	.	.	0.000	0.000	0.153	3.007	0.145	1.583	0.158	3.469
dy0e91	0.007	0.103	-0.009	0.175	0.081	1.560	0.248	2.790	0.158	3.574
dy0e92	-0.009	0.135	0.041	0.800	0.130	2.547	0.194	2.328	0.170	3.863
dy0e93	-0.012	0.205	-0.019	0.347	0.055	1.194	0.208	2.570	0.149	3.442
dy0e94	0.035	0.567	-0.099	1.757	0.087	1.860	0.177	1.982	0.141	3.217
dy0e95	0.020	0.279	0.165	1.726	0.127	2.702
dy0e96	-0.067	1.012	-0.155	2.785	-0.095	1.891	.	.	0.017	0.385
dy0e97	-0.130	1.363	.	.	-0.086	1.417	0.031	0.225	.	.
ageent	-0.051	2.300	-0.070	4.359	-0.046	2.943	-0.089	3.109	-0.057	5.766
ageent2	0.001	1.889	0.001	3.881	0.000	2.453	0.001	2.959	0.001	5.008
phd	0.040	0.496	-0.029	0.466	-0.017	0.238	0.142	1.172	0.002	0.041
mast	0.066	0.888	-0.012	0.205	0.048	0.683	0.133	1.320	0.033	0.873
bach	0.015	0.162	-0.071	1.035	-0.085	0.552	0.015	0.134	-0.016	0.340
dl_can	0.016	0.121	0.181	1.086	0.112	0.740	.	.	0.036	0.450
dl_fra	0.049	0.588	-0.017	0.269	0.121	1.737	-0.120	0.795	0.031	0.743
dl_grm	0.562	5.323	.	.	0.048	0.558	.	.	0.374	6.001
dl_ukg	0.024	0.234	0.059	0.920	-0.017	0.170	0.173	1.496	0.081	1.768
dl_usa	0.015	0.224	0.000	0.012	0.035	0.702	-0.057	0.648	0.015	0.547
ml_can	-0.007	0.080	-0.164	1.669	-0.151	1.243	.	.	-0.046	0.852
ml_fra	-0.059	0.776	0.012	0.122	-0.074	0.981	-0.038	0.282	-0.046	1.022
ml_grm	-0.042	0.355	.	.	-0.082	0.541	.	.	-0.028	0.336
ml_ukg	0.015	0.205	-0.050	0.807	-0.080	1.156	-0.075	0.676	-0.047	1.282
ml_usa	-0.010	0.171	-0.041	0.985	-0.008	0.183	-0.106	1.603	-0.018	0.687
bl_can	0.055	0.377	0.060	0.422	0.044	0.255	-0.138	0.703	0.004	0.051
bl_fra	0.098	0.365	.	.	-0.077	0.377	.	.	-0.006	0.045
bl_grm	-0.012	0.046	0.057	0.286
bl_ukg	0.037	0.355	0.086	0.872	0.025	0.142	.	.	0.003	0.047
bl_usa	0.231	1.230	.	.	0.166	1.074	.	.	0.082	1.257
dl_eco	0.015	0.260	0.001	0.023	0.012	0.334	-0.005	0.095	0.015	0.632
dl_bus	-0.125	0.493	-0.098	0.499
dl_eng	0.029	0.245	-0.037	0.518	0.756	5.149	-0.078	0.563	0.015	0.275
dl_fin	0.102	0.392	0.051	0.522	-0.011	0.073	.	.	0.035	0.391
ml_eco	-0.014	0.280	-0.061	1.386	0.046	1.372	0.115	1.849	0.006	0.249
ml_bus	0.117	1.000	-0.050	0.311	0.002	0.017	.	.	0.068	0.965
ml_eng	-0.002	0.021	0.072	1.218	-0.134	1.501	0.035	0.186	0.007	0.191
ml_fin	0.144	1.637	0.119	1.980	-0.073	1.442	0.108	0.794	0.059	1.534
bl_eco	0.057	0.587	-0.030	0.302	-0.143	1.490	-0.029	0.139	0.012	0.231
bl_bus	.	.	0.382	3.861	0.344	3.284
bl_eng	-0.019	0.190	0.100	1.044	-0.038	0.247	.	.	0.012	0.224
bl_fin	0.027	0.100	0.048	0.237
wrkex	0.003	0.928	-0.002	0.691	-0.001	0.290	0.002	0.291	0.001	0.491
d_exp	0.093	0.498	-0.014	0.188	-0.019	0.281	-0.055	0.401	0.001	0.013
cvp	0.002	0.053	0.066	1.931	-0.028	0.970	-0.010	0.168	0.007	0.340
oper	0.020	0.557	0.079	2.764	0.001	0.019	-0.040	0.724	0.027	1.651
marid	0.065	1.551	0.036	1.015	-0.010	0.458	-0.001	0.029	0.024	1.421
d2_US	0.005	0.183	.	.	-0.001	0.034
d2_CAN	0.006	0.112	.	.	0.022	0.373	.	.	0.008	0.246
d2_GBR	-0.041	0.673	.	.	0.149	2.751	.	.	0.041	1.256
d2_AUS	0.024	0.406	.	.	-0.017	0.214	.	.	0.015	0.365
d2_IND	.	.	-0.018	0.630	.	.	-0.028	0.565	-0.015	0.583
d1_PAK
d1_FIL	.	.	-0.028	0.360	.	.	-0.096	0.959	-0.007	0.103
p_harv	-0.131	0.512	0.028	0.243	0.009	0.102	.	.	-0.003	0.036
p_mit	.	.	0.015	0.091	0.131	1.199	.	.	0.084	0.730
p_chic	0.099	0.537	-0.065	0.874	-0.046	0.438	0.277	1.630	0.010	0.155
p_stan	0.102	0.556	-0.148	1.290	0.047	0.533	.	.	-0.011	0.148
p_prin	0.004	0.020	0.102	0.884	0.026	0.257
p_lse	0.241	1.361	-0.082	0.478	1.533	8.880	.	.	-0.362	3.698
p_oxfd	.	.	-0.108	0.860	0.120	0.962	.	.	-0.040	0.408
p_cmbg	0.140	0.807	-0.215	2.012	-0.082	0.910
_cons	1.202	2.624	1.700	5.125	1.154	3.735	1.727	3.094	1.243	6.031
Num Obs	326		257		230		99		912	
Adj R-sq	0.106		0.295		0.562		0.201		0.219	

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